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Chapter 1
Introduction
Globalisation, which often is associated with the deepening of international trade relationships,
in fact is a phenomenon with multiple facets, comprising both the international integration of
goods and factor markets. Thereby the latter kind of market integration in its traditional sense
either takes the form of cross-country capital flows or international labour migration. Within
the last decades these traditional arbitrage mechanisms where complemented by a third, new
paradigm, to which Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008, 2012) refer as “trade in task” or
“offshoring”. Unlike international labour migration, which is associated with workers moving
from low- to high-wage countries, offshoring refers to the shifting of jobs from high- to low-wage
locations. Thereby, as Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008, p. 1987) put it: “The difference
between falling costs of offshoring and falling costs of immigration is that the former create rents
for domestic firms – which ultimately accrue to domestic factors in the general equilibrium –
whereas the latter create rents for the immigrants.”
Both phenomena, the offshoring of production steps as well as the international migration
of labour, and in particular the migration of high skilled workers, became more important in
absolute and relative terms during the last decades. Thereby proxies for international offshoring
activities can be drawn from different sources. The most often used approach follows Feenstra
and Hanson (1999) and proxies offshoring through some measure of imported intermediates.
Following this strategy, a comparable “index of outsourcing abroad”, developed in OECD (2007),
reveals increasing levels of offshoring in many OECD countries between 1995 and 2000. Using
1
more recent data from the World Input Output Database (WIOD) Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez
(2013) come to a similar conclusion for the period from 1995 to 2009: Although most countries
are self-sufficient in terms of intermediate inputs, “supply-chain trade” in general expands and
moreover shifts towards Asia and in particular China.
For the first time Ozden, Parsons, Schiff, and Walmsley (2011) provide a complete picture
of bilateral global migration for the second half of the 20th century between 1960 and 2000.
The data implies that the global migrant stock increased from 92 million in 1960 to 165 million
in 2000. Similarly, Hanson (2010) reports that the share of individuals residing outside their
country of birth increased from 2.2% of the world population in 1980 to 3.0% in 2005. The
quantitative largest part of global migration thereby occurs between developing countries, which
account for half of all international migration in 2000, while the fastest growing component of
global migration is migration from developing to developed countries. While bilateral migration
flows, disaggregated by educational attainment, are only available for a subset of country pairs
(cf. Docquier, Özden, Parson, and Artuc, 2012), there is substantial evidence that the migration
of high-skilled workers became relatively more important during the same time span. With
respect to the relative importance of high-skilled migration, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) report
a world-wide average emigration rate of skilled workers for the year 2000 of 5.4 %, more than
three times larger than the average emigration rate of all workers and almost six times larger
than the emigration rate of low-skilled workers. Lowell (2007) reports a net increase of two
million tertiary-educated adults who migrated between developed countries for the time span
from 1975 to 2005 which is equivalent to an increase of 40%. With respect to the two-way
nature of high-skilled migration, Figure 3.8 in OECD (2008a) shows that the largest destination
countries for high-skilled migration, the U.S. and Canada, have substantial emigration of high-
skilled individuals as well. Even more remarkably, for the United Kingdom and Germany inward
and outward migration of high-skilled individuals are very similar.
In this thesis offshoring and international labour migration as the two dominant vehicles for
international labour market integration are explored as two separate phenomena. This strict
separation is not meant to imply that there are no interesting interactions arising from both
2
phenomena.1 It rather provides two separate frameworks to focus on the allocational conse-
quences of both phenomena in isolation, which allows for a clear-cut identification of the effects
that offshoring and high-skilled migration have on domestic welfare and inequality. Following
this logic, the thesis is structured in two parts (see Figure 1.1), with the first part being devoted
to the analysis of offshoring and the second part addressing questions related to the migra-
tion of high-skilled individuals. Both parts of the thesis comprise two content-based chapters,
Chapter 2:
The offshoring literature so far
Part I:
Offshoring
Chapter 3:
Offshoring with
heterogeneous
firms
Chapter 4:
Offshoring and
individual skill
upgrading
Part II:
High-skilled migration
Chapter 5:
Two-way
migration
between similar
countries
Chapter 6:
The political
economy of
high-skilled
migration
Figure 1.1: Overview
each addressing a specific question relating either to offshoring or high-skilled migration. The
first part of the thesis in addition includes a introductory chapter providing a detailed analysis
1Indeed Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2013) recently showed that when offshore workers are specialised in the
performance of tasks with an intermediate degree of complexity, which are located between the low-complexity
tasks performed by immigrants and the high-complexity tasks performed by natives, immigrants are closer sub-
stitutes for offshore workers than for natives. Offshore workers may then act as a buffer between immigrants
and natives absorbing potentially negative employment effects resulting from falling migration cost and increased
immigration.
3
of offshoring within the well-known Heckscher-Ohlin framework based on the work of Kohler
(2004b) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), as well as a short review over the theoretical
offshoring literature. The necessity for such a review arises, since unlike the literature on inter-
national labour migration, the much younger offshoring literature lacks a systematic literature
survey, which – to the best of my knowledge – except for Feenstra’s 2008 Ohlin lecture (cf. Feen-
stra, 2010) so far does not exist.2 Sticking to this logic, in the following the research questions
raised in each of the four content-based chapters are introduced and discussed together with the
central results from the respective chapter.
Chapter 3 – Offshoring with heterogeneous firms:
Motivated by the empirical findings that only the subset of the most productive firms engage
in offshoring (cf. Moser, Urban, and Weder di Mauro, 2009; Paul and Yasar, 2009; Monarch,
Park, and Sivadasan, 2013), Chapter 3 develops a simple two-country model of offshoring with
monopolistic competition between heterogeneous firms at the (intermediate) goods market and
occupational choice between entrepreneurship or employment as production worker at the labour
market. Unlike in neoclassical trade models with atomistic firms (cf. Kohler, 2004a,b; Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Rodriguez-Clare, 2010), in this framework it is possible to differenti-
ate between the effects of offshoring at the micro-level within single firms and at the macro-level
within the aggregate economy. In making this distinction, the chapter’s focus is on the endoge-
nously derived extensive margin of offshoring between multinational and purely domestic firms.
It is shown that the allocation of employment shares across these two types of firms crucially
shapes the outcomes of the domestic economy in terms of welfare and inequality. Thereby it
turns out that the effects of offshoring at the macro-level often point in exactly the opposite di-
rection of what one would expect if guided by firm-level effects. Instrumental for this divergence
2For the literature on international labour migration several separate surveys exist. For general reviews of the
migration literature the interested reader is referred to Borjas (1999) and Hanson (2009). The brain drain/gain
literature is surveyed in more detail by Hanson (2010) and Docquier and Rapoport (2012). Detailed reviews on
temporary and return migration are provided by Dustmann and Glitz (2011) and Dustmann (2001), respectively.
Finally, Felbermayr, Grossmann, and Kohler (2012) provide a detailed survey on the links between international
migration, international trade, and cross-country capital flows.
4
of micro- and macro-level results is the reallocation of workers between different firms and oc-
cupations. To give an example: Imagine a situation, where high-productivity firms reduce their
domestic employment in favour of additional offshore employment abroad. At the micro-level
domestic workers are displaced from their jobs, which – ceteris paribus – is bad for those workers
that are directly affected (cf. Crinò, 2010; Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips, 2013).
But what are the implications for the aggregate economy? If the market for production labour is
characterised by firm-level rent-sharing, with wages above the market-clearing level and aggre-
gate unemployment, it is possible that the displacement of domestic workers through offshoring
gives rise to an increase in economy-wide employment. How can this be the case? Offshoring
firms are highly productive and pay high wages. If these high-wage jobs are offshored, and hence
lost for the domestic economy, employment in the imperfectly competitive labour market for
production workers becomes – ceteris paribus – less attractive relative to employment in alterna-
tive (competitive) labour markets without the risk of unemployment. To restore the indifference
for (risk neutral) workers employed in different sectors of the economy, unemployment in the
production sector has to decline, which then explains why the displacement of workers at the
micro-level can brighten up the economy-wide employment prospects at the macro-level.
Apart from this illustrative example three general results are derived. If the firm-level
employment effect in newly offshoring firms is unambiguously negative, offshoring reallocates
domestic labour into less productive uses. Domestic jobs in highly productive firms vanish, and
workers losing their jobs either choose to start their own firm (despite being of comparatively
low productivity), they work for a domestic firm, or they find work in the service sector. This
unfavourable effect on the resource allocation in the domestic economy constitutes a fundamental
difference between offshoring and international goods trade, where standard models (cf. Melitz,
2003) unambiguously reallocate labour towards more productive firms; and the resulting increase
in average industry productivity has been one of the important novel insights from this strand
of literature (cf. Melitz and Trefler, 2012).
Despite the fact that source-country employment of newly offshoring firms may fall, their
overall employment, revenues, and profits increase. It is shown that as a result decreasing
offshoring costs increase the inequality of entrepreneurial incomes in a non-monotonic way:
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Newly offshoring firms are at the top (bottom) of the profit distribution when the share of
offshoring firms is low (high), and hence lower offshoring costs lead to more (less) inequality in
entrepreneurial incomes. Moreover, inter-group inequality between entrepreneurs and workers
is monotonically increasing in the share of offshoring firms. Both types of inequality are higher
in any offshoring equilibrium than in autarky, and hence offshoring generates a superstar effect
favouring the incomes of the best entrepreneurs, as found by Gabaix and Landier (2008).
In an extended framework with a more sophisticated model of the labour market, which
allows to address the widespread concern that offshoring may have a negative effect on ag-
gregate employment in the source country (cf. Geishecker, Riedl, and Frijters, 2012), there is
rent-sharing at the firm level, leading to wage differentiation among production workers and
to involuntary unemployment. The model variant with firm-level rent sharing and therefore
firm-specific wage rates gives even more relevance to the domestic reallocation of workers who
lost their job through offshoring. In line with empirical evidence for the US (cf. Crinò, 2010;
Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips, 2013), offshoring at early stages shifts employment
from good manufacturing jobs (characterised by high wage premia, (cf. Krueger and Summers,
1988)) to bad (i.e. low paid) jobs. At the macro-level this generates new results regarding the
effect of offshoring on aggregate unemployment, and on inequality within the group of produc-
tion workers. In particular, it is shown that both the effect of offshoring on unemployment and
the effect on intragroup inequality among production workers are non-monotonic in the share
of offshoring firms, with unemployment and inequality being lower than in autarky when only
few firms offshore, while the reverse is true when a large share of them does so. Given that
production workers are identical ex ante, the model thus offers an explanation for the large vari-
ation in wage effects that offshoring has on workers within the same skill group (cf. Hummels,
Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang, 2013).
Chapter 4 – Offshoring and individual skill upgrading:
Shifting the focus from firms to workers, Chapter 4 allows individuals to react upon an
offshoring shock through an adjustment of their skill acquisition strategies, which links offshoring
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to increased individual skill upgrading. To structure this idea, a small-open-economy model of
offshoring in the spirit of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) is set up. The model features
two offshorable sets of tasks, which differ in their skill requirements. Unlike in standard trade
models, where endowments are fixed, workers may react to a given offshoring shock by selecting
into costly on-the-job training, thereby gaining abilities that are needed to perform skill-intensive
high-wage tasks. Since the productivity effect of offshoring in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) proportionally scales up wages for both task sets, the gap between these wages increases
as well, rendering on-the-job training more attractive for untrained workers, who select into skill
upgrading as long as the (offshoring induced) gap in wages exceeds the associated cost of skill
upgrading.
The model’s predictions are then tested using data from the German manufacturing, whereby
it turns out that increased offshoring indeed has a positive and significant impact on the indi-
vidual on-the-job training propensity of workers employed in German manufacturing between
2004 and 2006. This link holds for a number of specifications and is robust to the inclusion
of various controls at the individual, firm, and industry level. After taking account of, among
other things, technological change, business cycle effects, and firm-size differences, a one stan-
dard deviation higher offshoring growth at the industry level over the period 2004 to 2006 is
related to an increase in the propensity to observe individual on-the-job training by between 3
to 7 percentage points.
Chapter 5 – Two-way migration between similar countries:
Motivated by the empirical regularity that many country pairs feature surprisingly balanced
bilateral stocks of inward- and outward-migrants, Chapter 5 develops a simple framework for
the analysis of permanent and temporary migration of high-skilled workers between similar
countries. As a key feature of this modelling environment country asymmetries – underlying
traditional theories of temporary and permanent migration – are absent. In the absence of such
natural migration incentives high-skilled workers make use of costly two-way migration between
identical countries as a signalling device (cf. Spence, 1973) to reveal their otherwise unobservable
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skills to potential (foreign) employers. The described migration mechanism thereby not only
captures the balance of permanent bilateral migration stocks, but also explains the balance of
temporary bilateral migration stocks in a dynamic (two-period) setting.
In traditional asymmetric-country frameworks welfare gains for temporary and/or perma-
nent migrants follow as a consequence of workers’ arbitrage between internationally unintegrated
labour markets. Between symmetric countries such welfare effects should not arise, and indeed
the derived welfare effects model contradict conventional wisdom in so far as all workers (in-
cluding the migrants) tend to be worse off in an laissez-faire equilibrium with temporary and/or
permanent migration than in an equilibrium without migration. Instrumental for the associated
aggregate welfare loss is a negative migration externality, which leads to excessive temporary
and/or permanent emigration in the presence of wasteful migration costs. As a consequence,
aggregate production gains, which result from the more efficient matching of natives and mi-
grants at the firm level, are eaten up by the costs of living abroad. Of course this does not
mean that all migration, temporary or permanent, is socially harmful and, hence, must be re-
stricted. Employing an omniscient, global social planner, it can be shown that, if the costs of
living abroad are not too high, the socially optimal equilibrium may feature temporary and/or
permanent migration, both – of course – at a smaller scale than in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Thereby the social planner solution in a static model can be introduced by an appropriately
chosen emigration tax, while the implementation in an dynamic two-period setting requires a
carefully chosen combination of emigration tax and return subsidy.
Chapter 6 – The political economy of high-skilled migration when inequality
matters:
As the final part of my thesis Chapter 6 is devoted to the political economy of high-skilled
migration and extends the work of Bougheas and Nelson (2012) towards an environment, in
which workers display an aversion against (disadvantageous) inequality, as proposed by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). A democratic referendum with respect to the host country’s (high-skilled)
immigration policy will, hence, not only depend on whether the median voter benefits from
8
immigration through a higher absolute (real) income, but also on the change of median voter’
rank (i.e. its relative position) in the host country’s (real) income distribution. Thereby, the
median voter in the host country’s labour-intensive sector – as in Bougheas and Nelson (2012) –
benefits from the indirect terms of trade effect induced by skilled immigration, which at a global
scale shifts resources into the host country’s more efficient skill-intensive industry. To absorb
the resulting expansion in the global production of the skill-intensive good the (relative) world
market price of the skill-intensive good has to decline, and this is what leaves the median voter,
who is employed in the host country’s labour-intensive sector, better off, both in absolute and
in relative terms. Apart from this indirect terms of trade effect skilled immigration has another
more direct effect on individuals, who display an aversion against (disadvantageous) inequality,
as it changes the composition of the host country’s (real) income distribution. Since skilled
workers from the source country immigrate into the top-ranks of the host country’s income
distribution, the median voter compares to a group of workers, whose skills and, hence, incomes
are upward biased relative to a situation without migration. The increase in disutility from
(disadvantageous) inequality aversion associated with this direct composition effect then – of
course – must be set against the individual welfare gains from the indirect terms of trade effect
and it is a priori not clear, which of both effects dominates. However, following Bougheas and
Nelson (2012) in assuming a uniform distribution of workers skills, it can be shown, that the
composition effect is always dominated by the terms of trade effect such that the median voter
prefers an equilibrium with high-skilled migration over an equilibrium without migration, even
if preferences are specified to reflect an aversion against (disadvantageous) inequality.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 serves as an introduction into
the theoretical offshoring literature and as a point of departure for the following chapters. As
outlined in Figure 1.1 what follows are the four content-based chapters discussed above, which
are finally summarised in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
The offshoring literature so far
Over the last decades the relocation of production steps towards low-wage locations abroad,
commonly referred to as “offshoring”, increasingly gained in importance. The academic literature
on offshoring, although constantly expanding, is a rather young one – in absolute terms, with
early contributions dating back to the beginnings of the nineties, and even more so in relative
terms, when seen as an offspring of the much older literature on international trade in final
products. As an inevitable consequence of the evolutionary process, that lead to the creation
of what nowadays is regarded as a more or less unified theoretical framework for the analysis
of offshoring, several terminologies along with different modelling approaches were introduced.
Given that – to the best of my knowledge – so far no systematic review of the theoretical
offshoring literature exists, this chapter provides an first overview over the topic and serves as
starting point for the later analysis, to which the interested reader may resort whenever some of
the upcoming result require a classification within the context of the recent offshoring literature.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 defines the term “offshoring” and distiguishs
the relocation of production steps towards low-wage locations abroad from related phenomena
such as “outsourcing”. In Section 2.2 a simple neoclassical model of offshoring based on Kohler
(2004b) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) is developed. Within this framework the basic
effects of offshoring on the allocation of factors as well as on the factor prices in the economy
are analysed in a graphical way. Thereby the purpose of this section is twofold: On the one
hand, the derived results serve as a reference point for the more general review of the offshoring
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literature in Section 2.3. On the other hand, shortcomings within the established neoclassical
framework can be identified and, hence, provide a natural starting point for a more detailed
view on specific aspects of offshoring in the subsequent Chapters 3 and 4.
2.1 The terminology of offshoring vs. outsourcing
A firm’s (global) production structure can be classified along two dimensions, differentiating be-
tween the organization and the location of a single production process (cf. Antràs and Helpman,
2004; OECD, 2007; Feenstra, 2010). According to this classification, there exists a organizational
choice to either perform all production steps within the boundary of the firm (integration) or
to rely on external suppliers for the production of intermediate inputs (outsourcing). At the
same time, there also is a location decision with the choice between production at the firm’s
headquarter location (domestic production) and production abroad (offshoring). The resulting
four sub-cases from the interaction of both, the organizational and the locational dimension,
are summarized in Table 2.1. Although used interchangeably in the earlier literature, the terms
Organization of production:
Internal production External production
(Integration) (Outsourcing)
Location:
Home Domestic Domestic
(Domestic) in-house production outsourcing
Abroad Foreign Foreign
(Offshoring) in-house production outsourcing
Table 2.1: Offshoring vs. outsourcing
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outsourcing and offshoring in the above classification have distinct meanings. While outsourcing
(dark gray shaded fields in Table 2.1) refers to the reliance on (domestic or foreign) external
suppliers, offshoring (light gray shaded fields in Table 2.1) describes the geographical reloca-
tion of production steps across country boarders, which can be done either in terms of in-house
production or by means of (foreign) outsourcing. Before this classification became necessary,
due to a shift in research focus towards the organization of international production processes
(see e.g. Antràs and Helpman, 2004)1, the earlier offshoring literature referred to the relocation
of production steps across country borders interchangeably as (international) “outsourcing” (cf.
Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a,b, 1999; Katz and Autor, 1999), (international) “fragmentation” (cf.
Jones, 2000; Kohler, 2003, 2004a,b; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2008) or “vertical specialization”
(cf. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001).2 Following the more recent literature (cf. Antràs, Garicano,
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Keuschnigg and Ribi, 2009;
Feenstra, 2010; Rodriguez-Clare, 2010; Mitra and Ranjan, 2010), the term offshoring from now
on is used to describe a situation, in which firms relocate parts of their production abroad
irrespective of the organizational structure of the underlying production process.
2.2 A simple framework for the analysis of offshoring
This section introduces offshoring into a standard neoclassical 2×2 production model, abstract-
ing for the moment from the by now common continuum-of-production-stages (cf. Kohler,
2004b), or alternatively continuum-of-tasks (cf. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008, 2012),
assumption. Instead it is assumed that there are just two task sets, labelled by H˜ (H,H∗) and
L˜ (L,L∗), respectively, which require as sole inputs high- or low-skilled labour. Both task sets
are decomposable into a non-offshorable tasks, H or L, and an offshorable task, H∗ or L∗, and
enter into the production of good i = 1, 2 according to Yi = Fi(H˜, L˜). To simplify the analysis,
1For a review of this literature refer to section 3 in Helpman (2006) as well as to Antràs and Helpman (2008).
2Alternative, but less common labels for the same or at least very similar phenomena are “slicing up the value
chain” (cf. Krugman, 1995), “trade in tasks” put forth by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008, 2012), and finally
“global supply chains”, recently introduced by Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012, 2013) to highlight the sequential
production structure of their offshoring model.
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a small-open-economy framework is chosen, which allows to blank out potential feedback effects
that offshoring may have on the world market prices for goods and factors.3 Denoting foreign
wages by w∗H and w
∗
L, respectively, the offshorable tasks are performed abroad if the cost of doing
so are sufficiently low, i.e. if wH ≥ τHw∗H and wL ≥ τLw∗L, where τH , τL ≥ 1 denote the usual
iceberg-type offshoring cost. The unit-costs for the task sets, H˜ and L˜, are hence equivalent
to ωH (wH , τHw∗H) ≡ ΩHwH and ωL (wL, τLw∗L) ≡ ΩLwL, in which ΩH ≡ ωH (·) /wH ≤ 1 and
ΩL ≡ ωL (·) /wL ≤ 1 denote the cost saving factors from offshoring tasks S∗ and L∗. Analo-
gously, the unit-cost for the final product, Yi, may be written as ci (ΩHwH ,ΩLwL) ≡ γjci (wH , wL)
with γi ≡ ci (ΩHwH ,ΩLwL) /ci (wH , wL) ≤ 1 denoting the total cost saving factor from (partly)
offshoring the inputs to the production of Yi.
Within this deliberately simple offshoring model several scenarios can be explored, whereas
offshoring is seen either as a sector-specific phenomenon (cf. Kohler, 2004b) or as a task-specific
phenomenon (cf. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). Thereby the sector-specific view on
offshoring implies that the relocation of production steps is possible in some but not in all
sectors of the economy, while the task-specific perspective generally emphasises differences in
offshorability between single tasks, which not necessarily depend on the sector, in which these
production steps are performed. Both concepts of offshoring are analysed within the above 2×2
production model, taking into account the usual distinction between a small open economy that
is either completely or incompletely specialised.
Beginning with an incompletely specialised small open economy, that produces both goods
i = 1, 2 at given world market prices p1 and p2, offshoring is assumed to be sector-specific, and
– without loss of generality – only possible in the labour-intensive sector two. Given the recur-
sive structure of our simple 2×2 production model, wages in the free trade equilibrium without
offshoring are solely pinned down by the zero-profit conditions pi = ci(wH , wL) as illustrated
in Figure 2.1. The introduction of offshoring into the above model impacts factor prices in the
3Ignoring these feedback effects may seem a bit awkward, given that wages in China and India – two of the
world’s major offshoring destinations – soared by 10 to 20 percent a year for the last decade according to The
Economist (2013). To capture this offshoring driven convergence in relative wages, domestic and the foreign factor
prices are endogeneised later on in Chapter 3. Thitherto, the simplifying assumption of constant and sufficiently
low foreign wage rates applies.
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Figure 2.1: Sector-specific offshoring in an equilibrium with incomplete specialisation
following way: Firms in the economy’s labour-intensive second sector benefit from offshoring
through a reduction in their production cost by factor γ2 < 1, which becomes possible through
the access to comparably cheap foreign labour. Hence, offshoring firms appear to be more pro-
ductive, and this is what Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) call the “productivity effect” of
offshoring. In Figure 2.1 the productivity effect of offshoring is then reflected by an outward
shift of the corresponding zero-profit condition by factor 1/γ2 > 1. This shift triggers a famil-
iar Stolper-Samuelson mechanism (cf. Stolper and Samuelson, 1941), which causes wage gains
(losses) for the factor that is more (less) intensively employed in the offshoring sector. In the
chosen example (again cf. Figure 2.1) offshoring thus benefits low-skilled workers at the expense
of high-skilled workers, which experience a decline in their (real) wages relative to a situation
without offshoring. The fact that offshoring impacts factor prices only through the productivity
effect is an immediate consequence of the so-called “factor price insensitivity” (cf. Leamer, 1995)
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in an imperfectly specialised small open economy. Workers that are displaced from their jobs in
the domestic economy through offshoring thereby are absorbed by the labour market through
a Rybczynski-type reallocation effect (cf. Rybczynski, 1955). To understand this reallocation
effect, note, that offshoring firms necessarily set free domestic workers, which previously were
employed in the now offshored tasks. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) call this the “labour
supply effect” of offshoring, since offshoring, by freeing up domestic workers, shows close re-
semblance to an exogenous increase in the domestic country’s labour supply. The absorption
of displaced workers by the domestic economy’s labour market follows the Rybczynski-theorem
and takes place without an adjustment in factor prices. Thereby, those workers, who dispropor-
tionately were displaced from their jobs through offshoring, are absorbed through an expansion
of the sector, which disproportionately relies on this type of workers as an input into production,
which renders an adjustment in (relative) factor prices superfluous.
To sum up, offshoring, when possible in only one of the economy’s two sectors, benefits
(hurts) the factor that is (not) intensively used in the offshoring sector through a familiar
Stolper-Samuelson mechanism, while in the background displaced workers are reallocated across
sectors in line with the well known Rybczynski-theorem. Thus, offshoring although beneficial
for the overall economy as such, creates winners and losers along similar lines as international
trade or sector-biased technological change would do. Outcomes thereby crucially depend on
whether offshoring takes place in the labour- or the skill-intensive sector.
Given these insight, how does offshoring affect domestic factor prices in a scenario, in which
the relocation of tasks abroad is generally possible at the same technology across both sectors?
When offshoring not only happens in both sectors but is also possible at exactly the same
technology, a surprisingly simple answer to this question exists. The impact of offshoring on
unit costs of low- or high-skilled labour in such a case is the same in both sectors such that unit
costs can be expressed as ΩLwL and ΩHwH , respectively, with ΩL,ΩH ≤ 1 denoting the cost-
savings factor from offshoring, which is common across both sectors. In an offshoring equilibrium,
the zero-profit conditions pi = ci (ΩHwoH ,ΩLw
o
L), as before, uniquely determine the equilibrium
unit-labour cost, and from the comparison with the respective conditions pi = ci (wnH , w
n
L) in the
non-offshoring equilibrium, it becomes clear that all workers irrespective of their type benefit
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from offshoring as woL = w
n
L/ΩL and w
o
H = w
n
H/ΩH . Figure 2.2 illustrates this result, whereas the
productivity effect of offshoring – now present in both sectors – causes an upward shift in both
zero-profit conditions, which in an offshoring equilibrium support wages woL > w
n
L and w
o
H > w
n
H
in excess of what firms would pay in an equilibrium without offshoring. Thereby, displaced
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Figure 2.2: Task-specific offshoring in an equilibrium with incomplete specialization
workers, as it was the case before, are absorbed through a Rybczynski-type reallocation of the
abundant labour towards the sector, which disproportionately relies on the respective type of
workers in the production process.
Taking stock, unlike before, offshoring works to the benefit of all workers. This finding not
only contrasts with the results from the previous scenario but also comes as a surprise, given
that offshoring repeatedly has been associated with falling wages and increasing job loss fears
Geishecker, Riedl, and Frijters (2012). To reconcile the different results from the previous two
scenarios, it is helpful to reflect on the underlying assumptions in both cases. In the first scenario,
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offshoring makes firms in the offshoring sector more productive. As in the case of sector-biased
technological change, the benefiting sector expands, thereby disproportionally attracting those
workers that are intensively used in the sectoral production process through relatively higher
wages. In the second scenario, offshoring equally lowers the cost – or, equivalently, raises the
productivity – for all workers of a given type across both sectors, and hence resembles factor-
biased technological change, which immediately translates into higher rewards for the benefiting
factor.4
In both of the above scenarios, offshoring affects factor prices only through the productivity
effect, while the labour supply effect throughout is absorbed by an inter-sectoral reallocation of
workers. To rule out this smooth reallocation, let us consider now a completely specialised small,
open economy, as depicted in Figure 2.3. Without the possibility of inter-sectoral reallocation
of labour, (relative) factor prices respond to changes in a country’s labour supply. Hence, wages
under autarky depend on the domestic country’s relative supply of high- to low-skilled labour
hn ≡ H¯/L¯, which in equilibrium must equal the relative labour demand (i.e. the slope 1/h of the
unit-cost function) at wages wnL and w
n
H , respectively. The productivity effect of offshoring, as it
was the case before, causes an upward shift in actives sector’s zero-profit condition by factor 1/γ.
For a notionally unchanged factor intensity hn this would imply a proportional wage increase
for both low- and high-skilled workers at factors 1/ΩL and 1/ΩH , respectively. However, in the
absence of Rybczynski-type reallocation effects the labour supply effect of offshoring, impacts on
the economy’s (aggregate) skill intensity h, which makes an adjustment in (relative) factor prices
unavoidable. Depending on which factor is offshored relatively more intensively, the economy’s
skill intensity becomes biased, which in the end benefits the factor that is offhored relatively less
intensively. Whether the economy then ends up in a situation, in which all workers are better
off, or in a scenario, which features winners and losers, then crucially depends on the relative
size of the productivity vs. the labour supply effect of offshoring. Figure 2.3 identifies a range
of h ∈ [homin, homin], within which the economy’s skill intensity supports an offshoring equilibrium
that renders all workers better off compared to the autarky scenario. Thereby small deviations
4For a discussion of sector- vs. factor-biased technological change in neoclassical trade models see, among
others, Krugman (2000) and Xu (2001).
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Figure 2.3: Offshoring in an equilibrium with complete specialization
for economy’s skill intensity under autarky hn (within the grey-shaded cone) ensure that the
productivity effect of offshoring is dominant. Intuitively, this is the case when labour supply
effect is relatively small or, equivalently, rather balanced across both types of factors. If instead
the labour supply effect is relatively strong and/or heavily biased towards one type of factor,
it becomes more likely that for a given productivity effect the economy’s skill intensity under
offshoring ho deviates substantially from its respective autarky value hn, such that the net effect
of offshoring benefits (hurts) those workers that are offshored less (more) intensively.
To sum up, offshoring has two immediate effects on the domestic economy: Firms get more
productive and share these gains with their employees, which in this way benefit from the pro-
ductivity effect of offshoring. As the same time, workers previously employed in now offshored
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tasks are displaced from their jobs, which is tantamount to an increase in the domestic country’s
labour supply and hence summarised under the term labour supply effect. The simple model
above, although highly stylised, combines both effects and offers a simple framework to anal-
yse how offshoring impacts workers of different skills. Thereby the outcomes for the domestic
economy – both in absolute and in relative terms – depend on two central questions: Can tasks
performed by a specific factor be offshored only in a given sector or in the whole economy? And,
can displaced workers be absorbed through inter-sectoral reallocation of employment shares be-
tween multiple sectors of the economy? Notwithstanding, these are not the only questions the
above model may raise. Given its usefulness in illustrating the partial and aggregate effects of
offshoring the highly stylised model, at the same time, features various, severe limitations in
replicating the complex multidimensionality of the underlying real-world phenomenon. While
some of these limitations (e.g. the heterogeneity of tasks) are addressed within the established
offshoring literature (see Section 2.3), others (e.g. the heterogeneity of firms) remain (largely)
unexplored and hence constitute a formidable challenge for the upcoming analysis in the sections
3 and 4.
2.3 A short review of the theoretical offshoring literature
In the theoretical literature several offshoring motives have been explored. As in the previous
section offshoring often follows from a cost saving motive and exploits cross-country wage differ-
ences, which are either exogenously given (cf. Kohler, 2004a,b; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg,
2008) or endogenised through a backward technology in the host country of offshoring (cf.
Rodriguez-Clare, 2010). Alternatively, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) motivate two-way
trade in tasks between similar countries by endogenously arising wage differences, which result
from the clustering of heterogeneous tasks produced under external scale economies at the na-
tional level. A similar pattern also arises in the literature on vertical specialisation (cf. Hummels,
Ishii, and Yi, 2001; Yi, 2003), where trade in intermediates usually is motivated by increasing
external returns to scale in the assembly of intermediate inputs (cf. Ethier, 1982). In Eckel and
Egger (2009), offshoring between identical countries results as firms strategically make use of
offshoring in order to undermine the bargaining position of domestic trade unions (cf. Skaksen,
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2004). Finally, Grossman and Helpman (2008) explore in a model with fair wage preferences how
offshoring alters the workers’ fairness considerations and analyse to what extent this provides
so far unexplored incentives for firms to shift production abroad.
Irrespective of the underlying offshoring motive, the effects on the offshoring firm usually
are the same. As described in the previous section firms can lower their production cost by
accessing cheap labour from abroad. Offshoring thus has a straightforward job relocation effect,
replacing domestic through foreign employment at the firm level. The benefits from the shift
of production activity to a low-cost location are ultimately reflected in a higher productivity of
multinational firms. Acknowledging these firm-level effects, the theoretical offshoring literature
focuses on the implications for the aggregate economy. As described in detail in the previous
section a central question thereby refers to the distributional consequences that offshoring has
for different kinds of workers in the domestic economy (see also Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,
1999) and Feenstra (2010) for review of this literature). Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2012)
and Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) pose a related question at a even more aggregated level
and analyse how offshoring affects the global income distribution between different countries.
While in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) the production of a continuum of heterogeneous
tasks can be split across two locations between which wage differentials arise as the consequence
of tasks clustering in the presence of external scale economies at the national level, Costinot,
Vogel, and Wang (2012) analyse multi-country supply chains, in which a country’s position in the
world income distribution depends on its position in the global supply chain.5 Another concern
with regard to offshoring in the open economy refers to the welfare effects of offshoring, when
countries are also integrated through trade in final products. As shown by Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008) and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), an expansion of domestic production capacity
through the offshoring of parts from a low-wage location deteriorates the sending country’s
terms of trade and thus erodes the gains from trade in final goods. Finally, there also exist
theoretical papers, which explore the impact of offshoring on domestic labour markets. One
5The structuring of offshoring processes as either “spiders”, whereas all (potentially offshorable) tasks are
assembled simultaneously (cf. Kohler, 2004a; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008, 2012), versus “snakes”, which
require the sequential performance of production steps (cf. Costinot, Vogel, and Wang, 2012, 2013), is discussed
in Harms, Lorz, and Urban (2012) and Baldwin and Venables (2013).
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of them is Egger and Kreickemeier (2008), who introduce a fair-wage effort mechanism into
a multi-sector traditional trade model with high-skilled and low-skilled workers to investigate
the consequences of offshoring on relative wages and unemployment. Keuschnigg and Ribi
(2009) study the labour market implications of offshoring in a setting with search frictions and
investigate the scope of government to make offshoring Pareto improving by introducing suitable
instruments of redistribution. Mitra and Ranjan (2010) consider a two-sector traditional trade
model with labour market imperfection due to search frictions, and shed light on how the degree
of inter-sectoral labour mobility influences the consequences of offshoring for employment and
wages.
The short survey above only gives a tentative and incomplete overview, sketching out the
most important cornerstones of the theoretical offshoring literature. A more detailed discussion
of the literature with regard to the questions posed in the Chapters 3 and 4 is therefore given
at the beginning of the respective chapters.
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Chapter 3
Offshoring with heterogeneous firms
Fragmentation of production processes across country borders, leading to the offshoring of tasks
that used to be performed domestically, is widely seen as a new paradigm in international trade.
Public opinion in high-income countries has been very critical of this phenomenon, and much
more so than of traditional forms of international trade, since it seems obvious that offshoring
to low-wage countries destroys domestic jobs.1 Academic research has drawn a picture of the
effects of offshoring that invites a more nuanced view of the phenomenon than the one held by
the general public. The academic literature points out that the effect of offshoring on workers
in the source country is ambiguous ex ante: On the one hand, offshoring has indeed the obvious
international relocation effect emphasised in the public discussion, as tasks that were previously
performed domestically are now performed offshore, thereby harming domestic workers. On the
other hand, however, there is a productivity effect, as the ability to source tasks from a low-wage
location abroad lowers firms’ marginal cost, thereby increasing overall domestic income, which
benefits domestic workers, ceteris paribus.
We show in this chapter that important additional insights into the effects of offshoring
can be gained by adding firm differences to the picture, thereby acknowledging the empirical
1As pointed out by The Economist (2009), “Americans became almost hysterical” about the job destruction
due to offshoring, when Forrester Research predicted a decade ago that 3.3 million American jobs will be offshored
until 2015. Using survey data from Germany, Geishecker, Riedl, and Frijters (2012) find that offshoring to low-
wage countries explains about 28% of the increase in subjective job loss fears over the period from 1995 to 2007.
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regularity that offshoring is highly concentrated among large firms, with many smaller firms
doing no offshoring at all.2 Both the international relocation effect and the productivity effect
turn out to have new implications in the presence of firm heterogeneity, thereby jointly shaping
welfare and inequality in the source country of offshoring.
To conduct our analysis, we set up a general equilibrium model that features monopolistic
competition between heterogeneous firms. In many aspects, the model resembles Lucas (1978):
each firm needs to be run by an entrepreneur and agents are identical in their productivity
as production workers, but they differ in their entrepreneurial abilities. These abilities are in-
strumental for firm productivity and thus for the profit income the entrepreneur earns when
becoming owner-manager of a firm. Agents are free to choose between occupations, and individ-
ual ability determines who becomes entrepreneur or production worker.3 We extend the Lucas
(1978) model to a two-country setting, and in order to introduce a stark asymmetry between
the countries we assume that entrepreneurs exist in only one of them. This country ends up as
the source country of offshoring, while the other country is the host country of offshoring.4
2Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007, 2012) show for the US that only a relatively small fraction of
firms imports and that these firms systematically differ from their non-importing competitors: they are bigger,
more productive, and pay higher wages. Similar evidence can be found for other countries (Wagner, 2012). This
evidence is well in line with observations from a literature that looks more specifically on offshoring patterns. For
instance, based on information of the IAB Establishment Panel from the Institute for Employment Research in
Nuremberg, Moser, Urban, and Weder di Mauro (2009) report that only 14.9 percent of the 8, 466 plants in this
data-set undertake some offshoring and that, on average, offshoring firms are larger, use better technology, and
pay higher wages than their non-offshoring competitors. Monarch, Park, and Sivadasan (2013) as well as Paul
and Yasar (2009) report similar results for firms in the US and Turkey, respectively.
3Support for the occupational choice mechanism between entrepreneurship and employment as formalised in
Lucas (1978) comes from matched worker-firm-owner data, which show that individuals who are unemployed (cf.
Berglann, Moen, Røed, and Skogstrøm, 2011) or displaced from their job (cf. von Greiff, 2009) are more likely
to select into entrepreneurship. More indirect evidence on this mechanism comes from Germany, where active
labour market policies (ALMP) subsidising start-ups for unemployed (unlike other ALMP) turned out to be quite
successful (cf. Caliendo and Künn, 2011).
4The assumption of a complete absence of entrepreneurs in the second country is not crucial for our results.
Rather, it is a particularly convenient way of ensuring that the second country in the absence of offshoring would
have the lower wage rate for production workers, thereby making it attractive as the destination country of
offshoring. This outcome could be achieved by a less extreme assumption (e.g. by assuming that the host country
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Similar to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) we model
output of a firm as a composite of different tasks, and furthermore assume that only part of
the tasks performed by a firm are offshorable. According to the taxonomy in Becker, Ekholm,
and Muendler (2013), these are tasks that are routine (cf. Levy and Murnane, 2004) and do
not require face-to-face contact (cf. Blinder, 2006). Offshoring allows to hire foreign workers
for performing routine tasks at a lower wage, and this provides an incentive for firms based in
the source country to shift production of these tasks abroad. This incentive is not unmitigated,
since firms relocating their routine tasks abroad need to buy offshoring services, resulting in
a fixed offshoring cost, and in addition shipping back to the source country the intermediate
inputs produced in the host country is subject to iceberg trade costs.
As we model the production process in a similar way to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008),
our model shares important features of their work. In particular, offshoring in our model and in
theirs features both the international relocation effect (which Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg call
“labour supply effect”) and the productivity effect.5 Since the goods market in the framework
of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) is perfectly competitive and firms are atomistic, both
effects are identified in their model only in terms of their aggregate implications – the first one
harming domestic workers by reducing their wage, the second one benefiting them by increasing
their wage. In contrast, our framework with monopolistic competition features firms of well-
defined size, and we can therefore identify the international relocation effect and the productivity
effect at the firm level (with the first one leading to a reduction in domestic employment of an
offshoring firm, and the second one leading to an increase), thereby allowing a direct mapping to
the empirical literature using firm level data (Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang, 2013).
With firm heterogeneity, the firm-level effects themselves as well as their implication for the
economy-wide labour allocation depend on the composition of offshoring and purely domestic
firms (which itself is endogenous). If variable offshoring costs are high, only the high-productivity
has entrepreneurs, but they are less productive than in the source country), but this would add nothing interesting
to our analysis, while making it considerably more complicated.
5Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) identify a third effect of offshoring, which materializes if the relative
prices of export and import goods change in the process of offshoring. In our model with a single final good and
production of this good in just one country, this terms-of-trade effect is absent.
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firms benefit from shifting production of their routine tasks abroad. In this case, the firm-level
productivity effect is negligible (since marginal cost savings are small due to high obstacles to
international production shifting), while the international relocation effect is sizable (since all
offshoring firms relocate a discrete fraction of their tasks), and therefore the firm-level employ-
ment effect in newly offshoring firms is unambiguously negative. As a consequence, offshoring
unambiguously reallocates domestic labour into less productive uses. Domestic jobs in highly
productive firms disappear, and workers losing their jobs in these firms either choose to start
their own firm despite being of comparatively low productivity, they work for a (new or old)
purely domestic firm, or they find work in the offshoring service sector. When variable offshoring
costs are low, the effects are reversed: the firm-level employment effect in newly offshoring firms
turns positive, and offshoring reallocates labour towards more productive firms. The potentially
unfavourable effect on the resource allocation in the source country constitutes a fundamental
difference between offshoring and international goods trade, where standard models with firm
heterogeneity (cf. Melitz, 2003) feature an unambiguous reallocation of labour towards more
productive firms; and the resulting increase in average industry productivity has been one of
the important novel insights from this strand of literature (cf. Melitz and Trefler, 2012).
Despite the fact that source-country employment of newly offshoring firms may fall, their
overall employment, revenues, and profits increase. We show that as a result the effect of de-
creasing offshoring costs on the inequality of entrepreneurial incomes is non-monotonic. The
reasoning is straightforward: Newly offshoring firms are at the top of the productivity distribu-
tion when the share of offshoring firms is low, and hence lower offshoring costs in this case lead
to more inequality in entrepreneurial incomes. By contrast, newly offshoring firms are at the
bottom of the productivity distribution when the share of offshoring firms is high, and hence
lower offshoring costs in this case lead to less inequality in entrepreneurial incomes. We also
show that the effect of offshoring on inter-group inequality between entrepreneurs and workers
is monotonically increasing in the share of offshoring firms. Both types of inequality are higher
in any offshoring equilibrium than in autarky, and hence offshoring generates a superstar effect
favouring the incomes of the best entrepreneurs, similar to Gersbach and Schmutzler (2007).
Empirical support for this kind of superstar effect comes from Gabaix and Landier (2008), who
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show that small differences in managerial skills are sufficient to explain vast differences in the
remuneration of US top managers, once the differences in the size of managed firms are taken
into account.6
In the main part of this chapter, we assume that the market for production labour is perfectly
competitive. While this version of our model serves the purpose well to isolate the role of
firm heterogeneity in the offshoring process, we show that it is straightforward to extend the
framework by using a more sophisticated model of the labour market, which allows us to address
the widespread concern that offshoring may have a negative effect on aggregate employment in
a country that shifts production of routine tasks to a low-wage location (cf. Geishecker, Riedl,
and Frijters, 2012). In this extended version of the model, there is rent-sharing at the firm level,
leading to wage differentiation among production workers and to involuntary unemployment.
Interestingly, all our results from the full-employment version of the model remain qualitatively
unchanged. In addition, the model variant with firm-level rent sharing and therefore firm-specific
wage rates gives even more relevance to the domestic reallocation process for workers who lost
their job through offshoring. In line with recent empirical evidence for the US (cf. Crinò, 2010;
Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips, 2013), we find that offshoring at early stages shifts
employment from good manufacturing jobs (characterised by high wage premia, cf. Krueger and
Summers, 1988) to bad (i.e. low paid) jobs, that for example emerge in the service sector. At
the macro-level this reallocation process generates new results regarding the effect of offshoring
on aggregate unemployment, and on inequality within the group of production workers. In
particular, we show that both the effect of offshoring on unemployment and the effect on intra-
group inequality among production workers are non-monotonic in the share of offshoring firms,
with unemployment and inequality being lower than in autarky when only few firms offshore,
while the reverse is true when a large share of them does so. Since all production workers are
identical ex ante, our extended model offers an explanation for the large variation in wage effects
6In particular, Gabaix and Landier (2008) show that the sixfold increase in the remuneration of the top 500
CEOs in the US from 1980 to 2003 is well explained by the simultaneous increase in the size of firms managed by
these CEOs. Although the ultimate cause for the increase in firm size is not subject of their analysis, the authors
point to “greater ease of communication” (cf. Gabaix and Landier, 2008, p. 93), facilitating the global expansion
of US top firms, as one possible explanation.
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that offshoring has on workers within the same skill group (cf. Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch,
and Xiang, 2013).
This chapter is related to the large literature that studies offshoring to low-wage countries,
including the key contributions by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990), Feenstra and Hanson (1996a),
Kohler (2004b), Rodriguez-Clare (2010), and, as earlier discussed in detail, Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008).7 Only few papers in the literature on offshoring consider firm heterogeneity.
Antràs and Helpman (2004) were the first to analyse a firm’s sourcing decision in the presence
of firm heterogeneity. In their model, which features incomplete contracts, they explain the
coexistence of up to four different sourcing modes (outsourcing vs. in-house production in the
domestic or foreign economy, respectively) as well as the prevalence of certain sourcing patterns,
when firms with different productivities self-select into these modes. Importantly, Antràs and
Helpman (2004) address neither the welfare nor the distributional effects of offshoring, which are
the focus of our analysis. Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) develop a model with
team production, in which offshoring is synonymous to the formation of international teams.
Individuals are heterogeneous in their skill level, and the highest-skilled individuals self-select
into becoming team managers. Since individuals with higher skills are more productive in the
role of a production worker as well as in the role of a manager, offshoring – by providing
access to a large, relatively low-skilled foreign labour force – not only increases the incentives
of workers to become managers in the source country, but also reduces the average skill level of
the domestic workforce. Due to positive assortative matching between managers and workers,
the top managers therefore end up being matched with workers of a lower skill level in the open
economy, and hence they lose relative to less able managers. This is a key difference to the
superstar effect present in our model. Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008) consider high-
7In very recent work, Acemoglu, Gancia, and Zilibotti (2012) consider a Ricardian model in which offshoring
induces directed technical change. With technical change favoring high-skilled workers at low levels of offshoring,
this model provides a rationale for the empirical observation of rising skill premia in developed as well as developing
countries. Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2013) use a Ricardian framework with many goods and countries to
study vertical specialisation of countries along the global supply chain. In Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) this
framework is extended to study how a country’s position in the global supply chain affects the income distribution
within the respective country.
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skilled offshoring in a model with search frictions, in which firms can choose whether to produce
with an advanced technology or a traditional technology, and workers are either high-skilled
or low-skilled. Their framework is very different from ours, in that all firms hire only a single
worker, and in an offshoring equilibrium they have to decide whether to do so domestically or
abroad, ruling out incremental adjustments in firm level employment.8
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.1 we set up the model and
derive some preliminary results regarding the decision of firms to offshore and its implications
for firm-level profits. We also characterise the factor allocation in the open economy equilibrium
and show how the share of offshoring firms is linked to the variable cost of offshoring. In Section
3.2 we analyse how changes in the offshoring costs affect factor allocation, income distribution,
and welfare in our model. In Section 3.3 we present the extended version of our model that
features firm-level rent sharing and involuntary unemployment. In Section 3.4 we analyse the
effect of offshoring on economy-wide inequality. In Section 3.5 we use parameter estimates from
existing empirical research to quantify the implications of offshoring on welfare, unemployment,
and income inequality in a model-consistent way. Section 3.6 concludes our analysis with a
summary of the most important results.
3.1 A model of offshoring and firm heterogeneity
We consider an economy with two sectors: A final goods industry that uses differentiated in-
termediates as the only inputs, and an intermediate goods industry that employs labour for
performing two tasks, which differ in their offshorability. One task is non-routine and requires
face-to-face communication, and it must therefore be produced at the firm’s headquarters loca-
8There is a complementary literature that looks at offshoring between similar countries in the presence of firm
heterogeneity. Amiti and Davis (2012) and Kasahara and Lapham (2013) extend Melitz (2003) and develop a
model in which firms may import foreign intermediates which are then combined with domestic labour to produce
the final output good. Unlike in our model, firms’ sourcing decisions are driven by external increasing returns
to scale in the assembly of intermediate goods (cf. Ethier, 1982) and do not follow from a cost-savings motive.
In fact, the variable unit cost for imported intermediates (including variable trade cost) in these models usually
exceeds the variable unit cost of domestically produced intermediates.
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tion. The other task is routine and can be either produced at home or abroad. Each firm in the
intermediates goods industry is run by an entrepreneur, who decides on hiring workers for both
tasks. We embed the economy just described into a two-county world, where the second country
differs from the first in only one respect: The second country does not have any entrepreneurs.
Given our production technology, the country without entrepreneurs cannot headquarter any
firms, and therefore ends up being the host country of offshoring. The other country is the source
country of offshoring. Trade is balanced in equilibrium, with the source country exporting the
final good in exchange for the tasks offshored to the host country. In the remainder of this
section, we discuss in detail the main building blocks of our model and derive some preliminary
results.
3.1.1 The final goods industry
Final output is assumed to be a CES-aggregate of differentiated intermediate goods q(v):
Y =
[
M (1−ε)(ρ−1)
∫
v∈V
q(v)ρdv
]1/ρ
, (3.1)
where V is the set of available intermediate goods with Lebesgue measure M , and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a
preference parameter that is directly linked to the elasticity of substitution between the different
varieties in the production of Y : σ ≡ (1− ρ)−1 > 1. Parameter ε ∈ [0, 1] determines the extent
to which the production process is subject to external increasing returns to scale, analogous to
Ethier (1982). As limiting cases we obtain for ε = 0 the production technology without external
increasing economies of scale, as in Egger and Kreickemeier (2012), and for ε = 1 the textbook
CES production function with external increasing returns to scale, as in Matusz (1996). We
choose Y as the numéraire and set its price equal to one. Profit maximisation in the final goods
industry determines demand for each variety v of the intermediate good:
q(v) =
Y
M1−ε
p(v)−σ. (3.2)
As will become clear in the following, the size of ε, and hence the extent of external increasing
returns to scale, does not affect our results apart from those on welfare.
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3.1.2 The intermediate goods industry
In the intermediate goods sector, there is a massM of firms that sell differentiated products q(v)
under monopolistic competition. Each firm is run by a single entrepreneur who acts as owner-
manager and combines a non-routine task, which must be performed at the firm’s headquarters
location in the source country, and a routine task, which can either be produced at home or
abroad. We denote the non-routine task by superscript n and the routine task by superscript
r. In analogy to Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we assume
that the two tasks are inputs in a Cobb-Douglas production function for intermediate goods.
Assuming that one unit of labour is needed for one unit of each task, the production function
for intermediates can be written as
q(v) = ϕ(v)
[
ln(v)
η
]η [ lr(v)
1− η
]1−η
, (3.3)
where ϕ(v) denotes firm-specific productivity, ln(v) and lr(v) are the labour inputs in firm v for
the production of the respective tasks, and η ∈ (0, 1) measures the relative weight (cost share)
of the non-routine task in the production of the intermediate good.9 Firms select into one of two
categories: either they become a purely domestic firm, denoted by superscript d, or they become
an offshoring firm, denoted by superscript o. The two types of firms differ with respect to the
unit production cost for the routine task: For a purely domestic firm, performing the routine
task onshore, this cost is simply equal to the domestic wage rate w. For an offshoring firm,
hiring labour for this task in the host country, the cost is equal to the effective host country
9Our production function can easily be extended to account for a continuum of tasks that differ in their
offshorability as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Firms would then not only choose their offshoring
status, but also decide on the range of tasks they relocate abroad. In Appendix A.1 we show that all offshoring
firms would choose to offshore the same range of tasks, irrespective of their own productivity ϕ(v). As the
only additional effect in this more sophisticated model variant, a change in the cost of offshoring would not
only be associated with a change in the share of firms entering offshoring, but also with a change in the range
of tasks offshored by infra-marginal firms. Since the general equilibrium implications of the latter effect are
well understood from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), we focus here on the extensive margin of offshoring
between rather than on the intensive margin within firms. For an extension of the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) framework to a production technology that allows for arbitrary degrees of substitution in the assembly of
tasks, see Groizard, Ranjan, and Rodriguez-Lopez (2013).
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wage rate τw∗, where τ > 1 represents the iceberg transport costs an offshoring firm has to
incur when importing the output of the routine task from the offshore location.10 The constant
marginal costs of producing output q(v) for the two types of firms are therefore given by
cd(v) =
w
ϕ(v)
and co(v) =
w
ϕ(v)κ
, where κ ≡
(
w
τw∗
)1−η
(3.4)
measures the relative change in its marginal cost that a firm achieves by moving the routine
task abroad. Assuming that offshoring also entails a fixed cost resulting from the purchase
of offshoring services, it is only attractive for source country producers to move routine tasks
abroad if κ > 1, making κ the marginal cost savings factor that a firm can achieve by offshoring.
While κ is endogenous and yet to be determined, it is immediate that the equilibrium will feature
offshoring, provided that variable offshoring costs τ are finite: If no firm were to offshore, w∗
would fall to zero since the host country has no local entrepreneurs. Eq. (3.4) shows that in
this case co(v) would fall to zero, which implies that at least some firms would self-select into
offshoring.
Firms set prices as a constant markup 1/ρ over marginal cost, giving
pi(v) =
ci(v)
ρ
i ∈ {d, o}. (3.5)
Using Eqs. (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5), we can compute relative operating profits of two firms with
the same productivity, but differing offshoring status. We get:11
πo(ϕ)
πd(ϕ)
= κσ−1. (3.6)
With κ > 1, an offshoring firm makes higher operating profits than a purely domestic firm with
identical productivity. Analogously, the relative operating profits by two firms with the same
offshoring status but differing productivities ϕ1 and ϕ2 are given by
πi (ϕ1)
πi (ϕ2)
=
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)ξ
, i ∈ {d, o}, (3.7)
where ξ ≡ σ − 1. Therefore, given their offshoring status, more productive firms make higher
operating profits.
10We use an asterisk to denote variables pertaining to the host country of offshoring.
11We suppress firm index v from now on, because a firm’s performance is fully characterised by its position in
the productivity distribution and its offshoring status.
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3.1.3 Equilibrium factor allocation
We assume that the source and the host country of offshoring are populated by N and N∗ agents,
respectively. While the population in the host country has only access to a single activity, namely
the performance of routine tasks in the foreign affiliates of offshoring firms, agents in the source
country can choose from a set of three possible occupations: entrepreneurship, employment as a
production worker, and employment in the offshoring-service sector.12 Entrepreneurs are owner-
managers of firms, and their ability determines firm productivity. To keep things simple, we
assume that entrepreneurial ability maps one-to-one into firm productivity, and we can therefore
use a single variable, ϕ, to refer to ability as well as productivity. Being the residual claimant,
the entrepreneur receives firm profits as individual income. Agents differ in their entrepreneurial
abilities, and hence in the profits they can achieve when running a firm. Following standard
practice, we assume that abilities (and thus productivities) follow a Pareto distribution, for
which the lower bound is normalised to one: G(ϕ) = 1− ϕ−k, and where both k > 1 and k > ξ
are assumed in order to guarantee that the mean of firm-level productivities and the mean of
firm-level revenues, respectively, are positive and finite.
Entrepreneurial ability is irrelevant for the two alternative activities that can be performed
in the source country of offshoring, so that agents are symmetric in this respect. If an individual
works in the offshoring-service sector, she receives a fee s, which is determined in a perfectly
competitive market in general equilibrium. Finally, agents in the source country can also ap-
ply for a job as production worker and perform the routine or non-routine task, receiving the
endogenous wage rate w. As shown below, our equilibrium features self-selection of the most
productive firms into offshoring if the variable cost of offshoring is sufficiently high. In this case,
the lowest-productivity firm is purely domestic. Denoting this firm’s productivity by ϕd, we can
characterize the marginal entrepreneur by indifference condition
πd(ϕd) = w = s. (3.8)
12It is not essential for our analysis that source country labour is used for providing offshoring services. This
assumption mediates factor reallocations between entrepreneurship and employment as production workers –
which are essential for the main results in this chapter – and hence it helps us to secure against overemphasizing
the role of occupational changes in the source country of offshoring.
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We assume that offshoring requires the purchase of one unit of offshoring services and that the
labour input coefficient in the service sector is equal to one.13 The indifference condition for the
entrepreneur running the marginal offshoring firm with productivity ϕo is given by
πo(ϕo)− πd(ϕo) = s, (3.9)
i.e. for the indifferent entrepreneur the gain in operating profits achieved by offshoring equals
the fixed offshoring cost. All variables in Eqs. (3.8) and (3.9) are endogenous, and both indif-
ference conditions are linked via their dependence on s. To illustrate the nature of this link,
consider some change in the value of model parameters that leads to, say, an increase in w. As
a consequence, the fee s paid to individuals in the offshoring service sector has to increase by
the same amount in order to keep individuals indifferent between both occupations. A higher
offshoring service fee s drives up the fixed cost of offshoring, thereby in turn requiring a larger
offshoring-induced gain in operating profits in order to keep the marginal offshoring firm indif-
ferent between both modes of operation. We now proceed in two steps: in the remainder of this
section we solve for the domestic factor allocation as a function of model parameters and the
fraction of offshoring firms χ ≡ [1−G(ϕo)]/[1−G(ϕd)], while in Section 3.1.4 below we link χ
to the underlying model parameters, including the (variable) costs of offshoring τ .
The indifference condition in Eq. (3.8) postulates the equality between profits of the marginal
firm πd(ϕd) and the wage rate of production workers w. We now link these two variables to
economy-wide aggregates. For this purpose, it is useful to introduce three new operating profit
averages, namely average operating profits π¯, average operating profits for the counterfactual
situation in which all firms would choose domestic production π¯dom and the average operating
profit surplus due to the most productive firms actually choosing offshoring instead of domestic
production π¯off. There is a direct relation between the three averages which is given by π¯ =
π¯dom+χπ¯off. Due to Pareto distributed productivities, the two averages π¯dom and π¯off are linked
to operating profits of the marginal domestic firm πd(ϕd) and the gain in operating profits of the
marginal offshoring firm πoff(ϕo) ≡ πo(ϕo)−πd(ϕo), respectively, by the factor of proportionality
13Our analysis extends in a straightforward way to the more general case where firms require fo > 0 units of
offshoring services.
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ζ ≡ k/(k − ξ). This allows us to write
π¯ = ζ
[
πd(ϕd) + χπoff(ϕo)
]
= ζ(1 + χ)πd(ϕd),
where the second equality follows from the fact that due to indifference conditions (3.8) and
(3.9) both πd(ϕd) and πoff(ϕo) are equal to s. Using the relation σπ¯ = Y/M , we can express
profits of the marginal firm as a function of economy-wide variables:
πd(ϕd) =
1
ζ
Y
σM(1 + χ)
. (3.10)
Turning to the determination of w, we make use of the fact that due to constant markup
pricing the wage bill of each source country firm is a constant fraction ρ of the firm’s revenues.
Taking into account the fact that for offshoring firms only a fraction η of the wage bill is paid
to production workers in the source country, and denoting by π¯d and π¯o the average operating
profits of purely domestic and offshoring firms, respectively, we get
w = γρ
Y
L
, (3.11)
where
γ ≡ (1− χ)π¯
d + χηπ¯o
π¯
is the share of the overall wage bill paid in the source county, and L is the endogenous supply
of source country production workers.14 We show in Appendix A.2 that γ can be written as
γ(χ; η) =
1 + ηχ− (1− η)χ k−ξk
1 + χ
.
It is easily confirmed that γ(χ; η) decreases monotonically in χ, falling from the maximum value
of 1 at χ = 0 to the minimum value of η at χ = 1.
Having derived, in Eqs. (3.10) and (3.11), expressions for the wage rate of production workers
and the profit income of the marginal entrepreneur, respectively, we can rewrite indifference
condition (3.8) as:
L = γζ (1 + χ) (σ − 1)M. (3.12)
14To simplify notation, we suppress the arguments of functions when the dependence is clear from the context.
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A second condition linking L and M is established by the resource constraint
L = N − (1 + χ)M, (3.13)
which illustrates that individuals can work as either entrepreneurs (M), workers in the service
sector (χM), or production workers (L). Together, Eqs. (3.12) and (3.13) pin down the equilib-
rium mass of intermediate goods producers M and the equilibrium mass of production workers
L as functions of model parameters and a single endogenous variable, the share of exporting
firms χ:
M =
{
1
(1 + χ) [1 + γζ(σ − 1)]
}
N, (3.14)
L =
[
γζ(σ − 1)
1 + γζ(σ − 1)
]
N. (3.15)
The mass of firms is linked to the ability of the marginal entrepreneur by the condition M =
[1−G(ϕd)]N , and solving for ϕd gives
ϕd = {(1 + χ) [1 + γζ(σ − 1)]} 1k . (3.16)
In the next subsection we show how χ is determined as a function of the cost of offshoring τ .
3.1.4 Determining the share of offshoring firms
In this subsection, we derive the formal condition in terms of model parameters for an interior
offshoring equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which some but not all firms offshore, and we also show
how the share of offshoring firms χ varies with the cost of offshoring τ in an interior equilibrium.
Given our assumption of Pareto distributed productivities, the indifference condition of the
marginal offshoring firm (3.9) allows us to derive a link between χ and the marginal cost savings
factor κ. Substituting from Eqs. (3.6) to (3.8), we get the offshoring indifference condition (OC)
χ =
1−G (ϕo)
1−G(ϕd) =
(
κσ−1 − 1
) k
ξ . (3.17)
Intuitively, a larger marginal cost savings factor κmakes offshoring more attractive, and therefore
a larger share of firms chooses to move production of their routine tasks abroad. It is easily
checked in Eq. (3.17) that an interior equilibrium with χ ∈ (0, 1) requires 1 < κ < 21/(σ−1).
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A second link between χ and κ can be derived from the condition for labour market equi-
librium in both countries. Labour market equilibrium in the source country follows from Eqs.
(3.11) and (3.15) as
w = ρ
[
1 + γζ(σ − 1)
ζ(σ − 1)
](
Y
N
)
,
while labour market equilibrium in the host country is analogously given by
w∗ = (1− γ) ρ
(
Y
N∗
)
.
Using Eq. (3.4), we arrive at the labour market constraint (LC), which links labour market
equilibrium in both countries to the marginal cost savings factor κ:
κ =
[
1 + γζ(σ − 1)
τ (1− γ) ζ(σ − 1)
(
N∗
N
)]1−η
. (3.18)
Since γ decreases monotonically from 1 to η as χ increases from zero to one, we know that
the labour market constraint is monotonically decreasing in χ, starting from infinity. This is
intuitively plausible: At χ = 0, there is no production in the host country, and wage rates there
fall to zero, making the marginal cost savings factor κ infinitely large. Holding τ constant, as
more firms start to offshore production, effective wages in the host country are bid up, thereby
reducing κ.
Combining Eqs. (3.17) and (3.18) in Figure 3.1, we can conclude that an interior equilibrium
with χ < 1 is reached if the right-hand side of Eq. (3.18), evaluated at γ(1, η) = η, is smaller
than 21/(σ−1). This can obviously be achieved for sufficiently high values of τ , because a higher τ
lowers for any given χ the marginal cost-saving factor of offshoring determined by the right-hand
side of Eq. (3.18), while leaving the link between χ and κ established by the offshoring indifference
condition in Eq. (3.17) unaffected. A decline in the relative population size N∗/N has a similar
effect. The smaller the relative size of the host country population, the larger is, all other things
equal, the endogenous relative wage τw∗/w, and hence the smaller are the potential cost savings
from offshoring, according to Eq. (3.18). Therefore, focusing on an interior equilibrium with
χ ∈ (0, 1) is equivalent to focusing on sufficiently high levels of τ and/or sufficiently low levels
of N∗/N , and this is what we do in the subsequent analysis. Such an interior equilibrium is
illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Partitioning of firms by their offshoring status
To get insights on the link between offshoring cost τ and the share of offshoring firms χ, we
can combine Eqs. (3.17) and (3.18) to the implicit function
F (χ, τ) ≡
[
1 + γζ(σ − 1)
τ (1− γ) ζ(σ − 1)
(
N∗
N
)]1−η
−
(
1 + χ
ξ
k
) 1
σ−1
= 0.
Implicit differentiation yields dχ/dτ < 0 for any interior equilibrium with 0 < χ < 1. As noted
above, higher direct costs of shipping intermediate goods, i.e. a higher parameter τ , shifts the
LC locus downwards, but does not affect the OC locus in Figure 3.1. We therefore have the
intuitive result that a higher τ reduces the marginal cost savings factor κ, and thus reduces χ,
the equilibrium share of firms that shift production of their routine task abroad. Due to the
monotonic relationship between (endogenous) χ and (exogenous) τ we can equivalently derive
comparative static results below in terms of either variable.15
15One can see in Eq. (3.18) that the limiting case χ→ 0 is induced by τ →∞.
3.2 The effects of offshoring
The purpose of this section is to look at the effects of offshoring on key economic variables,
namely on the factor allocation between occupations and between firms, on income inequality
within the group of entrepreneurs as well as between entrepreneurs and production workers, and
on aggregate welfare. Throughout this section, we derive comparative static results in terms of
changes in χ. As shown above, this is equivalent to considering exogenous changes in offshoring
cost τ , noting that dχ/dτ < 0, and hence in the discussion of results we will sometimes refer to
changes in τ as well. Also, we focus our discussion on the source country, since the effects for
the host country are trivial due to our simplifying assumption that no firms are headquartered
there.
3.2.1 Factor allocation
Since our economy is populated by firms of well-defined size, we can distinguish between allo-
cation effects at the firm level and economy-wide allocation effects. Looking first at the firm
level, we ask the question what the offshoring decision does to employment of a firm in the
source country. Firm-level employment in the source country for an offshoring firm and for a
purely domestic firm, respectively, follows from applying Shephard’s Lemma to the firm-specific
variable unit cost functions in Eq. (3.4), and multiplying the resulting labour input coefficients
by firm-level output. This gives:
lo(ϕ) =
ηqo(ϕ)
ϕκ
and ld(ϕ) =
qd(ϕ)
ϕ
,
respectively. The source-country employment effect of offshoring at the firm level can now be
computed as the log difference ln lo(ϕ) − ln ld(ϕ), which is the difference in percent between
domestic employment of an offshoring firm and employment of a purely domestic firm with
the same productivity. The firm-level employment effect thus measured compares for each firm
the actual employment level with the employment in a counterfactual situation in which the
respective firm would be in the other category.
To get a better intuition, it is helpful to write the firm-level effect as the sum of two partial
effects, the effect of offshoring on employment per unit of output, and the effect of offshoring
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on firm-level output. We call the first effect the international relocation effect (IR), since it
measures the direct effect of relocating tasks abroad on firm-level employment in the source
country, without taking into account the induced reduction in marginal cost. The second effect
we call the firm-level productivity effect (FP), since it is a measure of the change in output –
and, hence, the change in employment – induced by the reduction in marginal cost.16 Using the
link between κ and χ given in offshoring indifference condition Eq. (3.17), we obtain
ln lo(ϕ)− ln ld(ϕ) = ln
[
η
(
1 + χ
ξ
k
) 1
1−σ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
IR
+ ln
[(
1 + χ
ξ
k
) σ
σ−1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
FP
. (3.19)
The international relocation effect is negative for any χ ≥ 0, since on the one hand the routine
task is now produced by foreign labour and on the other hand the input ratio changes in favour
of this – now relatively cheaper – task. The latter effect is stronger if the marginal cost savings
factor κ is higher, i.e. if χ is higher. In contrast to the international relocation effect, the firm-
level productivity effect is zero if evaluated at χ = 0 (since the marginal cost savings factor κ is
zero), and it increases monotonically with increasing κ, i.e. with increasing χ.
Two aspects of the partial firm-level employment effects identified above are noteworthy.
First, Eq. (3.19) shows that neither effect depends on firm productivity. Hence, for a given level
of offshoring costs, implying some value of χ, the percentage difference in firm-level domestic
employment relative to the respective counterfactual (offshoring for the purely domestic firms,
purely domestic production for the offshoring firms) is the same for all firms. Second, the
fact that only the international relocation effect is of first order at χ = 0, while both effects are
continuous in χ, means that the international relocation effect determines the overall effect at low
levels of offshoring. Inspection of Eq. (3.19) furthermore shows that the firm-level productivity
effect dominates at high levels of offshoring if and only if the cost share of non-routine tasks η is
greater than 0.5. This is the case we focus on in the following, which is in line with the findings
of Blinder (2009) and Blinder and Krueger (2013), who report for the US that 25 percent of
tasks can be classified as offshorable and thus could be moved abroad in principle. While this
16The effects are directly analogous to the labour supply effect and the productivity effect, respectively, derived
by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), but in contrast to the latter they are identified at the firm level rather
than just at the aggregate level.
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number is not a perfect match for our cost-share parameter η, the fact that the Blinder-Krueger
measure considers potential offshorability rather than actual offshoring renders our parameter
constraint of η > 0.5 a rather conservative assumption.17
The firm-level employment effects of the decentralised offshoring decisions have consequences
for the allocation of domestic workers across firms. Considering a decrease in marginal costs of
offshoring τ , Eq. (3.19) describes the effect on the employment in marginal (newly) offshoring
firms, which is negative at high levels of τ and positive if τ is low. To derive the effect on the
employment in infra-marginal firms (purely domestic firms and incumbent offshoring firms) we
use the result that due to constant-markup pricing relative employment across firms in the same
category is identical to relative operating profits, and therefore in analogy to Eq. (3.7) given by
li(ϕ1)/li(ϕ2) = (ϕ1/ϕ2)ξ. In addition, also as a consequence of constant-markup pricing, the
wage bill of the marginal firm is a multiple σ − 1 of its operating profits, and with w = πd(ϕd)
we find that employment of the marginal firm is given by ld(ϕd) = σ − 1.
Using these results, Figure 3.2 illustrates the effects of a decrease in τ on the allocation of
production labour, where the top panel shows the case of low χ (high τ), while the bottom panel
shows the case of high χ (low τ). If χ is low, a marginal reduction in τ increases employment
in all purely domestic firms (of which there are relatively many), including – as shown formally
below – some new entrants. It also increases employment in the incumbent offshoring firms (of
which there are relatively few). The newly offshoring firms – which are high-productivity firms
in this case – are therefore the only ones to shed production workers in the source country if τ
is reduced and the share of offshoring firms is low. If χ is high the picture is different: following
a decrease in τ employment in all offshoring firms, marginal and infra-marginal, increases, while
employment in purely domestic firms falls, and the least productive firms stop production and
exit. Hence, offshoring exerts a non-monotonic effect on the allocation of production workers
17Empirical evidence for the effect of offshoring on firm-level employment comes from Moser, Urban, and
Weder di Mauro (2009), Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2013) and Monarch, Park, and Sivadasan
(2013), who sort out the firm-level productivity effect and the international relocation effect using matched
employer-employee-data. While the former study finds that the firm-level productivity effect dominates for the
case of Germany, the opposite seems to occur in Denmark and the US as noted by Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch,
and Xiang (2013) and Monarch, Park, and Sivadasan (2013), respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Offshoring and the allocation of production workers
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across firms, reallocating them towards less productive firms if offshoring costs are high, and
towards more productive ones if offshoring costs are low.
The effect of offshoring on aggregate factor allocation in our model works via its effect on
occupational choice, considering that the labour indifference condition has to hold throughout.
Formally, the effects of offshoring on the mass of production workers and the mass of firms follow
directly from Eqs. (3.14) and (3.15):
dL
dχ
=
ζ(σ − 1)∂γ/∂χ
[1 + γζ(σ − 1)]2N,
dM
dχ
= −1 + ζ(σ − 1) [γ + (1 + χ)∂γ/∂χ]
(1 + χ)2[1 + γζ(σ − 1)]2 N.
Since ∂γ/∂χ is negative, it is immediate that dL/dχ < 0 holds for arbitrary levels of χ, and
hence in line with the empirical findings of Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2013)
offshoring unambiguously reduces the mass of production workers in our model, with the affected
individuals either moving to the offshoring service sector, or becoming managers of newly-opened
low-productivity firms.
The effect of offshoring on the mass of firms (or, equivalently, on the cutoff productivity
of the marginal firm) is non-monotonic, with dM/dχ > 0 for low levels of χ and dM/dχ < 0
when χ is high. If χ is close to zero and τ is reduced, the newly offshoring firms are the most
productive ones and these are the firms with the largest workforce in both tasks. Not all workers
losing their jobs in these firms can be absorbed by expansion of other already existing firms or
by expansion of the offshoring service sector, and hence new firms have to enter in order to
restore the labor market equilibrium. For low levels of χ, M therefore increases as τ decreases.
The effects are different for high levels of χ, because labour demand from offshoring firms (new
and old) increases as τ decreases, and the mass of firms has to fall in order to restore the labour
market equilibrium.18 The effects are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2.1 When χ is low, a reduction in marginal offshoring costs τ reallocates pro-
duction workers towards less productive firms, and new firms enter the market in the lower tail
of the productivity distribution. When χ is high, a reduction in τ reallocates production workers
towards more productive firms, and firms at the lower tail of the productivity distribution leave
18To see these effects formally, consider η > 0.5 and note that ∂γ/∂χ is equal to −∞ if evaluated at χ = 0 and
equal to (η − 1)/(2ζ) if evaluated at χ = 1.
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the market. The mass of production workers decreases monotonically with a decrease in τ .
Proof Analysis in the text.
The potentially unfavourable effect of offshoring on the resource allocation in the source country
constitutes a key difference to international trade in goods, which in a comparable setting always
reallocates labour from low- to high-productivity firms (cf. Egger and Kreickemeier, 2012), with
the latter effect of course well known from the canonical model by Melitz (2003). The finding that
offshoring in our setting has a non-monotonic effect on labour allocation is furthermore a direct
consequence of firm heterogeneity. To see this, consider the limiting case of k →∞, in which all
firms have the same productivity (equal to 1, the lower bound of the Pareto distribution). In
this model variant, both the international relocation effect and the firm-level productivity effect
are independent of the level of χ and, according to Eq. (3.19), they are given by ln[η21/(1−σ)] and
ln[2σ/(σ−1)], respectively. Consequently, the firm-level productivity effect of offshoring is of first
order already at χ = 0, whereas the adverse international relocation effect is mitigated, because
the newly offshoring firms have lower employment than in the model variant with heterogeneous
producers. A reduction in τ therefore reallocates production workers towards offshoring firms,
and some firms leave the market for any χ ∈ (0, 1).
3.2.2 Inequality among entrepreneurs and between groups
Intra-group inequality of entrepreneurial income is measured by the Gini coefficient for profit
income, which, as formally shown in Appendix A.3, is given by
AM (χ) =
ζ − 1
ζ + 1
[
1 +
χ (2− χ)
ζ + (ζ − 1)χ
]
. (3.20)
The relationship between Gini coefficient AM (χ) and the share of offshoring firms χ is non-
monotonic as offshoring always increases the profits of newly offshoring firms. If the share
of offshoring firms is small, an increase in χ implies that newly offshoring firms are run by
entrepreneurs with high ability, and these are firms that already ranked high in the profit
distribution prior to offshoring. Hence, an increase in χ raises the dispersion of profit income in
this case. Things are different at high levels of χ, because newly offshoring firms are now firms
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with a low rank in the distribution of profit income and an increase in χ therefore lowers the
dispersion of profit income. Furthermore, comparing AM (χ) for χ > 0 with AM (0), we find that
offshoring increases the dispersion of profit income relative to the benchmark without offshoring,
irrespective of the prevailing level of χ. This result is due to the fact that the common fixed cost
of offshoring disproportionately affects the profits of less productive firms, thereby contributing
to an increase in the dispersion of profit incomes.19
Inter-group inequality is measured by the ratio of average entrepreneurial income and average
labour income, where the latter is simply given by wage rate w. According to Eq. (3.10), average
entrepreneurial income, ψ¯, is equal to πd(ϕd)(1+χ)ζ−χs. Applying indifference condition (3.8),
the ratio of average entrepreneurial income and average income of production workers, ω¯ ≡ ψ¯/w,
is therefore given by
ω¯ = ζ + (ζ − 1)χ. (3.21)
It follows immediately from Eq. (3.21) that inter-group inequality rises monotonically in the
share of offshoring firms χ. The intuition is as follows: A higher value of χ indicates that the
marginal cost saving factor κ must be higher, which in turn implies that profits of all offshoring
firms increase, both in absolute terms and relative to the profits of the marginal firm in the
market. Since the marginal firm’s profits are equal to w, it is clear that inter-group inequality
has to go up in response to an increase in χ.
The following proposition summarises the results.
Proposition 3.2.2 The inequality of entrepreneurial income, measured by the Gini coefficient,
rises with the share of offshoring firms at low levels of χ, and decreases at high levels of χ, while
19Since the offshoring service sector is perfectly competitive, one can think of individuals working there as
one-person firms, and hence we can define the group of self-employed agents, which covers both entrepreneurs and
offshoring service providers. As we show in Appendix A.4, the Gini coefficient for this broadly defined income
group can be expressed as
AS(χ) =
ζ − 1
ζ + 1
[
1 +
2
ζ
χ
(1 + χ)2
]
,
with A′S(χ) > 0. Therefore, inequality in the group of all self-employed agents increases monotonically with χ.
The comparison of AM (χ) and AS(χ) furthermore shows that inequality within the group of all self-employed
agents is less pronounced than inequality within the subgroup of entrepreneurs.
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always staying higher than in the benchmark situation without offshoring. Increasing the share of
offshoring firms χ leads to a monotonic increase in inter-group inequality between entrepreneurs
and workers.
Proof Analysis in the text and formal discussion in Appendix A.3.
Together the two effects in Proposition 3.2.2 give birth to a class of entrepreneurial superstars
(cf. Gabaix and Landier, 2008), who benefit from the global expansion of their respective firms
by sourcing part of their production from low-cost locations abroad.
3.2.3 Welfare
With just a single global consumption good, welfare for the source country is simply given
by source country income per capita. Aggregate income in the source country is given by
I = (1−ρ+γρ)Y , where (1−ρ)Y is the sum of profit income and offshoring service income, and
γρY is domestic labour income. The determination of the welfare effects of offshoring is the only
place in our analysis where the extent of external increasing returns to scale, introduced earlier
in Eq. (3.1) via parameter ε ∈ [0, 1], matters for the results. Using Eq. (3.2) for the marginal
firm with productivity ϕd, as well as Eqs. (3.8) and (3.10), we get
I(χ) = (1− ρ+ γρ)A (1 + χ) σσ−1
(
Mϕd
)
M
ε
σ−1 , (3.22)
with A ≡ (σ−1)ζσ/(σ−1) collecting parameters, and a solution for I in terms of model parameters
and χ follows by substituting for M and ϕd from Eqs. (3.14) and (3.16), respectively. Income
in the source country is higher in an offshoring equilibrium than in autarky if for the specific
share χ of offshoring firms in this equilibrium we have Φ(χ) ≡ I(χ)/I(0) > 1, and lower than
in autarky if Φ(χ) < 1. It is easy to see that ε plays a crucial role for the welfare effect of
offshoring: the greater the external increasing returns to scale, the more beneficial is an increase
in the mass of produced varieties M for aggregate output, ceteris paribus, and therefore the less
harmful will be the resource allocation towards less productive firms that, as shown above, is
characteristic for offshoring at low levels of χ.
For the sake of transparency, we start with the discussion of the two polar cases ε = 0 and
ε = 1. If ε = 0, there are no external increasing returns to scale, and the mass of firms has no
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independent effect on aggregate output. As we show formally in Appendix A.5, source country
welfare in this case is lower than in autarky if the level of offshoring is low, and it is higher
than in autarky if the level of offshoring is high. The sign of the welfare effect is determined by
two partial effects: an expansion of economy-wide output, that can be achieved by using foreign
labour to perform routine tasks at lower cost, and an outflow of labour income because foreign
workers must be paid by offshoring firms. The relative strength of these two counteracting effects
depends on the relative strength of international relocation and firm-level productivity effect.
Therefore, the main forces determining the welfare implications of offshoring are the same as the
forces determining its implications for labour allocation. Offshoring reallocates labour towards
less productive uses if χ is low, and in this case source country welfare falls. By contrast,
offshoring reallocates labour towards more productive uses if χ is high, and in this case source
country welfare increases.
The reallocation effect is of course also welfare relevant if ε = 1, and viewed on its own it
leads to a welfare decrease at low levels of χ. But the increase in the mass of varieties now
affects welfare positively, and hence overall offshoring has an unambiguously positive effect on
welfare. Intuitively, this is so since with ε = 1 decentralized entry decisions establish allocational
efficiency, and hence the market outcome replicates the solution to the social planner’s problem
in the source country under autarky (see Appendix A.6). Offshoring provides access to (cheap)
foreign labour, and this expands domestic production possibilities with positive welfare implica-
tions for the source country, as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). We show in Appendix
A.5 that the welfare results for the two borderline cases carry over to intermediate cases of ε.
In particular, we derive a critical value ε¯ ≡ (σ − ξ)(σ − 1)/(σk) and show that offshoring is
detrimental for source-country welfare at low levels of χ if the external increasing returns to
scale are sufficiently weak (ε < ε¯), while offshoring is always beneficial for the source country if
the external increasing returns to scale are sufficiently strong (ε > ε¯).20
Taking stock, source country welfare in our model can only fall as a consequence of offshoring
if the factor allocation is not efficient under autarky, and hence ε < 1 is a necessary condition for
20In Appendix A.5, we also show that the external increasing returns to scale reported by Ardelean (2011) for
the US are sufficiently small to render the welfare losses of offshoring at low levels of χ empirically relevant.
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welfare losses. In this case, offshoring can lower source country welfare by reallocating workers
towards less productive uses. Domestic misallocation of resources as a potential source of losses
from offshoring in the case ε < 1 distinguishes our model from similar results in Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodriguez-Clare (2010), where source country welfare can fall due to
an offshoring-induced negative terms-of-trade effect. As outlined above, offshoring cannot have
such unfavourable allocation effects in our model if firms are identical, and hence welfare losses
from offshoring in our model are the result of a misallocation of resources in the presence of
heterogeneous firms. This relates our analysis to Dhingra and Morrow (2013) who construct a
model with monopolistic competition among heterogeneous firms in which endogenous markups
lead to a misallocation of resources that can be amplified by trade.
We summarise our insights regarding the welfare implications of offshoring in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.2.3 For strong external increasing returns to scale welfare in the source country
increases monotonically in the share of offshoring firms. For weak external increasing returns
to scale welfare in the source country decreases with the share of offshoring firms at low levels
of χ. The effect is reversed as more firms offshore, and welfare surpasses its autarky level if χ
is sufficiently large.
Proof Analysis in the text and formal discussion in Appendix A.5.
3.3 Offshoring in the presence of firm-level rent-sharing
In this section, we extend our framework by a more sophisticated labour market model, which
allows us to address the widespread concern that offshoring may have a negative effect on
aggregate employment in a country that shifts production of routine tasks to a low-wage location
(cf. Geishecker, Riedl, and Frijters, 2012). More specifically, we develop a model of firm-level
rent sharing that features involuntary unemployment of production workers and, at the same
time, captures the stylised fact that more profitable firms pay higher wages (cf. Blanchflower,
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Oswald, and Sanfey, 1996).21
The labour market model proposed in this section is a fair-wage-effort model which builds
upon the idea of gift exchange, and whose main assumptions are rooted in insights from psycho-
logical research (see Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). The model postulates a positive
link between a firm’s wage payment and a worker’s effort provision, and workers exert full effort,
normalised to equal one, if and only if they are paid at least the wage they consider fair.22 As
in Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) and Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier (2013) we assume that
the fair wage wˆ is a weighted average of firm-level operating profits π(ϕ) and the average wage
of production workers (1− U)w¯, where U is the unemployment rate of production workers and
w¯ is the average wage of those production workers who are employed:
wˆ(ϕ) = [π(ϕ)]θ[(1− U)w¯]1−θ, θ ∈ (0, 1). (3.23)
An analogous condition, with (1 − U∗)w¯∗ substituted for (1 − U)w¯, holds in the host country
of offshoring, which implies that multinationals share their rents with workers in the source
and host country of offshoring.23 Following Akerlof and Yellen (1990), we assume that effort
decreases proportionally with the wage if workers are paid less than wˆ, and hence firms have
no incentive to do so. At the same time, as we discuss below, our model features involuntary
unemployment in equilibrium, and therefore even low-productivity firms do not need to pay
more than wˆ to attract workers. Firms hence set w(ϕ) = wˆ(ϕ), and Eq. (3.23) describes the
distribution of wages across firms as a function of firm-level operating profits.24
21Offshoring in the presence of labour market imperfections is also discussed in other papers, including Egger
and Kreickemeier (2008), Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) and Mitra and Ranjan (2010). While all of these studies
highlight important channels through which offshoring can affect domestic employment, neither study sheds light
on the specific role of firm heterogeneity or the consequences of occupational choice.
22Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder (2009) survey the extensive experimental evidence for the fair-wage-effort hy-
pothesis. Cohn, Fehr, and Goette (2013) provide evidence supportive of the fair-wage-effort hypothesis in a field
study.
23Evidence supportive of international rent sharing within firms is provided by Budd, Konings, and Slaughter
(2005) and Martins and Yang (2013).
24Even though firms set wages unilaterally, their profit maximisation problem does not differ from the one in
Section 3.1.2. As pointed out by Amiti and Davis (2012), wages depend positively on profits due to fair-wage
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In contrast to the full employment version of our model the decision to become a production
worker in a labour market with firm-specific wages now carries an income risk.25 We make the
standard assumption that workers have to make their career choice before they know the outcome
of the job allocation process among applicants (cf. Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010).26 With risk
neutral individuals, the indifference condition for the marginal entrepreneur then becomes
πd(ϕd) = (1− U)w¯ = s. (3.8′)
Together, Eqs. (3.23) and (3.8′) imply that (only) the lowest-paid manufacturing workers, em-
ployed by the marginal firm with productivity ϕd, are paid the same wage as workers in the
service sector. Hence, all production workers employed by infra-marginal firms hold “good” jobs
in the sense that they get wages in excess of the wage rate in the service sector.
In comparison to the full employment version of our model, the relative operating profits of
more productive firms are lower with rent-sharing, since part of the advantage stemming from
higher productivity is compensated by having to pay a higher wage rate. Formally, the elasticity
of firm-level relative operating profits with respect to relative firm productivity (cf. Eq. (3.7)) is
no longer given by ξ ≡ σ − 1, but by ξ¯ ≡ (σ − 1)/[1 + θ(σ − 1)], which is smaller than ξ if θ is
strictly positive.27 It then follows from Eq. (3.23) that the elasticity of the firm-level wage with
respect to firm-level productivity is given by θξ¯, while the elasticity of firm-level employment
with respect to firm-level productivity is given by (1− θ)ξ¯.
constraint (3.23), and hence the firm has no incentive to manipulate the wage, but instead treats it parametrically
at the equilibrium level w(ϕ) = wˆ(ϕ).
25Guided by the findings of Katz and Summers (1989), we maintain the assumption that the wage in the
perfectly competitive service sector is fully flexible, and hence it is only the occupation as production worker
which carries an income risk in our model.
26Production workers would of course prefer to work for a firm that offers higher wages and, in the absence of
unemployment compensation, those who do not have a job would clearly benefit from working for any positive
wage rate. However, since due to contractual imperfections it is impossible to fix effort of workers ex ante, firms
are not willing to accept underbidding by outsiders: once employed, the new workers would adopt the reference
wage of insiders and thus reduce their effort when the wage paid by the firm falls short of the wage considered to
be fair (see Fehr and Falk, 1999).
27In the limiting case θ = 0, firm-level operating profits have zero weight in the determination of the fair wage,
Eq. (3.23) simplifies to wˆ = w, and the model collapses to the full employment version.
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All results derived in earlier parts of this chapter are robust with respect to our extension
featuring an imperfectly competitive labour market for production workers. In particular, the
two counteracting effects of offshoring on firm-level employment do not change qualitatively. Of
course, there are quantitative effects, which can be best understood by considering the following
mechanism that additionally arises due to firm-level rent sharing: For an offshoring firm, there
is a feedback effect on firm-level marginal costs in the source country, since higher operating
profits lead to higher firm-level wage rates via fair-wage constraint (3.23). This implies that the
input ratio changes more strongly in favour of the imported routine task. As a consequence, the
international relocation effect identified in Eq. (3.19) is now multiplied by the factor ξ/ξ¯ > 1,
and hence more strongly negative than in the full-employment model. In addition, the functional
relationships between χ and the two inequality measures in Section 3.2 on the one hand and
between χ and welfare on the other hand are still given by Eqs. (3.20) to (3.22), with the mere
difference that ξ¯ replaces ξ and ζ¯ ≡ k/(k − ξ¯) replaces ζ.28 Hence, the comparative static
effects of offshoring on aggregate welfare and on income inequality among entrepreneurs as well
as between entrepreneurs and workers change only quantitatively, but remain qualitatively the
same in the model extension considered here.
In the model variant with an imperfectly competitive labour market there are two further ag-
gregate variables that are worthwhile to look at: involuntary unemployment and wage inequality
among employed production workers. In the presence of firm-level rent sharing, L is the mass of
individuals looking for employment as production workers in the source country, while the mass
of (employed) production workers is now given by (1−U)L. Neither entrepreneurs nor workers
in the offshoring-service sector can be unemployed, and therefore the economy-wide unemploy-
ment rate in the source country is given by u ≡ UL/N . When looking at u/ua, it is helpful
to consider separately the effect of offshoring on the unemployment rate of production workers,
measured by U/Ua, and the effect on the supply of production labour due to adjustments in the
occupational choice, measured by L/La.29 As shown in Appendix A.8 , the unemployment rate
28A detailed discussion on how firm-level rent-sharing alters the equations in Section 3.1 is deferred to Appendix
A.7.
29The importance of occupational choice for understanding how a country’s labour market absorbs the conse-
quences of trade and offshoring has recently been pointed out by Liu and Trefler (2011) and Artuç and McLaren
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of production workers is given by
U =
θ(ζ¯ − 1) + 1−∆(χ; η)
θ(ζ¯ − 1) + 1 , (3.24)
where ∆(χ; η) ≡ β(χ; η)/α(χ; η) and
β(χ; η) ≡ 1 + χ k−(1−θ)ξ¯k
[
η
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)(1−θ)
− 1
]
, α(χ; η) ≡ 1 + χ k−ξ¯k
[
η
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)
− 1
]
. (3.25)
It is easily checked that ∆(0, η) = 1, and therefore U is lower in an equilibrium with offshoring
than in autarky if ∆(χ; η) > 1 and higher than in autarky if ∆(χ; η) < 1. The effect of
offshoring on L follows directly from Eq. (3.15), and as discussed in Subsection 3.2.1, the supply
of production labour is smaller in an offshoring equilibrium than in autarky. By reducing L,
this effect reduces aggregate unemployment u, ceteris paribus. Putting together these partial
effects leads to
u
ua
= Λ(χ; η), with Λ(χ; η) ≡ θ(ζ¯ − 1) + 1−∆(χ; η)
θ(ζ¯ − 1)
[1 + ζ¯(σ − 1)]γ
1 + ζ¯(σ − 1)γ , (3.26)
where ua can be computed from Eqs. (3.15) and (3.24). The first fraction of Λ(χ; η) is equal
to U/Ua and the second fraction is equal to L/La. Unemployment rate u is lower with χ > 0
than with χ = 0 if Λ(χ; η) < 1, while the opposite is true if Λ(χ; η) > 1. We show the following
result.
Proposition 3.3.1 Unemployment in the source country decreases with the share of offshoring
firms at low levels of χ. Under the sufficient condition
η > ηˆ ≡ 2
θθξ¯
2θθξ¯ + (2θ − 1)(kσ − ξ¯)
the effect is reversed as more firms offshore, and unemployment surpasses its autarky level if χ
is sufficiently large.
Proof See Appendix A.9, where it is also shown that ηˆ < 0.5 if k ≥ 2.30
(2012).
30Since empirical estimates for k are higher than two, it follows that, when focusing on the empirically relevant
parameter domain, η > 0.5 is sufficient for unemployment in the neighbourhood of χ = 1 being higher than under
autarky.
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The intuition for this result is straightforward. Since the labour supply effect works un-
ambiguously in favour of a reduction in overall unemployment, cf. Eq. (3.15), all potentially
harmful employment effects must work via an increase in the unemployment rate of production
workers U . This effect is understood most easily by noting that the fair-wage constraint implies
wd(ϕd) = πd(ϕd), which together with the indifference condition for the marginal entrepreneur
leads to
U = 1− w
d(ϕd)
w¯
in any equilibrium with χ < 1. Whenever the average wage of employed production workers is
higher than the wage paid by the marginal firm (which is the case whenever there is firm-level
rent sharing) this is accompanied in equilibrium by a strictly positive level of unemployment.
Moreover, we see that if w¯/wd(ϕd) changes, U has to change in the same direction, which has
the following implication: For an increase in χ, starting from zero the international relocation
effect in Eq. (3.19) dominates and offshoring displaces workers in high-productivity firms, which
– due to the rent-sharing mechanism – earn high wages, thereby reducing the average wage
relative to the wage paid by the marginal firm. This is only compatible with indifference between
occupations if unemployment of production workers decreases as well. The effect of a marginal
increase in offshoring on U is reversed at high levels of χ, since now the productivity effect
in Eq. (3.19) is dominant, such that both newly offshoring and infra-marginal offshoring firms
create additional high-wage jobs, pushing up the average wage relative to the wage paid by the
marginal firm, which is only compatible with indifference between occupations if unemployment
of production workers increases as well. Overall unemployment is then driven by two opposing
effects: the supply of production workers decreases, but a larger share of them is without a
job. If η is large, and hence the international relocation effect is small, the negative impact of
offshoring on U dominates the decline in L at high levels of χ.
The ratio w¯/wd(ϕd) provides one measure of income inequality among production work-
ers, but not a very informative one, since it ignores information on individual wage rates by
everybody but the workers in the marginal firm. Hence, in analogy to the measurement of
entrepreneurial income inequality we now look at the Gini coefficient as a more sophisticated
measure of wage dispersion. As formally shown in Appendix A.10, this Gini coefficient is given
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by
AL(χ) =
θ(ζ¯ − 1)
2 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
1 +
2
(
1− χ k−(1−θ)ξ¯k
)
[α(χ; η)− 1]
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)θ(ζ¯ − 1)
−
2
[
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
] (
1− χ k−ξ¯k
)
[β(χ; η)− 1]
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)θ(ζ¯ − 1)
 . (3.27)
Inequality of wage income is the same in the polar cases where either no firms or all firms
offshore: AL(0) = AL(1) = θ(ζ¯ − 1)/[2 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)].31 We can furthermore show that AL is lower
than the autarky level at low levels of offshoring, and higher than the autarky level at high
levels of offshoring. Figure 3.3 illustrates the resulting S-shape of the AL locus, alongside the
Gini-coefficient for entrepreneurial income AM that we computed in Section 3.2.2, with the only
modification that now ζ¯ replaces ζ.
The intuition is analogous to the one for the effect of offshoring on w¯/wd(ϕd). In a situation
where the offshoring strategy is only chosen by the most productive firms, the international
relocation effect shifts good (high-wage) jobs abroad, and displaced workers have to accept less
well paid jobs in- and outside the manufacturing sector. This effect is in accordance with results
from Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2013), who find for the US that workers who
have to switch occupations as they are displaced from the manufacturing sector suffer discrete
income losses of about 12 to 17 percent, and in our model it is responsible for the reduction
of wage inequality at low levels of χ. The influence of the relocation effect is reversed at high
levels of χ, since now the low-productivity firms shift low-wage jobs abroad, thereby contributing
to an increase in wage inequality in the source country. There is also a firm-level wage effect
due to the rent-sharing mechanism in our model: It increases wage dispersion at low levels of χ
(wage-boosting increase in profits by high-wage firms) and reduces wage dispersion at high levels
of χ (wage-boosting increase in profits by low-wage firms). The firm-level wage effect thereby
influences wage inequality in the opposite direction to the international relocation effect, and it
dominates the overall effect when many firms offshore.32
31An analogous result holds for the trade models of Egger and Kreickemeier (2009, 2012) and Helpman, Itskhoki,
and Redding (2010), where wage inequality is the same in the cases of autarky and exporting by all firms.
32As we show in Appendix A.12, the Gini coefficient for the income distribution within the broadly defined group
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Figure 3.3: Gini coefficients for entrepreneurial income and wage income
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The following proposition summarises the main insights regarding the distributional effects
of offshoring within the group of (employed) production workers.
Proposition 3.3.2 The impact of offshoring on the dispersion of wage income, measured by
the Gini coefficient, is non-monotonic. Wage income inequality falls relative to the benchmark
without offshoring if χ is small, while it rises relative to this benchmark if χ is sufficiently large.
Proof Analysis in the text and formal discussion in Appendix A.11.
of all production workers, including those who are unemployed, is given by AU (χ) = [1− U (χ)]AL (χ)+U (χ) ≥
AL (χ). Since U (χ) is smaller than U (0) at low levels of χ, while the reverse is true at high levels of χ, the
non-monotonic effect of χ on AL(χ) is reinforced. The only difference in the behaviour of both indices is that
AU (1) > AU (0) while AL (1) = AL (0), which results from the fact that U(1) > U(0).
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3.4 Economy-wide inequality
So far, our focus was on inequality within and between various subgroups of the population. We
now analyse the impact of offshoring on economy-wide inequality. For computing a comprehen-
sive measure of economy-wide income inequality, we have to solve the problem that distributions
of profit and labour income overlap if θ > 0. Due to this overlap, we cannot simply calculate
Gini coefficients for ranking the economy-wide income distributions with and without offshoring,
but instead look at the Theil index as an alternative measure of income inequality. In discrete
notation, the Theil index for the income distribution in a group of agents with population size
n can be computed according to
T =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi
y¯
ln
(
yi
y¯
)
, (3.28)
where yi is income of agent i, while y¯ is the average income. If income is equally distributed,
the Theil index has a value of zero. The index increases with inequality and reaches a maximum
value of lnn if all the income is fully concentrated on one person. This implies that the range
of the Theil index depends on population size. One of the main advantages of the Theil index
as compared to other measures of inequality is its decomposability. For instance, if there are m
subgroups of population, Theil index T can be decomposed according to
T =
m∑
j=1
nj y¯j
ny¯
Tj +
m∑
j=1
nj y¯j
ny¯
ln
(
y¯j
y¯
)
, (3.29)
where
∑m
j=1 nj = n and Tj refers to the Theil index of income group j, which can be computed
in analogy to Eq. (3.28). The Theil index can thus be written as a weighted average of inequality
within subgroups, plus inequality between these subgroups (cf. Shorrocks, 1980). This makes it
particularly useful for our purpose.
In our model, we can distinguish between self-employed agents (entrepreneurs plus offshoring-
service agents) and all production workers (employed and unemployed) as the two main income
groups. Denoting the Theil indices for these specific subgroups by TS and TU , respectively, the
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Theil index for the economy-wide income distribution can be written as33
T = aS
(
TS + ln ζ¯
)
+ aUTU + ln
(
aS
ζ¯
+ aU
)
, (3.30)
with
aS ≡ 1− ρ
ργ + 1− ρ and aU ≡
ργ
ργ + 1− ρ (3.31)
being the income shares of the two population subgroups. To understand how offshoring influ-
ences Theil index T , we first look at the benchmark scenario without firm-level rent-sharing, i.e.
θ = 0. In this case, all firms pay the same wage and all production workers find a job, implying
that Theil index TU falls to zero. Eq. (3.30) therefore simplifies to
T =
1− ρ
ργ + 1− ρ (TS + ln ζ) + ln
[
ζργ + 1− ρ
ζ(ργ + 1− ρ)
]
, (3.32)
where ζ¯ has been replaced by ζ due to θ = 0. To see how offshoring affects economy-wide inequal-
ity, it is crucial to understand how it influences the distribution of income within the subgroup of
self-employed agents. From the analysis in Section 3.2.2 we already know that offshoring raises
inequality within the group of self-employed agents according to the Gini criterion. However,
this is not sufficient for an increase in Theil index TS . Unlike the Gini coefficient, the Theil
index does not rely on the Lorenz curve. But the two indices share one important property:
both of them respect mean-preserving second-order stochastic dominance, which is equivalent to
Lorenz dominance. We can therefore conclude that the Gini coefficient and the Theil index rank
two distributions equivalently, if one of them Lorenz dominates the other one. One can show
that the distribution of income among self-employed agents under autarky Lorenz dominates
the respective distribution in an offshoring equilibrium for arbitrary values of χ ∈ (0, 1).34 This
implies TS > T aS (where superscript a refers to autarky).
Accounting for TS > T aS , it follows from Eq. (3.32) that T − T a > ∆T (χ), with35
∆T (χ) ≡ ρ(1− ρ)(1− γ)(ζ − 1)
ργ + 1− ρ + ln
[
ζργ + 1− ρ
ζ(ργ + 1− ρ)
]
− ln
[
1 + ρ(ζ − 1)
ζ
]
.
33See Appendix A.13 for derivation details.
34Showing Lorenz dominance in this case is tedious, and therefore we have delegated formal details of this
analysis to Appendix A.14.
35Thereby, T aS = (ζ − 1)
−1
∫
∞
1
x−k/ξ [lnx− ln ζ] dx = ζ − 1− ln ζ has been considered.
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Economy-wide inequality is higher with offshoring than under autarky if ∆T (χ) > 0 holds for
χ > 0. This is the case, because
d∆T (χ)
dχ
= − ρ
2(1− ρ)γ(ζ − 1)2
[ργ + (1− ρ)]2 (ζργ + 1− ρ)
dγ(χ; η)
dχ
> 0
and ∆T (0) = 0. We can therefore conclude that an increase of χ from zero to any positive level
increases Theil index T , and hence renders the economy-wide distribution of income less equal.
Things are more complicated if rent sharing gives rise to firm-specific wages and involuntary
unemployment, because in this case changes in Theil index T additionally account for adjust-
ments in the distribution of income within the group of production workers, as captured by TU .
Since we know from the analysis in the previous section that offshoring may increase or decrease
income inequality among production workers, it is a priori not clear, whether offshoring in our
model renders the economy-wide distribution of income more or less even than under autarky.36
We address this question as part of the numerical exercise conducted in the next section.
3.5 A quantitative exercise
In this section, we conduct a numerical exercise using the model variant from Section 3.3 and
parameter estimates from the empirical trade literature. The purpose of this exercise is twofold.
On the one hand, our aim is to illustrate the non-monotonic effect of offshoring on inequality,
welfare, and unemployment. On the other hand, we want to shed additional light on the conse-
quences of offshoring for the economy-wide distribution of income under firm-level rent-sharing,
for which the analytical results are not clear. Since our model – even with its extension in-
cluding firm-level rent sharing – is highly stylized, the quantitative effects should be viewed as
illustrative.
A first set of parameters is taken from Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier (2013), who struc-
turally estimate key parameters of a trade model along the lines of Egger and Kreickemeier
(2012), which is in may respects similar to the theoretical framework underlying our analysis,
but does not account for offshoring. Employing information from the Amadeus data-set, Egger,
36In Appendix A.15, we show that a movement from autarky to high levels of offshoring increases economy-wide
inequality if θ is sufficiently small.
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Egger, and Kreickemeier (2013) report the following parameter estimates for the average coun-
try in their data-set, which covers five European economies: θ = 0.102, σ = 6.698, k = 4.306.
While, to the best of our knowledge, there are no other directly comparable estimates for the
rent-sharing parameter available, the estimate of σ lies in the range of parameter estimates re-
ported by Broda and Weinstein (2006) and is well in line with the parameter value considered
by Arkolakis (2010) in his calibration exercise. The parameter estimate of k is higher than the
estimate of about 2 reported by Corcos, Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2012). However, it is
consistent with findings by Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) and – together with the estimates
for θ and σ – guarantees that the parameter constraint k > ξ¯ is fulfilled.
It is challenging to come up with a theory-consistent measure of η. We take guidance from
the findings by Blinder (2009) and Blinder and Krueger (2013) that about a quarter of jobs in
US manufacturing can be classified as offshorable.37 In our model, all jobs done by individuals
employed in routine tasks can in principle be offshored, and the economy-wide cost share of
these jobs is 1 − η. Under autarky, all workers within each firm are paid the same wage, and
therefore in this situation 1− η is also the fraction of jobs that can be offshored. We therefore
set η = 0.75. Of course, estimates on the actual extent of offshoring are much smaller than
the numbers reported by Blinder (2009) and Blinder and Krueger (2013). For the US economy,
Forrester Research predicted in 2002 a loss of 3.3 million jobs due to offshoring by 2015, which
is less than 2.5 percent of the workforce. Bringing the quantitative results from our numerical
exercise in accordance with such estimates therefore requires that the fraction of offshoring firms
is sufficiently small.
Based on these parameter estimates, we can quantify the effects of offshoring. For this
purpose, we compute how a given exposure to offshoring alters our variables of interest relative
to a benchmark without offshoring. Thereby, we first look on changes of intra- and inter-
group inequality and determine the relative importance of these changes for the adjustments in
economy-wide inequality. The results from this exercise are summarised in Table 3.1.
37Based on the taxonomy of Blinder (2009) and Blinder and Krueger (2013) researchers have provided estimates
on the share of offshorable tasks also for other industrialised countries. For Germany, the share of jobs that can
be classified offshorable amounts to 42 percent and is thus significantly higher than for the US (see Laaser and
Schrader, 2009).
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Table 3.1: Impact of offshoring on different measures of inequality
Change of
χ AM in pct. AL in pct. ω¯ in pct. TS in pct. TU in pct. T in pct.
0.001 0.033 −8.685 0.084 0.167 −9.818 −0.174
0.01 0.322 −6.910 0.837 1.174 −9.161 2.589
0.10 2.860 −0.488 8.369 6.485 −1.291 11.642
0.25 5.902 2.270 20.922 10.735 3.953 18.499
0.50 8.626 2.362 41.844 13.762 9.351 23.967
0.75 9.395 1.224 62.766 14.820 12.062 26.488
0.90 9.211 0.477 75.319 15.025 13.035 27.319
Notes: All reported figures refer to percentage changes relative to autarky.
Columns 2 to 4 quantify the impact of offshoring on the inequality measures discussed in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Evaluated at our parameter estimates, offshoring has only a moderate ef-
fect on intra-group inequality among (employed) production workers and among entrepreneurs,
whereas its impact on inter-group inequality between entrepreneurs and production workers can
be sizable. Columns 5 to 7 summarise the quantitative effects of offshoring on the distribution
of income within the two main income groups – self-employed agents (entrepreneurs plus off-
shoring service agents) and all production workers (employed and unemployed) – as well as for
the whole economy, relying on Theil indices. The qualitative effects of offshoring on income
inequality within the now more broadly defined income groups are the same as those reported
in Columns 2 and 3, but the quantitative effects seem to be more pronounced. The quantita-
tive differences regarding the effects of offshoring on intra-group inequality can be explained by
different definitions of income groups and by the fact that the Gini coefficient is confined to the
unit interval, while this is not the case for the Theil index. Our numerical results point to a
considerable increase in economy-wide income inequality at higher levels of χ. We can also see
that, evaluated at our parameter estimates, offshoring lowers economy-wide income inequality
if χ is sufficiently close to zero.
We now turn to the impact of offshoring on welfare and unemployment, which we summarise
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in Table 3.2. As outlined in Section 3.2.3, the impact of offshoring on source-country welfare
crucially depends on the value of ε. To illustrate this, we run separate numerical experiments
for the two polar cases highlighted in Section 3.2.3: a production technology without external
increasing returns to scale (ε = 0) and a textbook CES production technology (ε = 1). The
results for these two exercises are reported in Columns 2 and 3. Thereby, Column 2 confirms
our analytical finding that in the absence of external increasing returns to scale source country
income I declines relative to autarky at low levels of χ. However, the welfare loss is small
compared to the potential welfare gains at high levels of χ. With a textbook CES production
technology, external increasing returns to scale generate additional welfare gains from firm entry,
and these gains are sufficiently strong to dominate welfare losses from unfavourable labour
reallocations at low levels of χ. At higher levels of χ offshoring leads to firm exit and in this
case the external increasing returns to scale viewed on their own lead to a welfare loss. However,
this loss is not strong enough to dominate the positive welfare implications of the now more
favourable resource allocation and relying on the textbook production technology offshoring is
therefore a success story for the source country, irrespective of the level of χ.
Table 3.2: Impact of offshoring on welfare and unemployment
Change of
I in pct. u in ppt.
χ ε = 0 ε = 1 ε = 0.56
0.001 −0.800 0.624 −0.005 −2.554
0.01 −0.827 1.164 0.283 −2.654
0.10 2.067 3.796 3.032 −0.944
0.25 7.202 7.289 7.251 0.898
0.50 15.222 12.235 13.540 2.560
0.75 22.564 16.492 19.125 3.502
0.90 26.692 18.804 22.212 3.839
Notes: Welfare effects refer to percentage changes relative to autarky, whereas unemployment
effects refer to changes in percentage points.
The results for the two cases ε = 0 and ε = 1 define a corridor in which the welfare effects
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of offshoring can lie in our model. We also provide results using ε = 0.56, which is the empirical
estimate of Ardelean (2011). The insights from this exercise are summarized in Column 4, and
we see that in this case there are small welfare losses from offshoring for the source country
if χ = 0.001. The last column of Table 3.2 confirms our analytical finding from Section 3.3
that offshoring lowers aggregate unemployment at low levels of χ, whereas it exacerbates the
unemployment problem in the source country at high levels of χ. In general, the quantitative
effect of offshoring on economy-wide unemployment is fairly small, when evaluating the model
at our parameter estimates.
To complete our discussion on the quantitative effects of offshoring, we finally look more
specifically on the consequences of the observed exposure to offshoring. This requires empirical
information upon the share of firms that engage in offshoring, which is reported for Germany
by Moser, Urban, and Weder di Mauro (2009). Using a large sample of 8,466 German plants
from the IAB Establishment Panel, they find that the share of offshoring firms is 14.9 percent.
This share is somewhat lower than the share of offshoring firms reported by The Economist
(2004) from a small survey of 150 British firms, while it is significantly higher than the share of
firms conducting international outsourcing and/or FDI in Japan as reported by Tomiura (2007).
Evaluated at χ = 0.149, our model predicts that offshoring has increased inequality within the
group of entrepreneurs by 4.0 percent and inequality within the group of production workers by
0.9 percent, when relying on the metric of Gini coefficients. Looking at the relative income of
entrepreneurs and workers, offshoring has augmented the preexisting gap in Germany by 12.5
percent. Also economy-wide income inequality has widened considerably due to offshoring, with
the respective Theil index being 14.4 percent higher under the observed exposure to offshoring
than under autarky. With respect to its welfare consequences, our model predicts a moderate
increase for Germany, ranging between 3.1 (for ε = 0) and 5.0 (for ε = 1) percent. Using
Ardelean’s estimate of ε = 0.56, the welfare increase amounts to 4.5 percent. In contrast to the
widespread perception of large negative employment effects, our model predicts that offshoring
has lowered unemployment in Germany by 0.2 percentage points.38
38Since empirical evidence for Germany suggests setting η = 0.58 instead of η = 0.75, we have repeated
our numerical exercise from this paragraph for η = 0.58. This change in the value of η does not affect the
predicted consequences of observed offshoring for AM and ω¯, and it has only a small quantitative effect on the
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3.6 Summary
In this chapter we have developed an analytically tractable general equilibrium framework for
analysing offshoring to low-wage countries. It is a key feature of our framework that firms differ
from each other in terms of their productivity. As a consequence, the costly option to offshore
routine tasks to the low-wage country, while available to all firms, is chosen only by a subset
of them in equilibrium. The effects that offshoring has on welfare and the income distribution
depends on the share of firms that offshore tasks in equilibrium, and we are therefore able to
show that considering firm heterogeneity adds a relevant dimension to the established offshoring
literature that has mainly focussed on the heterogeneity of tasks.
Offshoring is attractive for firms because it leads to lower marginal production costs, and
this implies an expansion of employment in non-routine tasks at home. However, offshoring
at the same time destroys domestic jobs in which workers perform routine tasks. The relative
strength of these two opposing effects on domestic firm-level employment depends on the costs
of offshoring. If these costs are high, offshoring is only attractive for a relatively small fraction
of high-productivity firms, because its potential for lowering marginal production costs is small.
As a consequence, the destruction of domestic routine-task jobs dominates the establishment
of new jobs in which workers perform non-routine-tasks, and offshoring hence lowers domestic
firm-level employment. Workers losing their jobs in offshoring firms find employment in less pro-
ductive activities, including jobs in low-productivity firms newly entering the domestic market.
Unlike trade in final goods, which in canonical models with heterogeneous producers triggers a
reallocation of domestic workers from low- to high-productivity firms, offshoring therefore causes
a shift of domestic employment from high- to low-productivity firms.
The reallocation of workers from low- to high-productivity firms constitutes a detrimental
predicted consequences for I. At the same time, using the lower value for η leads to larger quantitative effects
of observed offshoring on economy-wide inequality and aggregate unemployment in Germany. With η = 0.58 our
model predicts that offshoring has increased economy-wide inequality by 21.73 percent and has lowered aggregate
unemployment by 2.46 percentage points. Finally, the reduction of η changes the predicted consequences of
offshoring for AL in a qualitative way. According to our model the observed exposure to offshoring has lowered
intra-group inequality among production workers in Germany by 2.19 percent, when considering η = 0.58 instead
of η = 0.75.
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welfare effect, which can dominate traditional sources of welfare gain, and therefore render the
source country worse off with offshoring than in autarky. The situation is more favourable
at lower costs of offshoring, because in this case offshoring becomes attractive for a broad
range of producers and leads to a reallocation of workers towards high-productivity firms. As a
consequence, source country welfare unambiguously increases relative to autarky if the costs of
offshoring are sufficiently small.
Income inequality between entrepreneurs and workers increases unambiguously with the
share of offshoring firms. However, the effect on income inequality among entrepreneurs is non-
monotonic: income inequality within this group increases if only a few firms shift the production
of routine tasks abroad, and it decreases (while always staying above the autarky level) if off-
shoring becomes common practice among high- and low-productivity firms. Both of these effects
contribute to the emergence of a new class of entrepreneurial superstars, who gain dispropor-
tionately from the global expansion of their firms under offshoring.
An extended version of our model with firm-level rent sharing, which preserves all results
derived in the benchmark model with perfectly competitive labour markets, allows us to address
the public concern that offshoring destroys domestic jobs and exacerbates the problem of unem-
ployment. Our analysis shows that it is important to distinguish between what happens at the
level of offshoring firms (firm-level effect) and what happens in the aggregate, after taking into
account general equilibrium effects. We find that firm-level employment of production workers
and aggregate employment tend do move in opposite directions: aggregate employment increases
unambiguously at low levels of offshoring, where the negative firm-level effects on source country
employment are largest. The reverse is true at high levels of offshoring: firm-level employment
of production workers goes up, while aggregate employment falls.
The model extension with rent sharing also provides a richer picture of the distributional
effects of offshoring, by additionally allowing for wage inequality of ex ante identical production
workers. To understand its distributional consequences for production workers, it is noteworthy
that offshoring constitutes a threat to the incomes of workers employed in both good (high-wage)
and bad (low-wage) jobs. The former fear the relocation of their jobs abroad at early stages of
offshoring, leaving them with alternatives that invariably yield lower incomes. The latter face
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a potential shut-down of their firms when production shifting becomes common practice among
high- and low-productivity employers at later stages of offshoring, and some of those losing their
job join the ranks of the unemployed. An immediate consequence of these firm-level employment
effects is that offshoring reduces wage inequality initially, but widens it if a sufficiently large share
of firms shifts the production of routine tasks abroad. A non-monotonicity also materializes with
respect to the effect of offshoring on economy-wide inequality. Relying on the Theil index, we
show that economy-wide inequality decreases if only a few high-productivity firms make use of
offshoring, whereas it increases if offshoring also becomes common practice among firms with
lower productivity levels.
Our analysis highlights the relevance of the extensive margin of offshoring for understand-
ing how relocating routine tasks to low-wage countries affects economy-wide variables, such
as income inequality, welfare, and unemployment. Firms in our model react differently to the
offshoring opportunity, and we show that their asymmetric response has important general equi-
librium effects. We hope that these insights together with the tractability of our framework can
provide guidance to the rapidly growing empirical literature on offshoring using firm-level data,
and that it will also be a useful point of departure for further theoretical work.
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Chapter 4
Offshoring and individual skill
upgrading
It is a common feature of advanced economies that their workforces are increasingly engaged
in the performance of more complex production tasks. Along with this changing structure of
skill requirements, individuals constantly retrain and update their capabilities. According to
Eurofound’s European Working Conditions Survey 2010 (cf. Eurofound, 2012), industry-wide
on-the-job training rates in Germany have increased from on average 28.4% in 2005 to about 40%
in 2010. At the same time, more and more firms find it optimal to restructure their production
processes by relocating the performance of offshorable tasks to low-wage countries abroad. Data
from the OECD STAN bilateral trade data base show that the output share of intermediate
imports from non-OECD countries in German manufacturing has increased by a remarkable
62% over the same time span. In this chapter, we argue that both phenomena are linked. We
offer a theory to explain the mechanism behind this link and an empirical analysis to show its
significance and magnitude.
In general a positive link between offshoring and training should not come as a surprise since
offshoring, which is associated with the relocation of tasks to low-wage countries abroad, in the
end (at least temporary) displaces some workers from their jobs. As shown by Hummels, Munch,
Skipper, and Xiang (2012), workers who are displaced because of offshoring have a particularly
high probability to acquire vocational training during the subsequent period of transitional
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unemployment. We add to this literature, focusing instead on the impact that offshoring has
on currently employed individuals and not only on those who directly loose their job through
offshoring. This new focus is motivated by two facts: On the one hand, the number of workers,
which are directly displaced from their job by offshoring, is dwarfed by the mass of individuals,
which stay in their job.1 On the other hand, it is well known from the theoretical trade literature
that offshoring not only leads to direct job losses for workers whose tasks are shifted abroad,
but also has a (positive) productivity effect, which may benefit all workers, as firms pass through
productivity gains from offshoring to domestic workers in form of higher wages (Kohler, 2004b;
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Rodriguez-Clare, 2010). It is exactly this productivity
effect which in our theoretical model creates incentives for on-the-job training by increasing the
associated wage gain of workers beyond the cost of skill upgrading.
To structure our idea, we set up a small-open-economy model of offshoring in the spirit of
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), featuring two offshorable sets of tasks, which differ in
their skill requirements. Unlike in standard trade models, where endowments are fixed, workers
in our model may react to a given offshoring shock by selecting into costly on-the-job training,
thereby gaining abilities that are needed to perform skill-intensive high-wage tasks. Since the
productivity effect of offshoring (cf. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) proportionally scales
up wages for both task sets, the gap between these wages increases as well, rendering on-the-job
training more attractive for untrained workers, who select into skill upgrading as long as the
(offshoring induced) gap in wages exceeds the associated cost of skill upgrading.
Focusing on this training indifference condition we translate our theoretical model into an
empirically testable specification. We thereby – in line with our theoretical results – expect that
offshoring leads to more observed on-the-job training at the individual level – a relationship that
we can estimate within a standard Probit framework. Our offshoring variable thereby relates
to sectoral imports of intermediate products, which are a widely used measure to proxy for
industry-level offshoring in the empirical trade literature (cf. Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a, 1999;
Geishecker and Görg, 2008; Baumgarten, Geishecker, and Görg, 2013). Using the industry-level
1For example, in the sample of Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2013), only 9% of all workers observed
from 1998 to 2006 loose their job through mass-layoff events. Out of those layoffs, again only 10% can be associated
with increased offshoring by the respective employers.
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variation in our offshoring measure to identify the impact on individual skill upgrading has
the clear advantage that offshoring growth can be seen as exogenous to single workers, whose
individual training decisions should not feed back into industry-level offshoring growth rates.
This approach embeds our analysis into a recent and growing literature, which uses industry-
level variation in globalization measures to identify effects that arise at the individual level
(cf. Geishecker and Görg, 2008; Baumgarten, Geishecker, and Görg, 2013; Ebenstein, Harrison,
McMillan, and Phillips, 2013). Data on individual skill upgrading decisions come from the
“BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2005/06”, which holds detailed information on individual
participation in on-the-job training measures. Crucially, due to the high resolution of our data we
can take into account a wide range of control variables, which in the empirical training literature
(cf. Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan, 2004; Bassanini, Booth, Brunello, De Paola, and Leuven,
2007) already have been identified as major determinants of individual skill-upgrading decisions.
Of particular interest for our application is thereby the possibility to observe the introduction of
technological innovations directly at the workplace, which gives us the opportunity to separate
the effect of offshoring from the one of sectoral biased technological change (cf. Feenstra, 2010).
Our findings offer clear support for the mechanism laid out in our theoretical model. Off-
shoring growth has a positive and significant impact on the individual on-the-job training propen-
sity of workers employed in German manufacturing between 2004 and 2006. This link holds for a
number of specifications and is robust to the inclusion of various controls at the individual, firm,
and industry level. After taking account of, among other things, technological change, business
cycle effects, and firm-size differences, a one standard deviation higher offshoring growth at the
industry level over the period 2004 to 2006 is related to an increase in the propensity to observe
individual on-the-job training by between 3 to 7 percentage points.
This chapter connects two strands of the empirical literature, which so far mostly have
been analysed in complete isolation. On the one hand we contribute to a literature that seeks
to identify the determinants of individual on-the-job training decisions (see Bassanini, Booth,
Brunello, De Paola, and Leuven (2007) for an overview). On the other hand, we also add to
the empirical trade literature, which focuses on the implications that offshoring has for domestic
labour markets (see Baumgarten, Geishecker, and Görg (2013); Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan,
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and Phillips (2013) for recent examples). The first strand of the literature usually focuses on a
combination of product and/or labor market based explanations to explain individual on-the-job
training decisions in a closed-economy setting, thereby ignoring the impact that globalization
may have on individual training decisions.2 The empirical trade literature, on the contrary,
mainly is concerned with the impact that offshoring has on skill upgrading in the aggregate. As
a central result, several studies have shown that increased offshoring is associated with a rise
in the share of high-skilled employment in total employment (cf. Crinò, 2008; Feenstra, 2010;
Davies and Desbordes, 2012). Individual skill levels thereby usually are considered as fixed such
that all skill upgrading takes place at the extensive margin between rather than at the intensive
margin within workplaces. As a notable exception Hummels, Munch, Skipper, and Xiang (2012)
show that workers, who are directly displaced from their job through offshoring are more likely
to select into training measures before taking up a new job. We complement this research by
focusing on the vast majority of workers staying in their jobs that, hence, are indirectly affected
through the general-equilibrium effects of offshoring – effects to which they respond by increased
on-the-job training.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop our theoretical model
and derive as main prediction that offshoring growth leads to more individual skill upgrading.
Subsequently, we look for the proposed link in the data and present an empirical analysis,
which includes a description of the econometric set-up, the data used, the results obtained and
a discussion on the timing and the robustness of the link between offshoring and on-the-job
training. A final section concludes the chapter.
2Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan (2004) and Bassanini, Booth, Brunello, De Paola, and Leuven (2007) control
for a comprehensive range of individual-level indicators to explain the selection of workers into on-the-job training.
Méndez and Sepúlveda (2012) point to the influence of the business cycle on skill upgrading and discuss carefully
the different training-types and their respective business cycle properties. Additionally, Görlitz and Stiebale
(2011) look at industry-level competition as a driver of on-the-job training decisions.
68
4.1 A simple model of offshoring and on-the-job training
The goal of this section is to describe an intuitive mechanism, which links offshoring and on-the-
job training. To this end, we employ a simplified version of the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) model of trade in tasks, focusing on a single industry, which produces a homogeneous,
constant returns to scale output Y at a given world market price normalised to p
!
= 1. The
production of final output Y requires the performance of two task sets, S˜ and N˜ , such that
our production technology may be summarized by Y = F (S˜, N˜), with S˜ and N˜ replacing the
usual inputs in the otherwise standard neoclassical production function F (·). The task sets, S˜
and N˜ , differ in their skill requirements: While workers performing the S˜-set must have some
task-specific skills, no such skills are needed to perform tasks from the N˜ -set. For simplicity,
we furthermore assume that both tasks sets consist of only two tasks: A non-offshorable task,
S or N , and an offshorable task, S∗ or N∗, which are combined according to technologies,
S˜ = S˜ (S, S∗) and N˜ = N˜ (N,N∗).
The offshorable tasks, S∗ or N∗, will be performed abroad, if the cost of doing so are
sufficiently low, i.e. if wS ≥ τSw∗S and wN ≥ τNw∗N , with τS, τN ≥ 1 denoting the usual iceberg-
type offshoring cost and w∗S and w
∗
N being the (constant) unit cost of performing the tasks S
∗ and
N∗ at a low-cost location abroad. The unit-costs for the task sets, S˜ and N˜ , may then be written
as ωS (wS, τSw∗S) = ΩSwS and ωN (wN , τNw
∗
N) = ΩNwN , where ΩS ≡ ωS (wS, τSw∗S) /wS ≤ 1 and
ΩN ≡ ωN (wN , τNw∗N) /wN ≤ 1 are defined as the cost savings factors from relocating tasks S∗ or
N∗ abroad (cf. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). Analogously, the unit cost for final output
Y may be expressed as c (ΩSwS,ΩNwN) = γc (wS, wN), with γ ≡ c (ΩSwS,ΩNwN) /c (wS, wN) ≤ 1
denoting the total cost savings factor from (partly) offshoring both inputs used in Y = F (S˜, N˜).
We assume a homogeneous workforce of size L¯ > 0. Workers can either exclusively perform
tasks from the S˜-set or from the N˜ -set, whereas, as outlined above, tasks from the S˜-set require
task-specific skills, while no such requirement exists for tasks from the N˜ -set. To acquire the
skills needed for the performance of tasks from the S˜-set, workers have to invest in costly on-the-
job training. Training cost κ > 0 (paid in units of the numÃ c©raire) are assumed to be constant
and workers invest into on-the-job training as long as the wage gain wS − wN associated with
it exceeds the corresponding cost κ. Accordingly, we may write the net gain from on-the-job
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training as
u ≡ wS − wN − κ ≥ 0, (4.1)
keeping in mind that in equilibrium u = 0 must hold, leaving workers indifferent between both
alternatives.
Equilibrium wages under autarky (denoted by superscript a) and with offshoring (denoted
by superscript o) can now be found in the intersection point of the training indifference condition
Eq. (4.1) and the zero profit condition γc (wN , wS) = 1 (see figure 1 below). As outlined above,
γ ≤ 1 thereby represents the total cost savings factor from offshoring, being equal to one under
autarky and smaller than one in an equilibrium with offshoring.
In order to derive testable predictions on how offshoring alters wages and thus the training
decision in Eq. (4.1), we have to specify our simple model in more detail. We assume that
Y follows from a Cobb Douglas production technology, such that F (S˜, N˜) = S˜αN˜1−α with
α ∈ (0, 1). It then can be shown that the total cost savings from offshoring γ = ΩαSΩ1−αN ≤ 1 are
a weighted geometric mean of the cost savings at the task level, ΩS ≤ 1 and ΩN ≤ 1, respectively.
The technology, according to which tasks within each of the two task sets are bundled together,
is the same as in Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Assuming
S˜ (S, S∗) = BSθ (S∗)1−θ as well as N˜ (N,N∗) = BN θ (N∗)1−θ, with θ ∈ (0, 1) measuring the
cost share of non-offshorable tasks and B ≡ 1/[θθ (1− θ)1−θ] > 0 being a positive constant,
we can infer that the cost savings from offshoring at the task-level, ΩS = (τSw∗S/wS)
1−θ ≤ 1
and ΩN = (τNw∗N/wN)
1−θ ≤ 1, are proportional to the respective international wage differential
(including the transport costs τS or τN , respectively). An offshoring firm’s profit maximization
problem may hence be written as
π = max
S˜,N˜
F (S˜, N˜)− ΩSwSS˜ − ΩNwNN˜ ,
from which the corresponding first order conditions can be derived as
wS (s˜) = f
′ (s˜)/ΩS, (4.2)
wN (s˜) = [f (s˜)− s˜f ′ (s˜)]/ΩN , (4.3)
with f (s˜) ≡ F (S˜, N˜)/N˜ = s˜α referring to our production function in intensive form notation
70
and s˜ ≡ S˜/N˜ measuring the overall skill intensity in the entire production process (including
domestic tasks, S and N , as well as foreign tasks, S∗ and N∗).
From Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3), two channels through which offshoring affects domestic wages
can be identified. As in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), cost savings from offshoring are
handed through to domestic workers in form of higher wages, which due to the productivity effect
of offshoring are scaled up by factors, 1/ΩS ≥ 1 and 1/ΩN ≥ 1, respectively. On the contrary,
the labor supply effect of offshoring leads to disparate wage effects by driving a wedge between
the overall skill intensity s˜ ≡ S˜/N˜ , which applies for the entire production process, and the
domestic skill intensity s ≡ S/N , which only reflects the composition of the domestic workforce.
To illustrate the labor supply effect, Shephard’s Lemma can be applied to ωS(wS, τSw∗S) and
ωN(wN , τNw∗N), resulting in:
∂ωS (wS, τSw∗S)
∂wS
≡ S
S˜
= θΩS and
∂ωN (wN , τNw∗N)
∂wN
≡ N
N˜
= θΩN . (4.4)
Dividing both expressions in Eq. (4.4) by each other reveals how the domestic skill intensity,
s ≡ S/N , is altered by the labor supply effect of offshoring, such that
s˜ =
ΩN
ΩS
s, (4.5)
emerges as the overall skill intensity. Intuitively, in the autarky equilibrium (with ΩS = ΩN = 1)
the overall skill intensity coincides with the domestic skill intensity, implying s˜ = s. With
offshoring, the overall skill intensity additionally depends on which factor is offshored more
intensively, such that s˜ ≷ s if N/N˜ ≷ S/S˜. Intuitively, the labor supply effect of offshoring
thereby favors the input factor which is offshored less intensively. When replacing s˜ in Eqs. (4.2)
and (4.3) by Eq. (4.5) to determine the overall effect that offshoring has on domestic wages,
it turns out that the productivity effect of offshoring is dominant and causes a proportional
increase in both wages, woS (s˜) = w
a
S (s) /γ and w
o
N (s˜) = w
a
N (s) /γ, by the same factor 1/γ ≥ 1
for a notionally unchanged domestic factor intensity s.
To see the impact on workers’ training decision, we may now substitute both wage rates into
the training indifference condition (4.1), which then can be rewritten as:
u = wS (s)− wN (s)− κ = αs
α−1 − (1− α) sα
γ
− κ, (4.1′)
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with γ = ΩαSΩ
1−α
N < 1 implying s
o > sa. Intuitively, if both wages are scaled up by an identical
factor 1/γ > 1 the same holds true for the gap wS − wN between these wages. In the end, as
more and more domestic workers optimally react on u > 0 by upgrading their individual skills,
the domestic skill intensity rises from sa to so such that equilibrium is restored.
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Figure 4.1: On-the-job training with and without offshoring
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of offshoring on on-the-job training. Starting out from the
autarky equilibrium in A and holding the domestic skill intensity notionally fixed at s = sa,
offshoring causes a radial outward expansions of the unit-cost curve by factor 1/γ < 1, which
results in the hypothetical equilibrium B.3 However, in point B we have u > 0, leaving domestic
3Fixing the domestic skill intensity at s = sa in this first step means that domestic workers are not allowed to
switch tasks between the N˜ - and the S˜-set. Of course this does not imply that workers are constrained in switching
from offshorable N∗- or S∗-tasks to non-offshorable N - or S-tasks within the respective N˜ - or S˜-set. Intuitively,
the latter kind of task-arbitrage is a natural adjustment strategy to increased offshoring and a necessary condition
for full-employment in our model.
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workers with an incentive to invest in on-the-job training. As more and more workers decide in
favor of on-the-job training, the domestic skill intensity increases from sa to so until the new
(offshoring) equilibrium C is reached. This result is at the heart of our analysis and we frame
it in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4.1.1 A decline in the cost of offshoring increases the share of tasks performed
abroad, thereby leading to increased individual skill upgrading through on-the-job training.
Proof Analysis in the text and formal discussion in Appendix A.17.
Summing up, offshoring positively impacts the individual decision in favor of on-the-job training.
Interestingly, the training decision does not depend on the task content of offshoring. Even if only
one task type is relocated abroad, ΩS < 1 or ΩN < 1 will be sufficient to induce γ = ΩαSΩ
1−α
N < 1
and, thus, more on-the-job training. Also note that offshoring not only affects the skill upgrading
decision of those individuals which are directly hit by a (temporary) job loss though offshoring
(cf. Hummels, Munch, Skipper, and Xiang, 2012). Rather it is the case that all individuals
and in particular the vast majority of those who stay with their jobs are more likely to invest
in individual skill upgrading as a response to given offshoring shock. Building upon these
insights, we put Proposition 4.1.1 to the test by estimating the impact of increased industry-
level offshoring on the individual on-the-job training decision displayed in Eq. (4.1).
4.2 The impact of offshoring on on-the-job training
The empirical part of this chapter is structured as follows: We lay out our empirical strategy
in Subsection 4.2.1. Subsection 4.2.2 describes the data we use. The results of our empirical
analysis then follow in Subsection 4.2.3. Finally, Subsections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 discuss the timing
of offshoring and skill upgrading and offer further robustness checks.
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4.2.1 Empirical strategy
As a natural starting point to test Proposition 4.1.1, recall training indifference condition (4.1),
which for individual i = 1, ..., I employed in industry j = 1, ..., J can be rewritten as
uij = wSij − wNij − κij .
We know from Proposition 4.1.1 that any increase in offshoring (triggered by a decline in the
offshoring costs τS or τN) widens the gap between wSij and wNij , thereby making on-the-job
training more attractive for the individual worker. What we seek to identify in our empirical
analysis is the realized on-the-job training in response to a given offshoring shock. We thus
identify the adjustment mechanism described in our model above, according to which individuals
engage in on-the-job training after an offshoring shock until a new equilibrium with uij = 0 and
so > sa is reached. Unfortunately, an individual’s net gain uij from on-the-job training is
unobservable to us. Yet, we know that individual i selects into on-the-job training (indexed by
Uij = 1) if uij > 0 and does not do so (indexed by Uij = 0) if uij ≤ 0. We are thus able to
portray the probability of on-the-job training as the outcome of an underlying latent variable
model
Pr(Uij = 1 | ·) = Pr(uij > 0 | ·), (4.6)
conditioning on a vector (·) of observable covariates. Our main variable of interest is the growth
rate of offshoring, Ôj , in industry j, which, according to Proposition 4.1.1, should have a pos-
itive impact on the probability of on-the-job training in Eq. (4.6). We furthermore allow the
individual training decision to depend on individual- and industry-specific characteristics, which
we collect in vectors Yi and Xj , respectively. While the vectors Yi and Xj will be specified in
more detail below, we may for now interpret them as additional controls capturing such things as
heterogeneity in the training cost κij . Taken together, we can reformulate the training decision
in Eq. (4.1) as:
uij = β0 + βÔj +X
′
jδ +Y
′
iη + εij , (1
′′)
with εij ∼ N(0, 1) following a standard normal distribution with zero mean and variance one.
We can then estimate the probability of on-the-job training Pr(Uij = 1 | ·) in Eq. (4.6) by a
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Probit model based on the following empirical specification:
Pr (Uij = 1 | ·) = Pr (uij > 0 | ·) = Pr(β0 + βÔj +X′jδ +Y′iη > εij | ·). (4.6′)
In line with Proposition 4.1.1, we expect a positive effect of offshoring growth Ôj on the probabil-
ity of observing individual on-the-job training, i.e. β > 0. The identification of this relationship
in our empirical model (4.6′) comes from varying offshoring growth rates across industries in
which individuals are employed. This has the clear advantage that offshoring growth, which
is measured at the industry level j, can be seen as exogeneous to worker i, whose individual
training decision should not feed back into sector level offshoring growth. Consequently, we
do not expect reverse causality to play a major role as potential source of endogeneity in our
setting. This approach embeds our analysis into a recent and growing literature which uses
industry level variation in globalization measures to identify individual level effects (Geishecker
and Görg, 2008; Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips, 2013; Baumgarten, Geishecker,
and Görg, 2013). To limit the problem of omitted variables as another main reason for po-
tentially biased estimates, we rely on a rich set of individual- and industry-specific covariates
(summarized in Yi and Xj), which we introduce in Section 4.2.2 before discussing their role
against the background of our empirical results in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.2 Data and definition of variables
Information on individual skill upgrading is taken from the “BIBB/BAuA Employment Sur-
vey 2005/06”, which contains information on a wide set of workplace related variables for a
representative sample of 20.000 individuals that participated between October 2005 and March
2006.4 We use the latest available wave of what has become established as a reliable and detailed
source for information related to on-the-job training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Dustmann
and Schönberg, 2012). Our main dependent variable is the training incidence Uij , which we
define as follows: If a respondent stated that she participated in on-the-job training once or
4The following version of the data set is used: Hall and Tiemann (2006) BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey
of the Working Population on Qualification and Working Conditions in Germany 2006, SUF 1.0; Research Data
Center at BIBB (ed.); GESIS Cologne, Germany (data access); Federal Institute of Vocational Education and
Training, Bonn doi:10.4232/1.4820. For further details, also see Rohrbach (2009).
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several times within the last two years or, alternatively, since being on her current job, we
count either one as training incidence and set Uij = 1. Otherwise we define Uij = 0. The
“BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2005/06” is particularly suited for our analysis since it com-
bines detailed information on training participation with a rich set of individual controls that
already have been identified as important determinants for the individual training decision (Bas-
sanini, Booth, Brunello, De Paola, and Leuven, 2007). In particular, we have information on
demographic controls (age, gender, education) and workplace characteristics (firm size, tenure,
employment contract).5 In context of the recent offshoring literature (cf. Acemoglu, Gancia, and
Zilibotti, 2012), our data has the great advantage that we are able to observe the introduction
of new technologies and organizational changes at the workplace. This allows us to discriminate
between offshoring and technological change when explaining the variation in individual training
decisions, and eliminates possible concerns about technological change being a potential source
of an omitted variable bias. As another advantage of our data we have information on individual
job loss fears (cf. Geishecker, Riedl, and Frijters, 2012). Given that offshoring often is associ-
ated with job losses for some workers (usually followed by a period of transitory unemployment
and/or training) this information provides a suitable control for a potential postponement of
on-the-job training in favour of later out-of-the-job training activity, as for example identified
by Hummels, Munch, Skipper, and Xiang (2012). To control for business cycle effects, which
have been linked to training by Méndez and Sepúlveda (2012), we rely on workers’ assessment
of the employing firm’s current business success, but also compute industry level output growth
between 2004 and 2006. Finally, following Görlitz and Stiebale (2011) we also use Herfindahl
indices of industry concentration from the German Monopoly Commission for 2003 to control
for varying product market competition in different industries.
5For sources, a comprehensive description, and more detailed summary statistics of the variables in our final
sample please refer to the data appendix.
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Offshoring is measured as a trade related phenomenon using data on imported intermediates.6
In line with our identification strategy outlined above, we follow the literature and observe
offshoring at the industry level (Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips, 2013; Baumgarten,
Geishecker, and Görg, 2013). In particular, we stick to the concept of Geishecker and Görg (2008)
and use input-output tables provided by the German Statistical Office to compute the share Θjj∗
of intermediate products used in industry j that originate from the same industry j∗ abroad.
We then multiply Θjj∗ by IMPj , which is the total value of sector j’s imports of goods that
originate from non-OECD countries, and finally divide by Yj , which is the value of sector j’s
output. In the end we obtain
Oj =
Θjj∗IMPj
Yj
, (4.7)
as a measure for the intensity of offshoring in sector j. Note that our offshoring measure only
includes intermediates that are imported from the same sector abroad, resembling the “narrow”
concept of offshoring put forth in Feenstra and Hanson (1999).7 Following our theoretical
model from Section 4.1, we are interested in offshoring that results from a cost savings motive
and, hence, focus only on imports of intermediates that originate from non-OECD countries.8
After all, this gives us a measure of offshoring to non-OECD countries that varies across 22
manufacturing industries (according to the NACE 1.1 classification). We use this information
to compute the sectoral growth rate of offshoring Ôj over the relevant sample period from 2004
to 2006. Both, levels and relative changes of our offshoring measure are reported in Table 8.2 (see
Appendix B.1). The levels can be considered as fairly low, which reflects the fact that trade with
non-OECD countries only accounts for a small share in German imports. Yet, growth has been
6Proxies for offshoring based on foreign direct investment (FDI) often suffer from the insufficient decompos-
ability of this data with regard to the motive behind outbound foreign direct investments. As an exception in
this literature, Davies and Desbordes (2012) are able to distinguish between greenfield FDI as well as mergers
and acquisitions (M&A), which allows them to control for FDI motives such as technology acquisition or the
elimination of foreign competitors.
7For a detailed discussion of the differences between the measure used here and the measure used by Feenstra
and Hanson (1999) please refer to Geishecker and Görg (2008).
8See Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) a model of trade in tasks between similar countries, in which firms
have incentives to cluster the production of the same tasks at the same location in the presence of external scale
economies that operate at the country level.
77
impressive. On average offshoring increased by 33% over the period from 2004 through 2006.
To obtain our final estimation sample, we match the growth rate of our offshoring variable with
the individual information taken from the “BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2005/06” and our
further sectoral control variables. Focusing only on individuals holding a full time contract in one
of the 22 manufacturing industries considered above leaves us with a total of 3.917 observations.
4.2.3 Estimation results
We estimate several variants of the Probit model specified in Section 4.2.1. Starting with
Table 4.1, in which we provide first evidence on the link between offshoring growth and on-
the-job training, we gradually add additional individual control variables, which the training
literature has identified as major determinants of individual skill upgrading (see Bassanini,
Booth, Brunello, De Paola, and Leuven, 2007).
As a point of reference, Column (1) in Table 4.1 shows the average marginal effect of off-
shoring growth from 2004 to 2006 on the probability of on-the-job training participation. Ac-
cording to this first estimate, offshoring growth has a strong and significant impact on individual
skill upgrading: A doubling of the non-OECD offshoring intensity defined in Eq. (4.7) would
lead to an increase in the probability of on-the-job training participation by 0.1732. Taking into
account the immense offshoring growth of (on average) more than 30% in the German manu-
facturing between 2004 and 2006, we find that a sizeable shift in training participation can be
attributed to increased offshoring.
Gradually adding further individual controls in the Columns (2) to (6) downsizes the effect of
offshoring growth only marginally. However, in line with Bassanini, Booth, Brunello, De Paola,
and Leuven (2007) and Méndez and Sepúlveda (2012), we find the usual life-cycle pattern in
the results in Column (2), according to which older individuals are less likely to undertake on-
the-job training than their younger counterparts. Including a gender indicator in Column (3),
we find, that men are more likely to select into on-the-job training than women, which at a first
sight contrasts with the findings of Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan (2004), who show that in
the European context women are in general no less likely to participate in training than men.
However, as documented in Bassanini, Booth, Brunello, De Paola, and Leuven (2007), the effect
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Table 4.1: Offshoring and on-the-job training: individual controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average marginal effect of:
Offshoring growth 0.1732*** 0.1643*** 0.1570*** 0.1565*** 0.1549*** 0.1500***
(0.0534) (0.0515) (0.0490) (0.0423) (0.0415) (0.0246)
Age 30 - 39 0.0351 0.0331 -0.0161 -0.0087 -0.0130
(0.0228) (0.0234) (0.0254) (0.0232) (0.0199)
Age 40 - 49 -0.0142 -0.0132 -0.0855*** -0.0722** -0.0691***
(0.0280) (0.0301) (0.0290) (0.0282) (0.0242)
Age 50 - 64 -0.0964*** -0.0946*** -0.1970*** -0.1811*** -0.1725***
(0.0330) (0.0320) (0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0247)
Age 65+ -0.3249*** -0.3257*** -0.4391*** -0.4214*** -0.4177***
(0.0774) (0.0788) (0.0676) (0.0665) (0.0555)
female -0.0630*** -0.0419** -0.0393** -0.0782***
(0.0232) (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0176)
Married -0.0100 -0.0148 -0.0147 -0.0112
(0.0238) (0.0235) (0.0233) (0.0226)
Tenure 0.0076** 0.0084** 0.0090**
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0039)
Tenure squared -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Medium-skill 0.1181*** 0.1169*** 0.0383
(0.0372) (0.0368) (0.0350)
High-skill 0.2118*** 0.2117*** 0.0169
(0.0255) (0.0258) (0.0204)
Importance to have a career 0.0628*** 0.0651***
(0.0199) (0.0199)
KldB88 (2-digit) occupation FE no no no no no yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.0100 0.0199 0.0221 0.0492 0.0509 0.1133
Observations 3,917 3,917 3,917 3,917 3,917 3,888
Notes: The table shows average marginal effects from estimating variants of the Probit model specified in Section
4.2.1. The reference category for an individual’s age is: age 16 - 29. Standard errors are clustered at the industry
level and are shown in parentheses below the coefficients. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
of gender on training participation, crucially depends on the sector of employment, with woman
receiving comparatively less on-the-job training in certain medium/low-tech manufacturing in-
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dustries. Given that our sample only includes workers employed in manufacturing industries,
with a strong bias towards male employment (on average 75.9%), we should not be surprised to
find a negative gender coefficient. Marital status, which we also introduce in Column (3), has
no significant effect on training participation. In Column (4) we additionally control for work
experience and education. Tenure has a positive but small effect on the probability of training
participation. We treat this result with caution, since tenure – for obvious reasons – most likely
is endogenous (Bassanini, Booth, Brunello, De Paola, and Leuven, 2007). Turning to the educa-
tion indicators, we find the usual result, that high-skilled workers are more likely to participate
in training than medium-skilled workers, while medium-skilled workers are again more likely to
participate in training than low-skilled workers (see Pischke, 2001; Bassanini, Booth, Brunello,
De Paola, and Leuven, 2007). To control for usually unobservable heterogeneity among workers
(e.g. motivation), we exploit the detailed information included in the “BIBB/BAuA Employ-
ment Survey 2005/06” and add a binary indicator variable, which takes the value of one if the
individual stated that having a career is (very) important and a value of zero otherwise. As we
would expect, individuals, which care more about their career, are also more likely to invest in
individual skill upgrading. Finally, adding occupation fixed effects in Column (6) to account for
occupation-specific variation in the data, leaves most of our coefficients unchanged.9 Only the
coefficients for education turn insignificant. This, however, does not come as a surprise, given
that in Germany entry into most occupations is subject to strict skill requirements (e.g. hold-
ing a certain university degree or a specific vocational qualification). Taking into account the
implied homogeneity of workers in terms of formal education within occupations, it is clear that
any attempt to identify the education coefficients based on the remaining skill variation within
occupations necessarily is doomed to fail. The necessity to control for occupation-specific effects
in our context arises as interactivity and complexity in the job content of certain occupations
impose severe limits to the offshorability of the respective jobs (Blinder, 2006; Goos, Manning,
and Salomons, 2009; Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright, 2013). At the same time, these activities may
require more frequent skill updating, which we would not want to confuse with our skill upgrad-
9By adding occupation fixed effects we lose 29 observations for which either no occupational classification is
coded in the data or too few observation for the estimation of an occupation-specific effect exist.
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ing mechanism from Section 4.1. Taking stock, we find that the effect of offshoring growth on
on-the-job training participation is only marginally reduced if further control variables at the
individual level are included.
In a next step we turn to more likely candidates for an omitted variable bias and control for
characteristics, which either directly describe the individual workplace or link to the industry in
which the respective worker is employed. We thereby keep our individual controls from Column
(6) in Table 4.1 throughout, while gradually adding additional workplace- and industry-level
control variables in Table 4.2.
We start with the inclusion of firm size controls in Column (1) of Table 4.2. In line with
Bassanini, Booth, Brunello, De Paola, and Leuven (2007), we find that workers employed by
larger firms are more likely to undertake on-the-job training than workers in small firms. Given
that offshoring usually is highly concentrated among large firms, with small firms often doing no
offshoring at all (see Moser, Urban, and Weder di Mauro, 2009; Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch,
and Xiang, 2013), we would expect that our estimate is upward biased, if differences in firm size
are not taken into account. Indeed, when controlling for differences in firm size, we find that the
impact that offshoring growth has on the probability of individual skill upgrading is reduced,
although still positive and highly significant. In Column (2) of Table 4.2 we add further controls,
which directly describe the employees’ individual working environments. In particular we take
into account whether a worker is employed under a fixed term contract or through a temporary
work agency. As in Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan (2004) and Bassanini, Booth, Brunello,
De Paola, and Leuven (2007), and in line with human capital theory, we find that workers
employed under fixed term contracts are less likely to invest in skill acquisition than workers
with permanent contracts. For workers temporary employed through an external supplier – after
all only 1% of all workers in our sample – no such effect exists, which we attribute to a lack of
variation in our data. Finally, we also take up recent findings by Geishecker, Riedl, and Frijters
(2012), who claim that offshoring to low-wage countries can explain about 28% of the increase
in subjective job loss fears of German workers for the time span from 1995 to 2006. Adding
an indicator variable, which takes a value of one whenever individuals stated that they face the
fear of job loss and zero otherwise, we find that workers who reported subjective job loss fears
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Table 4.2: Offshoring and on-the-job training: workplace and sectoral controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average marginal effect of:
Offshoring growth 0.1110*** 0.1107*** 0.1060*** 0.1078*** 0.1043*** 0.0776***
(0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0257) (0.0264) (0.0201)
Firm size 10 - 49 -0.0036 -0.0006 -0.0148 -0.0191 -0.0147 -0.0187
(0.0225) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0218) (0.0216) (0.0214)
Firm size 50 - 249 0.0701*** 0.0759*** 0.0537*** 0.0488*** 0.0537*** 0.0496***
(0.0170) (0.0150) (0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0161) (0.0163)
Firm size 250 - 499 0.1241*** 0.1306*** 0.1051*** 0.0990*** 0.1049*** 0.0973***
(0.0303) (0.0288) (0.0278) (0.0272) (0.0279) (0.0281)
Firm size 500+ 0.1518*** 0.1584*** 0.1343*** 0.1273*** 0.1343*** 0.1190***
(0.0284) (0.0273) (0.0267) (0.0253) (0.0266) (0.0243)
Fixed term contract -0.0901*** -0.0730** -0.0765** -0.0730** -0.0785**
(0.0323) (0.0318) (0.0320) (0.0319) (0.0328)
Temporary work 0.0272 0.0557 0.0512 0.0571 0.0394
(0.0532) (0.0538) (0.0532) (0.0535) (0.0539)
Job loss fear -0.0621*** -0.0632*** -0.0470** -0.0634*** -0.0504**
(0.0204) (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0209) (0.0211)
New technology introduced 0.1674*** 0.1655*** 0.1676*** 0.1640***
(0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0214)
Current Firm success (very) good 0.0429** 0.0406**
(0.0200) (0.0192)
Industry level output growth -0.0614
(0.0993)
Industry level Herfindahl index 0.0006***
(0.0001)
Individual controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
KldB88 (2-digit) occupation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.1240 0.1271 0.1359 0.1369 0.1360 0.1391
Observations 3888 3888 3888 3888 3888 3888
Notes: The table shows average marginal effects from estimating variants of the Probit model specified in Section
4.2.1. The reference category for firm size is 1 - 9 employees. The industry output growth is computed for 2004 to
2006. The Herfindahl index, which is published bi-annually by the German Monopoly Commission refers to 2005.
Individual controls are the same as in Column (6) of Table 4.1. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level
and shown in parentheses below the coefficients. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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are less likely to invest in on-the-job training. Together with the findings of Hummels, Munch,
Skipper, and Xiang (2012), who show that workers who lose their job (through offshoring) are
more likely to retrain their skills during the subsequent period of transitory unemployment, this
result may hint at a delay of on-the-job training in favour of later out-of-job training measures,
which are better tailored towards future re-employment possibilities. Important in our context is
that none of these controls do significantly alter the average marginal effect of offshoring growth
on individual skill upgrading. We now turn to Column (3) of Table 4.2, in which we include a
binary variable that takes a value of one whenever new technologies, machines, or organizational
features have been introduced at individual workplaces. There are two specific reasons why we
have to control for the introduction of new technologies in our setting: On the one hand,
our theoretical model from Section 4.1 reveals a close resemblance between the productivity
effect of offshoring and sector biased technological change, which we have to tell apart if we
want to identify the impact of offshoring growth on individual skill upgrading (cf. Feenstra and
Hanson, 1999; Feenstra, 2010). On the other hand, it is likely that whenever new technologies
are introduced this requires the (re-)training of involved workers, thereby mechanically leading
to increased on-the-job training, which we do not want to confuse with our skill upgrading
channel from Section 4.1. In line with these arguments, we find that workers who reported the
introduction of new technologies at their workplace are more likely to participate in on-the-
job training. Crucially, there still is a positive and highly significant link between offshoring
growth and individual skill upgrading, although – as we would expect – with a lower estimate
of the average marginal effect, which now stands at βˆm = 0.1060. A further concern relates to
a possible co-movement of increased offshoring with the sectoral business cycle. If on-the-job
training is pro-cyclical, for which – despite partly confounding results – at least some evidence
exists (cf. Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2012), it could be the case that the positive association of
individual skill upgrading with increased offshoring is nothing else than the reflection of the
German business cycle, which from 2004 to 2006 was at the beginning of a boom period. To
rule out this possibility, we include in Column (4) of Table 4.2 a control variable, which reflects
workers’ evaluation of the employing firms’ current business success. In line with Méndez and
Sepúlveda (2012), we find that workers employed by (very) successful firms tend to invest more
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often in on-the-job training. At the same time, the effect of offshoring growth on skill upgrading is
almost unchanged. Admittedly, our measure for the business cycle is a simple one, focusing only
on the employing firm, thereby ignoring possible inter-firm linkages in the respective industry. To
come up with more comprehensive measure we also add the log-difference of real industry output
in Column (5) of Table 4.2.10 The effect of output growth on on-the-job training is insignificant,
which is in line with the somewhat inconclusive literature on the cyclical properties of training
(see Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2012; Bassanini, Booth, Brunello, De Paola, and Leuven, 2007). Not
surprisingly, the effect of offshoring on skill upgrading is only slightly reduced and stays highly
significant. Finally, in Column (6) of Table 4.2 we also control for the competition intensity
within a given sector (cf. Görlitz and Stiebale, 2011). Given the positive correlation between firm
size and offshoring activities, it could be the case that industries dominated by a few large firms
have significantly different offshoring growth patterns than industries which are characterised
by a competitive number of firms. At the same time skill upgrading – for several reasons –
may also be linked to the intensity of competition within a sector: On the one hand increased
competition could lead to higher training needs, necessary to secure a well trained workforce
in a dynamic environment (Bassanini and Brunello, 2011). On the other hand, poaching, i.e.
the transfer of general skills to a different employer via job switching, is usually found to be
positively correlated with competition, which, hence, would lead to less training (Schmutzler
and Gersbach, 2012). Controlling for industry level competition, we use the same measure as
Görlitz and Stiebale (2011), the Herfindahl index of industry concentration.11 We find a positive
impact of competition on training, which is significant at the 1% level. Importantly, the effect
of offshoring growth on individual skill upgrading is still significant, albeit slightly smaller in
magnitude. Summing up, we find, that according to our preferred specification in Column (6) of
Table 4.2 a doubling of the industry level offshoring intensity defined in Eq. (4.7) would increase
the probability of on-the-job training participation by roughly 7.8 percentage points.
10Including sectoral output growth might raise concern about possibly high multicollinearity between output
growth and offshoring growth. However, this does not seem to be the case, as the coefficient on output growth
stays insignificant even if offshoring growth is excluded from the regression.
11The Herfindahl index is published bi-annually by the German Monopoly Commission. We use the values for
2005.
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4.2.4 The timing of offshoring and on-the-job training
The “BIBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2005/06” took place from October 2005 and March
2006, and individuals where asked whether they participated in on-the-job training two years
prior to the survey or since having the current job. We, thus, hold no precise information
concerning the timing of individual training incidences. For our main analysis we therefore use
a rather wide time frame covering offshoring growth from 2004 to 2006. As a robustness check,
we now consider shorter and varying time frames, each covering the growth rate of offshoring
on a year-to-year basis. Results are summarized in Table 4.3.
As we would expect, splitting up the time frame from 2004 to 2006 into two separate windows,
covering 2004 to 2005 and 2005 to 2006, does not change our result: Increased offshoring still
has a positive and significant impact on individual skill upgrading. Looking at a period (2002 -
2003) that far precedes the time frame potentially covered by the survey we find – as expected
– no effect. For the time frame from 2003 to 2004 we find a negative and significant coefficient.
We interpret this finding as evidence, that on-the-job training is a lumpy investment, which
individuals only use discontinuously over time with an optimal period of waiting between single
training incidences. Thus, if increased offshoring between 2003 and 2004 caused more training
in the period from 2003 to 2004 we would indeed expect that in the following period from 2004
to 2006 an immediate retraining becomes less likely for individuals who just completed their
last training in the previous period. Interestingly, when focusing on future offshoring growth
over the period from 2006 to 2007 we find a negative impact on the current training probability.
Several explanations may account for this result. Assuming that individuals discount the costs
and benefits of training at different rates, it could be the case that anticipated future offshoring
growth leads to a postponement of contemporaneous training to later period when the benefits
from training are even larger. Another explanation for the negative impact of future offshoring
growth on contemporaneous training could be the lack of sufficient long-run controls capturing
individual job loss fears. Given that offshoring tends to increase subjective job loss fears (cf.
Geishecker, Riedl, and Frijters, 2012), anticipated future offshoring growth could be associated
with more uncertain long-run employment prospects, causing a reduction or delay of current
on-the-job training. Finally, in Column (6) of Table 4.3 we only use individuals that are em-
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Table 4.3: Offshoring and on-the-job training: timing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average marginal effect of:
Offshoring growth 2002 - 2003 0.0178
(0.0121)
Offshoring growth 2003 - 2004 -0.1589**
(0.0697)
Offshoring growth 2004 - 2005 0.2672***
(0.0536)
Offshoring growth 2005 - 2006 0.2216***
(0.0774)
Offshoring growth 2006 - 2007 -0.1340***
(0.0476)
Offshoring growth 2004 - 2006 0.1009***
(0.0252)
Individual controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Workplace and sectoral controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
KldB88 (2-digit) occupation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.1335 0.1350 0.1370 0.1362 0.1354 0.1490
Observations 3,888 3,888 3,888 3,888 3,888 3,425
Notes: The table shows average marginal effect from estimating the variants of the Probit model in section 4.2.1
for different periods of offshoring growth. The dependent variable is a binary measure of observed skill upgrading
through training in the two years prior to the survey or since having the current job. The Herfindahl index is
not included since we do not have it for all respective time periods. Standard errors are cluster robust and are
shown in parentheses below the coefficients. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
ployed at the same employer since at least 2003. Because individuals where asked whether they
participated in on-the-job training two years prior to the survey or since having the current
job, this treatment gives us a more precise matching of the potential training period with the
time frame for which we observe our offshoring variable. The resulting coefficient for sectoral
offshoring growth is very similar to the one obtained from our preferred specification (Column
(6) of Table 4.2) and highly significant.
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4.2.5 Further robustness checks
In this subsection, we offer alternative specifications and check whether the link between off-
shoring growth and skill upgrading is driven by particular characteristics of our data set in terms
of measurement or outliers. Detailed results can be found in Table 8.3 in the Appendix. At
first, in Column (1) of Table 8.3 we look at the growth rate of worldwide offshoring, instead of
the growth rate of non-OECD offshoring intensities. We do this to provide evidence for an al-
ternative measure of offshoring. We find a positive and significant coefficient – which, somewhat
surprisingly, is even larger than what we have estimated before. Secondly, in Column (2) we look
at non-OECD offshoring again and include the growth rate of the export share in production
to control for influences related to overall international exposure. In column (3) we use sample
weights provided in the data and re-run our preferred specification using these weights. Note,
however, that the data set is designed by the BIBB to be balanced and adjustments are taken to
control for under representation of low-skilled individuals. Thus, it is not surprising to observe
very similar coefficients, both in terms of significance and magnitude. Next, we drop in Column
(4) four industries (tobacco; leather & luggage; office machinery & computers; coke & refined
petroleum) in which results, due to a low number of observations, could easily be affected by
outliers. In Column (5) we drop the two industries with the largest (other transport equip-
ment) and smallest (coke & refined petroleum) change in non-OECD offshoring, again to rule
out dependence on outliers, which could play an important role in our relatively small sample.
Similarly, in Column (6) we drop the industries with the highest (chemicals) and lowest (textiles)
average training participation rates. Reassuringly, all those changes have almost no effect on
the coefficient of sectoral offshoring growth, which remains positive and significant throughout
all specifications. Finally, let us recall our theoretical model from section 4.1, in which training
participation is modeled as a worker’s decision and it is the worker to whom both the cost and
the benefits associated with individual skill upgrading accrue. Translating this mechanism one
to one into our empirical model would require a distinction between employer-financed and self-
financed on-the-job training. Unfortunately, this information is not available to us. However,
we know whether a certain training measure can be traced back to the respective worker’s own
initiative or to some extrinsic motivation. Assuming that training which workers’ started by
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own initiative is more likely to be also self-financed, we drop all cases in which workers’ training
participation followed from the order or suggestion of the respective employer. The results are
shown in Column (7). Controlling for workers’ initiative to start on-the-job training does not
imply a correction of effect the growth rate of offshoring has on individual training participation.
Importantly, the coefficient is still significant and of similar size when compared to the coefficient
that results from the estimation of the full sample.
4.3 Summary
In this study we have derived a positive link between the offshoring of tasks and the individual
propensity to invest in on-the-job training. In particular, we developed a theory that outlines a
mechanism inducing employed individuals to select into training – a new aspect in the literature
linking offshoring and training, which has so far mostly analysed training responses to worker
displacement. In our model offshoring allows firms to save on costs when relocating parts of
their production abroad. The resulting costs savings are handed through to domestic workers,
whose wages are scaled up, thereby opening up so far unrealized skill upgrading possibilities.
We test for this intuitive mechanism, using data from German manufacturing, and find that
industry level offshoring growth rates indeed correlate with the individual probability of on-the-
job training in a positive and highly significant way. In obtaining this effect, we explicitly control
for a wide set of individual and workplace characteristics and in particular take into account
technological change at the workplace and industry output growth as major determinants of
individual on-the-job training.
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Chapter 5
Two-way migration between similar
countries
5.1 Permanent migration
In this section we develop a simple model to explain permanent two-way migration of high-skilled
individuals between developed countries. While the phenomenon of two-way migration has
received little attention in the theoretical literature, it is quantitatively important, in particular
for high-skilled individuals migrating between high-income countries. Table 5.1, which is based
on data from Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2008), shows for country pairs within the EU15 and
the OECD, respectively, the share of bilateral migration that can be characterised as two-way.
The share is measured by the Index of Bilateral Balance in Migration (Biswas and McHardy,
2005), which for each country pair (i, j) is given by Bij ≡ 2min(Emij ,Emji)/(Emij + Emji),
with Emij as the stock of emigrants from country i residing in country j.1 The numbers in
Table 5.1 are the average values of the index for the respective country group, in a given year
and skill group. The data show that the share of two-way migration is highest for high-skill
individuals, that it has grown over time, and that it is higher within the homogeneous group of
EU15 countries than in the more heterogeneous group of OECD countries.
1The construction of the index is directly analogous to the well-known Grubel-Lloyd index measuring intra-
industry trade, i.e. two-way trade in goods within the same industry.
89
Table 5.1: Index of bilateral balance in migration for EU15 and OECD countries
high skill med. skill low skill total
EU15
1990 0.61 0.53 0.20 0.35
2000 0.64 0.51 0.28 0.48
OECD
1990 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.19
2000 0.28 0.26 0.13 0.22
Focussing on high-skilled (tertiary educated) individuals, Figure 5.1 gives a more disaggre-
gated view at the level of country pairs for the EU15 (below the diagonal) and the OECD (above
the diagonal).2 The figure confirms that a lot of high-skilled migration between EU15 countries
is two-way in nature, while this is true to a lesser extent for the larger and more heterogeneous
group of OECD countries. Despite this regularity there is, of course, incidence of substantial
two-way migration for specific country pairs that are part of the OECD but not part of the EU15.
Taking Canada and the US as another prominent example of rather similar countries, we observe
substantial high-skilled migration in both directions, with the share of two-way migration being
0.5 for the year 2000.3
The key challenge in explaining two-way migration of similar (highly skilled) individuals
within a group of similar (high-income) countries – rather than one-way migration from low-
income to high-income countries – lies in the fact that country differences cannot be expected
to play a central role. The model we develop in this section therefore uses the assumption that
2The figure plots (15×14)/2 = 105 country pairs from the set of EU15 countries and (30×29)/2 = 435 country
pairs from the sample of OECD countries. Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia are omitted, as data on two-way
migration is not available for these countries in Docquier, Lowell, and Marfouk (2008). Note that country pairs
are order such that for the set of EU15 countries (blue) the net-emigration country appears first, while for the set
of OECD countries (red) the net-immigration country is named first. Hence, the strict separation in above and
below the 45 degree line.
3See Schmitt and Soubeyran (2006) and the references cited therein for additional anecdotal evidence on the
balance in migration flows between Canada and the US.
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Figure 5.1: Two-way migration among EU15 and among OECD countries
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countries are identical in all respects (this assumption is relaxed later on). In both countries there
is a continuum of workers with differing abilities, which are private knowledge. The production
technology, borrowed from Kremer (1993), exhibits complementarities between the skill levels
of individual workers, and profit maximising firms therefore aim for hiring workers of identical
skill. Migration is costly, and the cost is the same for all individuals. High-skilled individuals
from both countries self-select into emigration in order to separate themselves from low-skilled
co-workers at home. Firms can distinguish natives and immigrants, which allows them to form
more efficient matches, leading to larger gross wage premia for skilled workers.
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The welfare effects of migration in our model are stark: In the laissez-faire equilibrium
all individuals are worse off than in autarky. We show that this result is due to a negative
migration externality which leads to too much migration in equilibrium. We also show that for
sufficiently low migration cost the level of migration chosen by an omniscient social planner is
strictly positive (but of course lower than in the laissez-faire equilibrium), since the existence
of migrants as a distinct group of individuals enables firms to match workers of more similar
expected skill. While aggregate gains from migration exist in the social planner equilibrium,
the distributional effects are strong: All migrants gain relative to autarky, while all natives are
worse off. These distributional effects are mitigated if the social optimum is implemented via a
migration tax, since in this case the possibility of redistributing part of the gains to non-migrants
exists.
Our baseline model is deliberately stylised in order to bring out the basic mechanism driving
two-way migration and its welfare implications in the most transparent way possible. Due to
its simplicity, the basic version of the model has some extreme implications, and we introduce
multiple extensions with the aim for the model to better replicate various stylised facts of in-
ternational migration. In a first extension, we consider a situation where skills are imperfectly
observable, rather than unobservable as in our benchmark model. The most important effect of
this change is to give rise to instances where firms co-hire migrants and natives, thereby mit-
igating the complete segregation between migrants and natives across firms that is implied by
our basic framework (cf. Hellerstein and Neumark, 2008; Andersson, García-Pérez, Haltiwanger,
McCue, and Sanders, 2010). Our second extension analyses two-way migration in a world where
skills are only imperfectly transferable across countries (cf. Mattoo, Neagu, and Özden, 2008;
Chiswick and Miller, 2009). In this extension the skill distributions of migrants and natives
overlap, giving rise to a scenario in which migrants can find themselves in the middle (instead of
on the top) of the destination country’s skill distribution. Acknowledging that migration in our
framework effectively acts as a signalling device, we then show that migration is still observed as
an equilibrium phenomenon in our model if we add alternative signals, as for example education
(cf. Spence, 1973). In a fourth extension of our model we add capital as an internationally
immobile factor that is an essential input in the production of all firms (cf. Kremer, 1993). This
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extension introduces into our framework interactions between migrants and domestic factors of
production, which are well known in principle from many existing models of international mi-
gration (see, e.g., the complementarity between labour and capital underlying the “immigration
surplus” first documented in Berry and Soligo (1969) and more recently reviewed by Borjas
(1999), or the imperfect substitutability between natives and migrants recently highlighted in
Ottaviano and Peri (2012)). We show that migration is potentially more benign in this case
than in our basic model, since it allows for the more efficient allocation of capital between do-
mestic firms, with firms hiring migrants having a higher capital intensity due to a capital-skill
complementary that is well known from many models of migration. Lastly, we allow for small
differences in countries’ technologies. By gaining access to a better technology, workers from
the low-tech country then have an additional incentive to migrate, while the opposite holds true
for workers from the high-tech economy. Incorporating this modified incentive structure, we
still find two-way migration, which now is, however, biased towards the technologically superior
country: The high-tech country experiences net immigration while the low-tech country faces
net emigration.
The vast majority of theoretical models on high-skilled migration are in the tradition of the
“brain drain” literature, focussing on high-skilled migration from developing to more advanced
economies. Early contributions to this literature focused on the economic losses for source coun-
tries.4 However, more recently the possibility of a net “brain gain” as the prospect of emigration
raises education incentives has been emphasised by Mountford (1997), Stark, Helmenstein, and
Prskawetz (1997) and Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001).5 Embedding high-skilled migra-
tion between asymmetric countries into a general equilibrium model of inter- and intra-industry
trade Iranzo and Peri (2009) show that source countries gain, if high-skilled migration and trade
are complements and gains from trade through a larger set of varieties accrue globally. Similarly,
Bougheas and Nelson (2012) find that the majority of workers in source and sending countries
benefit from high-skilled emigration as Ricardian-type comparative advantages and the gains
4Grubel and Scott (1966b) point to the loss of positive externalities as professionals emigrate. Bhagwati and
Hamada (1974) stress the fiscal loss associated with the emigration of high-income earners, while Wong and Yip
(1999) show that a brain drain has negative growth effects as human capital accumulation is deteriorated.
5For a detailed review of the brain drain/gain literature see Hanson (2010) or Docquier and Rapoport (2012).
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from trade associated with it are reinforced.6 Hendricks (2001) use the same basic migration
mechanism as we do and models costly emigration as a signalling device, which is used by the
most able individuals to reveal their high but otherwise unobservable skills.7 Unlike our paper,
which analyses two-way migration between similar countries, Hendricks (2001) thereby focuses
on one-way migration and the subsequent assimilation of migrants into the more advanced des-
tination economy.
What all these models have in common are directed flows of high-skilled migrants from less
to more advanced economies triggered by exogenous country asymmetries. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to develop a model that can explain two-way international migration
of high-skilled workers between identical countries. Schmitt and Soubeyran (2006) address
the interesting but distinct question of two-way migration by individuals that have the same
occupation, rather than the same skill level. In their model, individuals have either high skills or
low skills, and they choose to be either entrepreneurs or workers, as in Lucas (1978). The career
choice of individuals depends not only on their own skill level, but also on the skill distribution
within each country. The equilibrium may feature two-way migration of both entrepreneurs and
workers, but high-skill individuals only migrate to the country where skills are relatively scarce.
If the countries are identical, as assumed in the main part of our model, no migration occurs.
Our model is also related to Hendricks (2001) and Giannetti (2001), who use the same basic
selection mechanism of high-skilled individuals into emigration as we do. But neither of these
models analyses two-way migration, which is the question we focus on in this chapter.
5.2 A simple model of permanent migration
Consider a world with two perfectly symmetric countries, each populated by a heterogeneous
mass of workers, which we normalise to one without loss of generality.8 Workers in each country
6For a discussion of the complementarity between international migration and international trade see for
example Felbermayr, Grossmann, and Kohler (2012).
7See also Giannetti (2001), who also models migration as a signalling device to explain inter-regional migration
patterns in Italy.
8Since countries are assumed to be symmetric, we suppress all country indices.
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differ with respect to their skills s which are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1], and
which are assumed to be private information. Moreover, workers are risk neutral, such that
utility u (x) = x can be expressed as a linear function of consumption x. Each country is a
single sector economy producing a homogeneous numéraire good y under perfect competition,
which is costlessly traded.
We follow Kremer (1993) in assuming a production technology which requires the processing
of l = 1, 2 tasks, each to be performed by a single worker. Firm-level output is given by
y = f (s1, s2) = 2As1s2, (5.1)
where A > 0 is a technology parameter and sl denotes the skill level of a worker performing task
l = 1, 2. Note that ∂f (s1, s2) /∂sl > 0 ∀ l = 1, 2. Moreover we have ∂2f (s1, s2) /∂sl∂slˆ > 0 for
all l, lˆ = 1, 2 and l 6= lˆ, such that Eq. (5.1) is supermodular and workers enter production as
complements.
In an equilibrium that features migration, firms can identify an individual worker as a mem-
ber of either the group of natives or the group of immigrants. This is the only information they
can base their hiring decision on, and this information is valuable since, as we show below, the
average skill of the two groups is different. Firms maximise their expected profits by choosing
the optimal skill mix of their employees:
max
s¯1,s¯2
π (s¯1, s¯2) = 2As¯1s¯2 − w (s¯1)− w (s¯2) , (5.2)
with s¯l, l = 1, 2, denoting the average skill of the group from which the worker for task l is hired,
and w(s¯l) being the expected wage paid to this worker. Lemma 5.2.1 gives the solution to this
optimisation problem.
Lemma 5.2.1 Firms maximise expected profits by hiring workers of the same expected skill.
Proof See Appendix A.18.
Wages cannot be based on individual ability, since this is private information. Consequently,
each worker is paid half the firm’s output independent of her actual contribution. Using this
remuneration rule, the expected wage rate of an individual worker with skill s equals
w (s¯ℓ, s) = As¯ℓs, (5.3)
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where s¯ℓ with ℓ ∈ {L,H} is the average skill of the group to which the individual belongs. We
assume that migration is costly, and the cost is equal to c. Although workers cannot observe
the individual skill of their potential co-workers, the distribution of skills in both countries is
known, such that expectations can be formed with regard to a potential co-worker’s average
skill s¯ℓ. It is now straightforward to show that our model leads to self-selection of the most able
individuals into emigration.
To see this, consider some arbitrary cutoff ability s˜ that separates high-skill and low-skill
individuals. The average skills in the two groups, L and H, are s¯L = s˜/2 and s¯H = (1+ s˜)/2 due
to our assumption of a uniform distribution, and the resulting difference between the averages of
both groups s¯H − s¯L is equal to 1/2 for all values of s˜. The expected wage gain for an individual
worker of being paired with a co-worker from group H is now given by A(s¯H − s¯L)s = As/2,
and it follows immediately that this gain is increasing in an individual’s skill s. With identical
migration cost for each individual, and assuming an interior solution, i.e. 0 < s˜ < 1, it follows
that high-skilled individuals self-select into migrating abroad, while low-skilled individuals are
deterred from migration by the cost attached to it. For the indifferent worker with skill s˜ the
condition As˜/2 = c holds, which immediately gives the migration cutoff in the laissez-faire
equilibrium as
s˜lf =
2c
A
. (5.4)
Self-selection into migration with s˜lf ∈ (0, 1) then obviously requires c ∈ (0, A/2). Proposition
5.2.2 summarises:
Proposition 5.2.2 With strictly positive but not prohibitively high migration cost, all workers
with skill s > s˜lf = 2c/A emigrate, while all workers with skill s ≤ s˜lf = 2c/A stay in their home
country. Migration flows increase for a higher level of technology A, and for lower migration
cost c.
Proof See Appendix A.19.
Taking stock, our model is able to explain two-way, high-skilled migration flows between two ex
ante and ex post symmetric countries, which are driven by the desire of high-skilled workers to
get separated from their low-skilled counterparts. In the resulting equilibrium costly migration
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acts as a signalling device, allowing high-skilled workers to (partly) reveal their true skill levels
as in Spence (1973).
Lemma 5.2.1 and Proposition 5.2.2 together imply that firms hire only migrants or only
natives. While this extreme implication of our model is counterfactual of course, Hellerstein and
Neumark (2008), Andersson, García-Pérez, Haltiwanger, McCue, and Sanders (2010), Aslund
and Skans (2010), Dustmann, Glitz, and Schönberg (2011) and Glitz (2012) find that there is
indeed considerable segregation of natives and migrants across workplaces in the US, Sweden
and Germany.9 Interestingly, Hellerstein and Neumark (2008), Andersson, García-Pérez, Halti-
wanger, McCue, and Sanders (2010) and Aslund and Skans (2010) also find that the high degree
of workplace segregation between natives and migrants in the US and Sweden is only weakly
related to the workers’ general education. Picking up on this, we show in Section 5.4.1 below
that a simple extension of our model, in which the abilities of some individuals are observ-
able, is compatible with the empirical observation of imperfect workplace segregation between
(high-skilled) natives and migrants.
As another straightforward implication of Proposition 5.2.2 we find the extreme result that
within each country migrants are at the top, while natives are at the bottom of the skill distri-
bution with no overlap in both groups’ skill ranges. Modelling imperfectly transferable skills in
line with the empirical findings by Mattoo, Neagu, and Özden (2008) and Chiswick and Miller
(2009) we show in Section 5.4.2 that our model can account for an overlap in the skill range
of migrants and natives. Alternatively we show in Section 5.4.3 that a similar result can be
obtained if workers can choose between migration and education as signalling devices. Since
the key mechanisms driving migration in our model are unaffected by these extensions, we stick
to our more parsimonious formulation with unobservable but perfectly transferable skills and
migration as the only signalling device for the time being, in order to save on notation and
9Hellerstein and Neumark (2008) find that 39.4% of Hispanics in the US have a co-worker who is also Hispanic,
while only 4.5% of the white workers have Hispanic co-workers. Comparing this to a probability of 6.9% for having
a Hispanic co-worker under random matching reveals a substantial workplace segregation by ethnicity. Figure
1 in Andersson, García-Pérez, Haltiwanger, McCue, and Sanders (2010) plots the cumulative distribution of the
immigrant co-worker share for natives and migrants, respectively, which significantly differ from the distribution
that would result under random assignment.
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terminology.
5.3 Welfare effects of permanent migration
In order to analyse the welfare effects of migration, the natural comparison is the scenario of
prohibitive migration cost c ≥ A/2, which leads to s˜lf = 1 (the “autarky case”). The value of
aggregate production equals total wage income, which for an arbitrary cutoff s˜ is given by
Y (s˜) = A
[∫ s˜
0
(
s˜
2
)2
ds+
∫ 1
s˜
(
1 + s˜
2
)2
ds
]
=
A [1 + s˜(1− s˜)]
4
.
Total output is therefore minimised under autarky (s˜ = 1), and maximised if exactly half
the individuals become migrants (s˜ = 1/2). Aggregate output rises, since firms that recruit
their workers from a labour market with a more diverse labour supply are able to discriminate
between the groups of natives and migrants. Since workers of the same nationality are more
similar with respect to their (unobservable) skills, we find, that firms in a more fractionalised
labour market realise productivity gains (cf. Trax, Brunow, and Suedekum, 2012) from the more
efficient matching of workers according to Lemma 5.2.1.
Aggregate welfare equals the difference between total output and total migration cost:
W (s˜, c) =
A[1 + s˜(1− s˜)]
4
− c(1− s˜). (5.5)
We can now use the link between s˜lf and c provided by Eq. (5.4) to express aggregate welfare
in the laissez-faire equilibrium as a function of s˜lf alone:
W (s˜lf) =
A [1− s˜lf(1− s˜lf)]
4
.
Thus, the effect of migration on aggregate welfare is diametrically opposed to its effect on total
output: Aggregate welfare is maximised under autarky (s˜lf = 1), and minimised if exactly half
the individuals become migrants (s˜lf = 1/2).
We now look at individual welfare, which is identical to an individual’s expected wage rate,
net of migration cost, if applicable. Non-migrants’ and migrants’ welfare is given by
wL(s˜
lf, s) =
As˜lfs
2
and wH(s˜
lf, s)− c = A[s− s˜
lf(1− s)]
2
,
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respectively. We see that all individuals are worse off than in the autarky equilibrium, where
the expected wage rate of an individual with skill s is equal to As/2.10 For non-migrants, this
simply happens because the pool of co-workers available for matching now has a lower average
skill. For migrants, this is explained by a negative external effect induced by migration that
can best be seen by a thought experiment, in which individual migration occurs sequentially, in
the order of decreasing ability of migrants: Every migrant, apart from the most skilled one, in
this case reduces the average skill of individuals in the migrant pool, thereby inflicting losses on
infra-marginal migrants’ wages. This effect is rationally ignored by individual migrants. Figure
Figure 5.2: Laissez-faire equilibrium
b
s
0 1s˜
lf
w
wH − wL
c
As/2
wH(s˜lf, s)
wH(s˜lf, s)− c
wL(s˜lf, s)
5.2 illustrates the results. The bottom quadrant shows how the migration cutoff is determined
by the equality of migration cost and expected migration gain for the marginal migrant. The top
quadrant shows in bold the resulting wage profile in the open economy as a function of individual
10Of course this result depends on the assumed skill distribution. As we show in Appendix A.20, an equilibrium
in which every worker is worse off results for all skill distributions, which feature a convex cumulative density
function, while for skill distributions with concave cumulative density functions there are net gains from migration
for the most able migrants.
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ability s where for migrants a distinction is made between the gross wage (bold dashed) and the
net wage, which subtracts migration cost (bold solid). The wage profile in autarky is given by
the thin solid line for comparison. Aggregate welfare is measured by the area under the autarky
wage profile and open economy wage profile, respectively.
The main welfare implications of high-skilled migration are summarised as follows:
Proposition 5.3.1 International migration leads to aggregate production gains, and to losses
in aggregate welfare. Furthermore, all individuals are worse off in the laissez-faire migration
equilibrium than in the autarky equilibrium.
Following the approach of Benhabib and Jovanovic (2012) we now look at the social planner
equilibrium. The social planner can freely choose the migration cutoff s˜ taking as given migration
cost c, but disregarding individuals’ migration incentives, which link s˜lf to c in the laissez-faire
equilibrium. Maximising Eq. (5.5) with respect to s˜ gives the optimal migration cutoff s˜sp and
hence the socially optimal extent of migration as a function of c:
s˜sp =
1
2
+
2c
A
. (5.6)
Hence, while there is “too much” migration in the laissez-faire equilibrium due to the negative
migration externality, the optimal level of migration is strictly positive if migration costs are
sufficiently low. Note also that s˜sp > 1/2 and therefore it is never socially optimal to have more
than half the population emigrating. It furthermore follows from Eq. (5.6) that zero migration
is enforced by the social planner (s˜sp = 1) whenever c ≥ A/4.
We can compare welfare in the laissez-faire and social planner scenarios by substituting
the respective migration cutoffs from Eqs. (5.4) and (5.6) into Eq. (5.5), thereby expressing
aggregate welfare in each scenario as a function of migration cost:
W lf(c) =
A
4
− c
(
1
2
− c
A
)
,
W sp(c) =
5A
16
− c
(
1
2
− c
A
)
,
and it is easily checked that W sp(c) is strictly larger than autarky welfare A/4 for all non-
prohibitive levels of c. The relationship between aggregate welfare and migration cost in the
laissez-faire equilibrium and the social-planner equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Aggregate welfare
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We now look at the effect that a socially optimal level of international migration has on
individual wages. Clearly, non-migrants are worse off with any level of high-skill emigration,
since the expected quality of their co-workers falls. Hence, we can restrict our attention to
comparing the expected net wage of migrants in the social optimum with the respective wage
in autarky. The net wage of migrants is given by
wH(s˜
sp, s)− c = A(1 + s˜
sp)s
2
− c,
and, substituting for s˜sp, it is immediate that there is a wage gain relative to autarky for migrants
with skill, s > 4c/(4c + A). Simple algebra shows that this threshold value is strictly smaller
than s˜sp as derived in Eq. (5.6), and therefore in the social optimum all migrants are better off
than under autarky. Figure 5.4, which is directly analogous to Figure 5.2 (but for expositional
purposes considers a smaller migration cost c) illustrates this. In constructing Figure 5.4, we use
the fact that from our results in Eqs. (5.4) and (5.6) we know that s˜sp = s˜lf+1/2. Furthermore,
the size of the jump in the wage profile in the upper quadrant at s˜sp is determined by the the
wage gain for the marginal migrant, which is determined in the lower quadrant. Proposition
5.3.2 summarises the results:
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Figure 5.4: Social planner equilibrium
b
s
0 1s˜
lf s˜sp
w
wH − wL
c
As/2
wH(s˜sp, s)
wH(s˜sp, s)− c
wL(s˜sp, s)
w(1, s)
1
2
Proposition 5.3.2 The socially optimal level of migration is strictly lower than in the laissez-
faire equilibrium, if the latter features positive migration levels. For c < A/4 the socially optimal
level of migration is strictly positive. In the social optimum, all migrants are better off than under
autarky, while all non-migrants are worse off.
The social optimum can alternatively be implemented by a tax on migration by both countries.
In this case, individual incentives to migrate are again relevant, of course. We assume that a
country’s tax revenue is distributed equally to all nationals, independent of their residence, and
hence does not affect the migration decision. Note that what countries care about in our setup
is emigration, not immigration: Immigrants do not interact with natives, and hence have no
effect on their wage rate, while emigration reduces the quality of matches available for those left
behind. Hence, a government in our framework would set an emigration tax, not an immigration
tax. Condition (5.4) now holds in a modified form, with effective (tax-inclusive) migration cost
c+ t replacing c:
s˜ =
2(c+ t)
A
.
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Substituting for s˜, using s˜sp from Eq. (5.6), implies tsp = A/4. Notably, the optimal emigra-
tion tax rate does not depend on whether it is set cooperatively between countries, or non-
cooperatively. This is due to the fact, mentioned above, that a country’s welfare is independent
of the extent of immigration (which is the only variable affected by the other country’s emigration
tax).
Figure 5.5: Equilibrium with optimal emigration tax
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Figure 5.5 shows the resulting distribution of wages, where as before the bold dashed line
gives the distribution of gross wages, and the bold solid line gives the distribution of net wages,
subtracting effective migration cost c + tsp. While in principle Figure 5.5 resembles Figure 5.2
from the laissez-faire equilibrium, with c + tsp substituted for c, there is one crucial difference:
The migration equilibrium now yields tax revenue, which is equally redistributed among natives.
The resulting transfer-inclusive wage is not shown in Figure 5.5 in order to avoid clutter, but it
is clear that the transfer leads to a parallel upward shift in the net-wage profile. Consequently,
individuals with the highest abilities and individuals with the lowest abilities are better off than
in autarky: For both groups the absolute pre-transfer losses relative to autarky are small, as
shown above, and therefore their transfer-inclusive incomes are higher than in autarky. It can be
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shown analytically that this simple tax-transfer scheme does not make everyone better off than
in autarky, and hence individuals with intermediate abilities (the most high-skilled non-migrants
and the least skilled migrants) see their transfer-inclusive net wages fall.11
5.4 Extensions
Five important assumptions of the model presented in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 are that (i) individual
ability of all workers is unobservable, (ii) migrants’ skills are perfectly transferable across coun-
tries, (iii) migration is the only available signalling device, (iv) internationally mobile labour is
the only factor of production, and (v) countries are ex ante identical in all respects. We now
consider extensions of our model, where we relax these five assumptions one at a time. In doing
so, we focus on the most interesting implications of the respective extension. In Section 5.4.1 we
consider the case where the ability of individuals becomes observable with a positive probability.
In Section 5.4.2 we allow for imperfect transferability of migrants’ skills. In Section 5.4.3 we in-
troduce education as an alternative signalling device. In Section 5.4.4 we add an internationally
immobile factor of production to the model. In Section 5.4.5 we consider country asymmetries.
5.4.1 Imperfect observability of skill
As discussed earlier, one key stylised fact that our benchmark model does not capture well is
the imperfect segregation between high-skilled migrants and non-migrants in the workplace, as
documented by Hellerstein and Neumark (2008), Andersson, García-Pérez, Haltiwanger, McCue,
and Sanders (2010), Aslund and Skans (2010). In our benchmark model the probability of a given
migrant being matched with another migrant is equal to one, while the empirical studies find
matching rates in excess of those that would be found under random matching, but significantly
smaller than one. We now demonstrate that imperfect observability of skill leads to exactly the
same outcome in our model.12
11The proof is delegated to Appendix A.21.
12Hendricks (2001) introduces the possibility of cross-matching between migrants and natives by assuming that
an exogenous fraction of migrants is indistinguishable from natives.
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For the sake of continued tractability we model the imperfect observability of abilities in a
parsimonious and stylised way. Consider the following sequence of events. Before individuals
decide about migration their abilities are revealed with probability p ∈ (0, 1). Then, as in our
baseline model, individuals decide whether to migrate, incurring migration cost c > 0, or to stay
put. This decision is based on a comparison of expected incomes. Once migration has taken
place, with probability q ∈ (0, 1) the abilities of those whose skills have been private knowledge
so far, are revealed. Finally, firms hire workers and production takes place.
Before considering a worker’s migration decision in this changed environment, we have to
derive the wage schedule for workers with observable skills. The firm’s profit maximisation
problem can analogously to Eq. (5.2) be written as
max
s1,s2
π (s1, s2) = 2As1s2 − w (s1)− w (s2) , (5.7)
in which sl, l = 1, 2, refers to the skill of a worker performing task l = 1, 2, while w (sl) denotes
the wage paid to this workers. The solution to the profit maximisation problem is given by the
following lemma:
Lemma 5.4.1 If workers’ skills are perfectly observable, firms maximise their profits by hiring
only workers with exactly the same skill level.
Proof Positive assortative matching of workers within firms follows immediately from the su-
permodularity of Eq. (5.1), see Kremer (1993).
Using the zero profit condition as well as the result on positive assortative matching in Eq. (5.7),
the wage rate of a worker with observable skill level s is given by
w (s) = As2. (5.8)
Now it is easy to see that individuals with ex ante observable skills have no incentive to migrate,
irrespective of their skill level: They are positively assortatively matched in any case, leaving
them with a wage rate as given by Eq. (5.8), and by staying put they can save migration cost c.
For workers whose skill is unobservable ex ante, an analogous logic to Section 5.2 applies: They
know that with probability 1− q their skill level remains unobservable ex post, in which case a
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switch from low-skill group L, with s¯L = s˜/2, to high-skill group H, with s¯H = (1 + s˜) /2, yields
a wage gain of As/2. However, with probability q their skill level is revealed ex post and the
worker earns the same wage at home and abroad. Hence, the expected wage gain of switching
from group L to H amounts to (1 − q)As/2. For the indifferent worker with skill s˜ condition
(1− q)As˜/2 = c must hold, giving a migration cutoff
s˜lf =
2c
(1− q)A.
Comparison to Eq. (5.4) from the benchmark model shows that a positive probability q of a
migrant’s skill being revealed ex post increases the migration cutoff, i.e. reduces the incidence
of migration among those with ex ante undisclosed skill levels.
We now illustrate the degree of workplace segregation predicted by our model. Consider
first the probability that a randomly picked migrant would have another migrant as a co-worker
under randommatching. This would happen with a probability equal to the migrants’ population
share, which is (1−p) (1− s˜lf). Now consider the same probability predicted by the model. With
probability (1 − q) the migrant’s skill is private knowledge, in which case he is matched with
another migrant with probability one. With probability q his skill is revealed ex post, and he is
matched with a co-worker of identical skill. Within the relevant group of individuals whose skill
has been revealed, the share of migrants is (1− p)q/[(1− p)q+ p], where (1− p)q is the share of
migrants of known skill in the overall population at this skill level, and p is the share of natives
in the overall population at this skill level.
Hence, in our extended model the probability for a random migrant to be matched with
another migrant is equal to
Prob(p, q) = 1− q + q
[
(1− p)q
(1− p)q + p
]
,
and it is easily shown that Prob(p, 0) = 1, Prob(p, 1) = 1 − p, and ∂Prob/∂q < 0. Hence, the
probability for a random migrant to be matched with another migrant is higher than under
random matching. Interestingly, for a given migrant the probability of being matched with
another migrant does not depend on his skill level s. This is also compatible with the results from
Hellerstein and Neumark (2008), Andersson, García-Pérez, Haltiwanger, McCue, and Sanders
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(2010), and Aslund and Skans (2010), who find that workplace segregation is at most weakly
related to skill levels. Summing up, we have the following result:
Proposition 5.4.2 The probability of migrants to have a co-worker who is also a migrant does
not depend on their skill level, and it is furthermore smaller than one, but larger than under
random assignment of workers into workplaces.
5.4.2 Imperfect transferability of skills
As discussed in Section 5.2, our baseline model implies zero overlap in the skill range of migrants
and natives: Migrants are always at the top of the destination country’s wage distribution, while
natives are at the bottom. This outcome is a consequence of the assumption in the benchmark
version of our model that skills are perfectly transferable between countries. In accordance with
results from Mattoo, Neagu, and Özden (2008) and Chiswick and Miller (2009), who show that
immigrants in the US are more likely to suffer from occupational “underplacement” than natives,
we now allow for a less than perfect transferability of workers’ pre-migration skills. In particular,
we assume that migrants can transfer only a fraction θ of their skills, while the fraction 1 − θ
of skills is country specific and therefore becomes obsolete when going abroad. The migration
arbitrage condition then reads
As˜
2
[
(1 + s˜)θ2 − s˜
]
= c,
where we have substituted s¯L = s˜/2 and s¯H = θ (1 + s˜) /2. Solving for the laissez-faire migration
cutoff s˜lf yields
s˜lf =
Aθ2 −√A2θ4 − 8 (1− θ2) c
2A (1− θ2) , (5.9)
where s˜lf ∈ (0, 1) ∀ c ∈ (0, A (2θ2 − 1) /2), which implies that an economically meaningful
solution requires θ ∈ (√1/2, 1]. Differentiating Eq. (5.9), we find that given our parameter
constraint for θ, we have ∂s˜lf/∂θ < 0. Thus, as one would reasonably expect, lower skill trans-
ferability θ weakens the incentive to migrate. There is now an overlap of the skill distributions
by migrants and natives, respectively, since the lowest-skill immigrant has skill level θs˜lf, while
the highest-skill native has skill level s˜lf. Proposition 5.4.3 sums up.
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Proposition 5.4.3 If skills are imperfectly transferable internationally, the skill distributions
of migrants and natives overlap.
5.4.3 Migration vs. education as signalling devices
While in our baseline model the only way for individuals to signal their true skill is by costly
migration, in reality there is of course a wide range of possible signals, with education being
probably the best known example, as already outlined by Spence (1973). We now analyse
whether the presence of costly education as an alternative signalling device limits the importance
of our signalling story in explaining the phenomenon of two-way migration.
Similar to migration, education involves a fixed cost, ce > 0, and workers can now choose
whether to emigrate, to get an education, or to do neither. Focussing on the signalling aspect of
education, it is assumed that education does not alter workers’ skills. Firms observe both signals
and use this information to form more efficient matches at the workplace. The equilibrium is
derived in the same way as in the baseline model. The results are summarised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.4.4 With costly migration and costly education as two alternative ways for work-
ers to signal their skill, and provided the cost of neither signal is prohibitive,
(i) high-skilled workers select into the costlier signal, while medium-skilled workers select into
the less costly signal, whenever costs for the two signals are sufficiently different,
(ii) high-skilled workers select into the costlier signal, and the other signal is not chosen,
whenever costs for the two signals are sufficiently similar.
Proof See Appendix A.22.
The intuition for Proposition 5.4.4 is the following. If the costs of the two signals are sufficiently
different, high-skilled workers use the costlier signal to get separated from co-workers with lower
skills. Medium-skilled workers are deterred from the costlier signal, but they have an incentive
to get separated from low-skilled workers, which is achieved by selecting into the signal with
the lower cost. Now consider the case where the costs of the two signals become more similar,
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by holding the cost of the cheaper signal constant, while the cost of the more expensive signal
gradually declines. As the costlier signal is easier to afford, the group of individuals choosing
the cheaper signal shrinks at both ends: The most high-skilled in this group now select the
expensive signal. This in turn makes it less attractive for everybody else to be in this group,
causing workers to drop out at the lower end as well. With converging costs of the two signals,
this mechanism eventually leads to the disappearance of the group choosing the cheaper signal.
Figure 5.6: Possible equilibria with two alternative signals
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Figure 5.6 illustrates this result. The two curves enclosing the dark lens are given by cm =
2c2e/A and ce = 2c
2
m/A, respectively. All parameter constellations within this lens represent
cases in which the costs for the two signals are similar, and in these cases only the costlier signal
is used. For combinations of cm and ce outside the lens, but inside the light, grey square both
signals coexist with the high-skilled (medium-skilled) workers using the expensive (cheap) signal.
If one of the signals is prohibitively expensive, i.e. cm ≥ A/2 or ce ≥ A/2, only the cheaper one
is used. If both are too costly, none is used.
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To sum up, in general, adding education as an alternative signalling device does not rule
out the use of migration as a signal. In fact for the largest part of the relevant parameter space
both signals coexist. In particular it is shown in the appendix that, if 0 < ce < cm < A/2,
the resulting migration cutoff s˜m is the same as in Eq. (5.4). Only for parameter combinations
leading to 0 < 2c2e/A < cm < ce < A/2 education completely replaces migration as a signalling
device.13
5.4.4 Internationally immobile factors of production
In this subsection, we add internationally immobile capital to our model. Capital is modelled
as an essential input in all firms, and hence we introduce an interaction between migrants and
domestic factors of production that is standard in most migration models (cf. Berry and Soligo,
1969; Borjas, 1999), but has not been a feature of our basic model. The production technology
is unchanged with respect to labour, i.e. there are two tasks, which have to be performed by
exactly one worker each, and following Kremer (1993) we assume that capital is combined with
labour in a Cobb-Douglas fashion. The resulting production function is given by
y = f (s1, s2, k) = 2As1s2k
α, (5.10)
with α ∈ [0, 1] denoting the partial production elasticity of capital and k being the per capita
capital stock used in production. With firms knowing only the average skill within the groups,
L and H, Lemma 5.2.1 implies positive assortative matching of group members. The profit
maximising level of capital depends on whether the firm employs individuals from group H or
L, and we show in the appendix that the amount of capital used by either type of firm is given
by:
kL =
[
s˜+ (1− s˜)
(
1 + s˜
s˜
) 2
1−α
]−1
k¯, (5.11)
kH =
[
(1− s˜) + s˜
(
s˜
1 + s˜
) 2
1−α
]−1
k¯, (5.12)
13If the cost of education declines in a worker’s skill, such that the effective cost of eduction for an individual
with skill s equals ce/s instead of ce, it can be shown that the equilibrium is of the type 0 < s˜lfm < s˜
lf
e < 1 for all
0 < cm < ce < A/2.
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where k¯ is the average capital stock in the economy. It is easily checked that kH ≥ k¯ ≥ kL.
Hence, firms employing workers of a higher expected ability, which in equilibrium will be firms
employing migrants, have a higher capital intensity.
In analogy to Section 5.2, wages are determined by splitting available revenue (now the
difference between total firm revenue and payments to capital) equally between the two workers.
Capital returns are distributed equally among the nationals of a country, and hence capital
ownership does not distort the decision to migrate. In analogy to the baseline model, the
laissez-faire migration equilibrium is then determined by the condition that the wage gain for
the marginal migrant is equal to the migration cost. We get
s˜lf =
2c
A(1− α)k¯α (Φ)
−1 , (5.13)
with
Φ ≡ (1 + s˜lf)
(
kH
k¯
)α
− s˜lf
(
kL
k¯
)α
≥ 1,
where the inequality is strict whenever α > 0. Comparison with Eq. (5.4) shows that the
relative size of the laissez-faire migration cutoffs in the two models depends on two effects. A
larger value for (1− α)k¯α increases migration flows since the migration cost falls in relation to
average income. The second effect is given by Φ−1, and it shows that an additional incentive
to migrate exists in the extended model, which stems from the reallocation of domestic capital
towards firms employing (more productive) migrants.
We now turn to the welfare implications that migration has in the framework with capital
just described. Going through the same steps as in the baseline model, we find that aggregate
welfare in the laissez-faire migration equilibrium is given by
W (s˜lf, α) =
A
{
kαH −
[
2Φ(1− α)k¯α − kαH
]
s˜lf(1− s˜lf)− (kαH − kαL) (s˜lf)3
}
4
,
and it is easily checked that autarky welfare is equal to W (1, α) = Ak¯α/4. We can now
compute the relative welfare levels in the migration equilibrium and in autarky, ω (s˜lf, α) ≡
W (s˜lf, α) /W (1, α), where aggregate migration gains exist whenever ω(s˜lf, α) > 1.
Figure 5.7 provides a contour plot of ω (s˜lf, α) for all combinations of s˜lf and α, where
combinations that lead to ω (s˜lf, α) > 1 are highlighted in different shades of grey. All other
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Figure 5.7: Aggregate welfare in a model with capital
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combinations lead to aggregate welfare losses from migration. We find that in contrast to
our baseline model that abstracts from complementarities in production between internationally
mobile and immobile factors, there exists now a non-trivial parameter space where welfare losses
from the negative migration externality are overcompensated by the efficiency gains resulting
from the reallocation of capital towards migrant-employing firms. The results are summarised
as follows:
Proposition 5.4.5 For high (low) values of α the model features aggregate welfare gains (losses)
from international migration.
Turning to the social planner’s solution, one can show that the socially optimal level of migration
will be lower than the one in the laissez-faire equilibrium given by Eq. (5.13).14 It is easy to
14The proof is deferred to Appendix A.24.
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see why: Adding capital to the model opens up a new channel for gains from migration, but
does not add a new distortion. Hence, the migration externality remains the only distortion in
the model. As an immediate consequence migration levels in the laissez-faire equilibrium will
in general be too high.
5.4.5 Country asymmetries
We now extend our baseline model by assuming AD 6= AF , where AD denotes the technology
level of the domestic economy while AF refers to the corresponding technology parameter in
the foreign economy. Recalling Eq. (5.3), the two country-specific indifference conditions for the
marginal migrant can be written as
Ais˜i
2
[
Aj
Ai
(1 + s˜i)− s˜i
]
= c ∀ i, j ∈ {D,F} with i 6= j, (5.14)
where we have used s¯Li = s˜i/2 and s¯Hi = (1 + s˜i)/2. Solving for s˜lfi yields
s˜lfi =
Aj −
√
A2j + 8 (Aj −Ai) c
2 (Ai −Aj) ∀ i, j ∈ {D,F} with i 6= j. (5.15)
It is now easy to check that the technologically superior country experiences net immigration,
i.e. for Aj > Ai we have s˜lfj > s˜
lf
i . Moreover, it follows from differentiating Eq. (5.14) that
∂s˜lfi /∂Ai > 0 > ∂s˜
lf
i /∂Aj if countries are not too dissimilar, i.e. if 2/3 < AD/AF < 3/2. This is
the case we focus on henceforth. Thus, emigration increases if the technology in the destination
country gets better, while it falls if the same occurs in the source country. The prohibitive level
of migration cost is now also country-specific: Setting s˜lfi = 1 in (5.15), we find that emigration
occurs from country i whenever c < (2Aj −Ai)/2.
Turning to the welfare implications of migration, aggregate welfare of nationals from country
i ∈ {D,F} can be expressed analogously to Eq. (5.5) as
Wi(s˜i, c) =
(Ai −Aj)(s˜i)3
4
+
Aj [1 + s˜i(1− s˜i)]
4
− (1− s˜i)c,
for all i, j ∈ {D,F} with i 6= j. In analogy to the baseline model we can use the link between
migration cost and the laissez-faire migration cutoff in Eq. (5.15) to express aggregate welfare
as a function of s˜lfi alone:
W lfi (s˜
lf
i ) =
Ai(s˜lfi )
2(2− s˜lfi )
4
+
Aj [1− (s˜lfi )2](1− s˜lfi )
4
. (5.16)
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Migration leads to aggregate welfare gains for the nationals of country i, whenever Wi(s˜lfi ) >
Wi (1) = Ai/4 for s˜lfi ∈ (0, 1), where (5.15) can be used to derive the necessary condition on the
cost of migration. We find the following:
Proposition 5.4.6 Aggregate welfare is lower in a migration equilibrium than under autarky for
nationals of the country with the better technology. For nationals of the technologically inferior
country, aggregate welfare gains from migration exist if migration costs are sufficiently low.
Proof See Appendix A.25.
Relative to the baseline model, in which all individuals lose from trade in the laissez-faire equi-
librium, country asymmetries result in an additional welfare effect that is positive for migrants
from the technologically inferior country (since they use a more efficient technology in the des-
tination country) and negative for migrants from the other country. It is therefore intuitively
plausible that only nationals from the technologically inferior country may gain in the aggregate
from migration.15
With the asymmetric version of our model at hand we can now return to Figure 5.1, which
compares two-way migration within the EU15 and the OECD. Using Eq. (5.15) and focussing
(without loss of generality) on the case Aj ≥ Ai, it is now possible to compute the familiar index
of bilateral balance in migration:
Bij(s˜
lf
i , s˜
lf
j ) =
2min (Emij ,Emji)
Emij + Emji
=
2(1− s˜lfj )
2− s˜lfj − s˜lfi
. (5.17)
Note that, if countries are identical, i.e. Aj = Ai = A, we have s˜lfj = s˜
lf
j = s˜
lf and Bij(s˜lfi , s˜
lf
j ) in
Eq. (5.17) takes a value of one. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that Bij(s˜lfi , s˜
lf
j ) declines
monotonically as Aj − Ai increases: As countries become more dissimilar migration becomes
less balanced. This is in accordance with the results in Table 1, which show that migration
of tertiary educated individuals between EU15 country pairs is more balanced than between
country pairs in the more heterogeneous group of OECD countries.
15Notably, the negative migration externality discussed in Section 5.3 is also present here. In particular we can
show that the migration cutoffs s˜spi ∀ i = D,F that an omniscient social planner would choose are strictly higher
than the ones from Eq. (5.15). The mathematical proof is deferred to Appendix A.26.
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5.5 Temporary migration
While so far the focus mainly has been on permanent migration, we now acknowledge the fact
that international migration today is increasingly seen as a temporary phenomenon (Dustmann
and Glitz, 2011).16 The theoretical migration literature thereby distinguishes between two broad
trends explaining the temporary character of international migration: Low-skilled guest-worker
migration (cf. Ethier, 1985; Djajic and Milbourne, 1988; Djajic, 1989, 2010, 2013a,b; Dustmann
and Kirchkamp, 2002; Mesnard, 2004) and high-skilled student migration (cf. Dustmann and
Weiss, 2007; Dustmann, Fadlon, and Weiss, 2011; Dustmann and Glitz, 2011). Common to both
strands of the literature is the analysis of temporary migration in an asymmetric two-country
setup, in which individuals emigrate from a developing country to a more advanced economy, in
order to invest either in physical or in human capital accumulation. Both types of investments
thereby tend to pay off at higher rates in the developing economy, and it is this difference in
returns, which rationalises the observed return migration towards the seemingly less attractive
location.
While this combination of country-specific push and pull factors provides a convincing ex-
planation for temporary migration between asymmetric countries, it seems less clear what drives
temporary migration between rather similar countries. To answer this question we develop a
theory of high-skilled temporary and permanent migration between two identical countries. In-
dividual (return) migration decisions thereby are analysed in a framework with two overlapping
generations of heterogeneous workers, which differ with respect to their unobservable skills.17
16Comparable data on bilateral temporary migration and in particular on return migration is scant. The OECD
reports average re-emigration rates for a small set of selected European countries and the US which vary from
19.1% for the US up to 60.4% for Ireland (cf. Table III.1. in OECD, 2008b). More recently, Gibson and McKenzie
(2012) surveyed 4,131 high-talented top-performers from five typical “brain drain” countries (Ghana, Micronesia,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga), which graduated from high school between 1976 and 2004. In their
sample, 65% of all respondents have ever migrated abroad, while 36% currently lived abroad when the survey was
conducted. Case studies on the return migration from single countries exist among others for the US (cf. Borjas
and Bratsberg, 1996), the UK (cf. Dustmann and Weiss, 2007), and Canada (Aydemir and Robinson, 2008). A
more detailed review over the respective literature is given in Dustmann and Glitz (2011).
17Traditionally, temporary migration has either been studied in life-cycle models à la Djajic and Milbourne
(1988), Djajic (1989, 2010), Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002), and Mesnard (2004), or in models with overlapping
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The production process requires the formation of teams as in Kremer (1993), and, hence, in-
duces high-skilled workers to use costly one- or two-period stays abroad in order to escape from
potentially “bad” matches with less skilled domestic co-workers. A costly stay abroad thereby
acts as a signalling device (cf. Spence, 1973), and it is the repeated use of this signalling option,
which shapes the strategic selection of workers into temporary and permanent migration. De-
pending on the costs of staying abroad two possible migration equilibria exist. If the costs are
low, the symmetric equilibrium in both countries features temporary and permanent migration.
Thereby, medium-skilled workers select into temporary migration, while high-skilled workers
decide to migrate permanently abroad. On the contrary, if the costs of living abroad are high,
we only observe temporary migration of the most high-skilled individuals.
In traditional asymmetric-country frameworks welfare gains for (temporary) migrants more
or less automatically result as a consequence of workers’ arbitrage between internationally un-
integrated national markets.18 Focusing on a setup with two identical countries, we would not
expect these kind of welfare effects to matter, and indeed the welfare effects in our model contra-
dict conventional wisdom in so far as all workers (including the migrants) tend to be worse off in
an laissez-faire equilibrium with temporary (and permanent) migration than in an equilibrium
without migration. Instrumental for the associated aggregate welfare loss is a negative migra-
tion externality, which leads to excessive temporary and permanent emigration in the presence
of wasteful migration costs. As a consequence, aggregate production gains, which result from
the more efficient matching of natives and migrants at the firm level, are eaten up by the costs
of living abroad. Of course this does not mean that all migration, temporary or permanent, is
socially harmful and, hence, must be prohibited. Employing an omniscient, global social plan-
ner we find that, if the costs of living abroad are not too high, the socially optimal equilibrium
may feature temporary and permanent migration, both – of course – at a smaller scale than
in the laissez-faire equilibrium. The global-social-planer solution thereby – as we show – can
be implemented by a carefully chosen combination of emigration tax and return subsidy, which
generations (cf. Galor, 1986; Karayalcin, 1994).
18As an example for this kind of arbitrage Dustmann (2001) refers to the higher purchasing power of assets
accumulated in the host country, when used for consumption back in the home country (e.g. after retirement).
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both countries independent from each other consider as socially optimal.
We consider three separate extensions to our model. In particular we show that the availabil-
ity of alternative signalling devices (e.g. education, see Spence (1973)) not necessarily leads to
a complete crowding out of temporary and permanent migration as signalling devices. It rather
seems to be the case that in particular high-skilled workers combine several signals (e.g. edu-
cation and migration) to achieve a more accurate signal of their otherwise unobservable skills.
We moreover highlight the strategic effect, that follows from the sequential structure of initial
emigration and later return decisions, and show that initial emigration is strategically reduced
if the marginal emigrant anticipates that the most high-skilled co-migrants permanently stay
abroad. Finally, in the third extension we explore under which conditions our model not only
features an equilibrium with temporary or temporary and permanent migration, but also an
equilibrium in which only permanent migration results.
Our analysis is motivated by the distinct pattern of temporary migration between rather sim-
ilar countries. While existing asymmetric-country models would predict unidirectional (return)
migration flows, which should be reflected in bilateral migration stocks, that are considerably
less balanced for short than for long durations of stay, we show that the observed pattern of
temporary migration is characterised by a surprisingly stable balance in bilateral migration
stocks over varying durations of stay. Due to lack of comparable data on bilateral temporary
migration and in particular on return migration, we follow Dustmann and Glitz (2011) and use
the Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) (cf. OECD, 2008c) to analyse the
duration of stay in bilateral migration between 15 OECD countries for which this information
is available around the year 2000.19 Admittedly, the dissection of bilateral migration stocks by
duration of stay yields a rather crude measure for temporary migration and the results must be
interpreted with caution. As pointed out by Dustmann and Glitz (2011) high shares of short-
term migrants could either result from actual short migration durations or from large number of
recent arrivals (as for example in the case of Italy or Spain). Moreover we hold no information
on which type of status change (e.g. return migration, onward migration or naturalisation)
19Notable exceptions are the studies by Gibson and McKenzie (2011, 2012); Dustmann and Glitz (2011), which
focus on return migration to (from) a small set of sending (receiving) countries.
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is responsible for the variation of bilateral migration stocks over different durations of stay.20
Despite these limitations the aggregate figures in Table 5.2 point to a considerable amount of
temporary migration in particular among the high-skilled: Only the half of all high-skilled mi-
grants live for more than 20 years in their destination country and, hence, can be considered
as permanent migrants. As an additional information in Table 5.2 we also report the share
of bilateral migration stocks that can be characterised as two-way. The share is measured by
the Index of Bilateral Balance in Migration (IBBM), which for each country pair (i, j) is given
by Bij ≡ 2min(Emij ,Emji)/(Emij + Emji), with Emij as the stock of emigrants from country
i residing in country j (cf. Biswas and McHardy, 2005).21 The numbers in Table 5.2 are the
average values of the index for a maximum of 15 × 14 = 105 OECD country pairs, in a given
skill group and for varying durations of stay.
Three important insights can be gained from the Index of Bilateral Balance in Migration
(IBBM). (i) Bilateral migration stocks are surprisingly balanced: Almost 50% of all high-skilled
migration can be considered as two-way migration. (ii) The balance in bilateral migration stocks
is stable over different durations of stay, i.e. the index values change only marginally if different
durations of stay are considered.22 And finally: (iii) Both trends seem to be most pronounced
for the migration of high-skilled individuals.
To highlight these findings we take another, more disaggregated view on the data and plot
in Figure 5.8 the bilateral migration stocks of high-skilled individuals, which stay more than
5 years (above the 45◦-line), against the bilateral migration stocks of high-skilled individuals,
which stay less than 5 years (below the 45◦-line). Most of the observations cluster along the
45◦-line, which indicates a considerable balance in bilateral migration for both durations of stay,
20One of the few studies that distinguishes between return and onward migration is Nekby (2006), which finds
that the return rates among re-emigrants from Sweden vary between 90% for migrants from Nordic sending
countries and 30% for migrants from African origin countries.
21The construction of the index is directly analogous to the well-known Grubel-Lloyd index (cf. Grubel and
G.Lloyd, 1975) measuring intra-industry trade in differentiated products, i.e. two-way trade in goods within
the same industry. See Brülhart (2009) for a recent application of the Grubel-Lloyd index as a measure of
intra-industry trade.
22Migration that lasts for less than one year to a large extend is driven by seasonal workers and young working
holidaymakers (cf. OECD, 2008c), which would explain the rather low index values in this category.
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Table 5.2: Migration shares and IBBMs for 15 OECD countries by duration of stay
Duration of stay
in years:
<1 1 - 3 3 - 5 5 - 10 10 - 20 >20 All
High skills:
Share 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.51 1
IBBM 0.41 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.41 0.46
(87) (93) (95) (101) (100) (104) (104)
Med. skills:
Share 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.66 1
IBBM 0.36 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.25 0.33
(80) (91) (96) (99) (100) (101) (105)
Low skills:
Share 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.80 1
IBBM 0.30 0.39 0.42 0.46 0.40 0.18 0.24
(59) (78) (77) (86) (93) (94) (102)
All skills:
Share 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.67 1
IBBM 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.27 0.34
(99) (101) (100) (102) (104) (104) (105)
Note: Table 5.2 reports the (average) shares of migrants by duration of stay along with the
aggregate Index of Bilateral Balance in Migration (IBBM) for bilateral migration between
15 OECD countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States) in
2000. Index values are computed separately at the country-pair level for varying durations of
stay and different educational attainments. Computations thereby are based on a maximum
of (15× 14)/2 = 105 country pairs, which we then aggregated up using the relative size of the
respective bilateral migration stocks as weights. The number of country pairs available for the
computation are reported in parenthesis below the respective index numbers.
and indeed the corresponding IBBMs take very similar values of 0.45 (0.46) for migrants that
stay for more (less) than 5 years. Together these findings are noteworthy, given that traditional
explanations based on country asymmetries in general would predict rather unbalanced bilateral
migration stocks, which in particular for short durations of stay are considerably less balanced
than for long durations of stay, (when temporary migration contribute to a lesser extent to the
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Figure 5.8: Two-way migration among 15 OECD countries by duration of stay
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Note: Figure 5.8 plots 101 out of (15×14)/2 = 105 possible bilateral migration stocks
for 15 OECD countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United States) in 2000, differentiated by duration of stay being either more or less
than 5 years. Observations for LU-AU, LU-CA, LU-NO, and LU-NZ are missing.
Note that for durations < 5 years (> 5 years) the net-emigration (net-immigration)
country is named first. Hence the strict separation in above and below the 45Â◦-line.
imbalance in bilateral migration stocks). Building up on this insight, in the following we de-
velop a simple model of temporary and permanent migration between similar countries, which
is able to explain the stable balance in bilateral migration stocks over different durations of
stay as an outcome of strategic (return) migration decisions in a framework with asymmetric
120
information. The stable balance of bilateral migration stocks thereby naturally results as work-
ers in both countries make use of temporary and permanent stays abroad as signalling device,
thereby generating balanced temporary and permanent migration flows. We thus complement
the existing theoretical literature in providing a novel explanation for a symmetric selection into
initial emigration and later return migration that is not based on country-specific push and pull
factors.23
The idea to analyse migration in a framework with imperfect information is not new and
has been used before to explain the differences in the performance of immigrants and natives
(cf. Hendricks, 2001) and the geographic clustering of high-skilled workers (cf. Giannetti, 2001).
However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide a simple framework, which not
only allows us to analyse the strategic selection into initial emigration and later return migration,
but also lends itself to a comprehensive welfare analysis and, hence, allows us to characterise
optimal migration policies. Although the majority of models on temporary migration derive
return decisions from country asymmetries (e.g. technology or endowment differences), there
are a few exceptions, which emphasise the role of information asymmetries.24 In an extension
to his baseline migration model Hendricks (2001) analyses individual return decisions. Other
than in our model migration decisions thereby depend on the cost of moving abroad instead
of living abroad.25 Although this distinction seems innocuous, it is crucial for the selection
23In Djajic and Milbourne (1988), Dustmann (2001) migrants earn a higher income abroad, but at the same
time have a preference for consumption in their home country. In Djajic (1989), Dustmann (2001) a similar
trade off results from the comparison of a higher income abroad versus a higher purchasing power at home. In
Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002), Mesnard (2004), and Djajic (2010) temporary migration results from a credit
constraint and migrants trade off a higher labour income abroad against better investment possibilities at home.
Finally, in Dustmann (2001), Dustmann and Weiss (2007), and Dustmann, Fadlon, and Weiss (2011) migrants
have access to high-quality education abroad, which yields higher returns when supplied in the migrants’ home
country.
24For an analysis of temporary migration decisions in life-cycle models with uncertainty see Berninghaus and
Seifert-Vogt (1988, 1993).
25Exploiting a rich survey on individual return migration to several typical “brain drain” countries, Gibson and
McKenzie (2011, 2012) highlight the relative importance of the costs of living abroad, when compared to the cost
of moving abroad.
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into return migration. While in Hendricks (2001) the costly act of returning home generates a
signal, in our framework it is the costly option to stay another period abroad which acts as a
signalling device. Unlike Hendricks (2001), we thus find that only the most high-skilled initial
emigrants decide to stay for another period abroad, while the least-skilled co-migrants return
home, thereby accentuating the initial selection of the most high-skilled workers into emigration.
A similar pattern is found by Stark (1995), who analyses return migration in an asymmetric
country setting, in which workers’ skills are more difficult to observe for firms in the destina-
tion country than for firms in the origin country (see also Katz and Stark, 1987). As in our
model return incentives thereby arise in particular for low-skilled migrants, who no longer can
expect to benefit from a pooling with high-skilled co-migrants once the information asymmetry
between workers and firms for some reason is lifted. We add to this literature by endogenising
the (partial) reinstatement of information symmetry as a consequence of workers’ strategic mi-
gration/signalling decisions in a setting with two identical countries. Building up on this richer
modelling environment we then, similar to Benhabib and Jovanovic (2012), ask for the globally
optimal degree of (temporary and permanent) international migration. As a central difference to
Benhabib and Jovanovic (2012), who focus on a classical efficiency-versus-distribution trade off,
resulting from a positive human-capital externality as in Lucas (1988), the social planner in our
model corrects for a negative migration externality, which in the laissez-faire equilibrium results
in excessive emigration and aggregate welfare losses. Unlike in Benhabib and Jovanovic (2012)
the social-planner equilibrium therefore features reduced, but non-zero levels of temporary and
permanent migration. Responsible for this outcome are the aggregate production gains, which
are generated by temporary and permanent migration through an improved matching of workers
in the labour market.26 The idea that temporary migration may contribute to a better match-
ing of workers within firms by alleviating existing information asymmetries thereby naturally
complements the existing literature (cf. Peri and Sparber, 2009; Peri, 2012), which focuses on
the specialisation of natives and migrants on different sets of tasks (e.g. manual-physical tasks
26Empirical support for firm-level productivity effects of international migration comes from Trax, Brunow, and
Suedekum (2012), who use administrative data from Germany to show that firms which are located in regional
labour markets that are characterised by a high-degree of cultural diversity tend to be more productive.
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vs. communication-language tasks) according to observable characteristics. Finally, we also
show that the social-planner equilibrium can be implemented by a carefully chosen combination
of emigration tax and return subsidy, which links our work to a recent and growing literature
analysing optimal temporary-migration policies in a context of two asymmetric countries. (cf.
Djajic and Michael, 2013; Djajic, Michael, and Vinogradova, 2012; Djajic, 2013b).
5.6 A simple model of strategic migration
Imagine two symmetric countries, producing a homogeneous numéraire good y, which is non-
storable and can be traded costlessly at a world-market price normalised to p
!
= 1.27 In each
period both countries are populated by two overlapping generations of workers, whose age we
denote by t = 1, 2. Generation size is constant over time and, hence, can be normalised to unity
without loss of generality. Workers in each generation are risk neutral and derive periodical
utility from the consumption x of the numéraire good according to a linear periodical utility
function u(x) = x. Lifetime utility then follows as the the sum over workers’ periodical utilities
at age t = 1, 2, given that workers are assumed to have no time preferences. Workers differ with
respect to their skills, which follow from a uniform distribution over the interval s ∈ [0, 1] and
are assumed to be private information.
A worker’s (return) migration decision can be sketched out as follows: At age t = 1, when
still being young, the worker either stays put and gets employed at home or emigrates abroad
and finds employment there.28 Subsequently, a worker, who went abroad at age t = 1, at age
t = 2 then either returns home or stays abroad for another (final) period. Figure 5.9 summarises
the available migration options and identifies the resulting individual migration patterns.
Production takes place under perfect competition, using an “O-ring” production technology
(cf. Kremer, 1993), which requires the processing of two tasks l = 1, 2, each to be performed by
27Given that countries are symmetric we suppress all country indices henceforth.
28For the sake of simplicity and consistent with typical life-cycle patterns of migration (cf. Sjaastad, 1962;
Gallaway, 1969; Schwartz, 1976; Goss and Paul, 1986; Johnson, Voss, Hammer, Fuguitt, and McNiven, 2005) we
do not consider late emigration at age t = 2 when workers are old.
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Figure 5.9: Migration and return decisions
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a single worker. Firm-level output follows correspondingly as:
y = f(s1, s2) = 2As1s2, (5.18)
with A > 0 being a technology parameter and sl denoting the skill level of the worker performing
task l = 1, 2. Crucially, we have ∂f(s1, s2)/∂sl > 0 and ∂2f(s1, s2)/∂slslˆ > 0 ∀ l, lˆ = 1, 2 with
l 6= lˆ, such that Eq. (5.18) is supermodular and workers enter production as complements.
In an equilibrium that features either temporary or permanent migration (cf. Figure 5.9)
firms can identify individual workers as members of either the group of non-migrants N (at age
t = 1, 2), the group of migrants M (at age t = 1, 2) or the group of returnees R (at age t = 2).
This is the only information firms can base their hiring decision on, and this information is
valuable since, as we show below, the average skills within the various subgroups (non-migrants,
migrants, and returnees) are different. Taking into account these differences, firms then maximise
their expected profits by choosing the optimal skill mix of their employees:
max
s¯1,s¯2
π (s¯1, s¯2) = 2As¯1s¯2 − w (s¯1)− w (s¯2) , (5.19)
with s¯l, l = 1, 2 referring to the average skill of the group from which the worker performing
task l is recruited, and w(s¯l) being the wage paid to this worker. The solution to the profit
maximisation problem in Eq. (5.19) is given by Lemma 5.6.1.
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Lemma 5.6.1 Firms maximise expected profits by hiring workers of the same expected skill.
Proof See Appendix A.27.
Wages cannot be set according to individual skill, which is private information. As a conse-
quence, each worker is paid exactly half of the firm’s output. With this deliberately simple
remuneration rule at hand, the expected wage rate of an individual worker with skill s then
equals:
w (s¯ℓt, s) = As¯ℓts. (5.20)
Interestingly, the wage of a worker with skill s not only depends on the worker’s own skill s, but
also on expected skill s¯ℓt of the co-worker, which is assigned to the respective match. Although
workers cannot observe the individual skill of their potential co-workers, the distribution of skills
in both countries is known, such that expectations can be formed with regard to a potential
co-worker’s average skill s¯ℓt with ℓ ∈ {N,M,R} and t = 1, 2.29 Given this simple notion of
workers’ wages, the (return) migration decision of a forward-looking worker can be solved as a
two-stage game (cf. Figure 5.9) with an initial emigration decision at age t = 1, and – in case
of initial emigration – a later return decision at the age t = 2. We assume constant and equal
periodical costs c > 0 for living abroad and solve the respective migration game by backward
induction.30
As a natural starting point we begin with the return decision of worker s at the age t = 2,
assuming that this worker emigrated abroad at the age t = 1. The forfeit wage gain ∆r(s) for
a worker s, who returns returns home at age t = 2 instead of staying a second and final period
abroad, thereby amounts to:
∆r (s) ≡ w (s¯M2, s)− c− w (s¯R2, s) , (5.21)
29Note that there are no returnees of age t = 1, hence, the subgroup R× 1 does not exist.
30Periodical costs of living abroad in a new social and cultural environment without close relationships to friends
and family back in the home country naturally arise for migrants who try to sustain familiar surroundings (cf.
Sjaastad, 1962). Supportive evidence underpinning the importance of such costs comes for example from Gibson
and McKenzie (2011), who use data on high-skilled return migration to three Pacific countries to show that return
decisions are strongly linked to family and lifestyle reasons, rather than to the income differentials between source
and destination countries.
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and depends on the expected net wage w (s¯M2, s) − c earned as a permanent migrant (M × 2)
relative to the expected wage w (s¯R2, s) earned as a returnee (R× 2). It is now straightforward
to show that our model leads to self-selection of the most able initial emigrants (M × 1) into
permanent migration. For this purpose we assume positive selection into initial emigration,
which, as we will show below, indeed results at age t = 1. Thus, initial emigrants are assumed
to have skills s ≥ s˜m with s˜m ∈ (0, 1) denoting the skill of the least skilled emigrant at age t = 1.
We may now consider some arbitrary cutoff ability s˜r ≥ s˜m that separates initial emigrants at
age t = 2 into a group of high- and low-skilled individuals, which we precautionary label by
M × 2 and R × 2, respectively. The average skills of the two groups immediately follow from
the assumed uniform distribution and equal s¯M2 = (s˜r+1)/2 > s¯R2 = (s˜m+ s˜r)/2. Substituting
s¯M2 and s¯R2 into Eq. (5.21), we find that the expected wage gain from staying abroad equals
∆r (s) = A(1 − s˜m)s/2 − c and increases in individual skill s, such that incentives for staying
abroad are high (low) for those workers with comparatively high (low) skills. Solving for the
return cutoff, i.e. finding the marginal returnee s˜r, to whom
∆r (s˜r) =
A
2
(1− s˜m) s˜r − c != 0
applies, finally yields
s˜r (s˜m) =
2cˆ
1− s˜m . (5.22)
Intuitively, the mass of permanent migrants staying abroad is large if the (relative) costs cˆ ≡ c/A
of doing so are low. Given the inter-temporal structure of migration these costs – of course –
must be weighted by the potential for permanent migration, i.e. the number of workers 1− s˜m
who decided to emigrate in the first place at age t = 1.
Knowing how the return cutoff s˜r from Eq. (5.22) links to the initial emigration cutoff s˜m, we
now focus at workers’ emigration decisions at age t = 1. Workers thereby take into account their
later return decisions at age t = 2 and distinguish between three possible migration patterns,
which we denote by (a), (b) and (c). The possible migration patterns are:
(a) 0 < s˜m = s˜r < 1 ⇒ permanent migration only,
(b) 0 < s˜m < s˜r < 1 ⇒ temporary and permanent migration,
(c) 0 < s˜m < s˜r = 1 ⇒ temporary migration only.
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In case (a) the emigration and the return cutoff coincide, i.e. s˜m = s˜r, such that all workers
who stayed abroad at age t = 1 do the same at age t = 2. In case (b) only the best workers
with skills s ∈ [s˜r, 1] stay for another period abroad, while workers with lower skills s ∈ [s˜m, s˜r)
return home at age t = 2. Finally, in case (c) with s˜r = 1 everybody who emigrated at age t = 1
returns home at age t = 2. Taking into account these differences we can rank the average skills
within the subgroups ℓ× t with ℓ ∈ {N,M,R} and t = 1, 2 as follows:
s¯ℓt =

s¯Nt = s˜m/2 < s¯M1 = s¯M2 = (s˜m + 1) /2 if (a),
s¯Nt = s˜m/2 < s¯R2 = (s˜m + s˜r) /2 < s¯M1 = (s˜m + 1) /2 < s¯M2 = (s˜r + 1) /2 if (b),
s¯Nt = s˜m/2 < s¯M1 = s¯R2 = (s˜m + 1) /2 if (c),
(5.23)
depending on which of the migration patterns (a), (b), or (c) results. The indifferent worker s˜m
at age t = 1 then faces the following trade-off:
∆m (s˜m) =

w (s¯M1, s˜m) + w (s¯M2, s˜m)− 2c− w (s¯N1, s˜m)− w (s¯N2, s˜m) != 0 for (a),
w (s¯M1, s˜m) + w (s¯R2, s˜m)− c− w (s¯N1, s˜m)− w (s¯N2, s˜m) != 0 for (b),
w (s¯M1, s˜m) + w (s¯R2, s˜m)− c− w (s¯N1, s˜m)− w (s¯N2, s˜m) != 0 for (c),
(5.24)
with ∆m(s) denoting the expected lifetime income gain from going abroad, which for the in-
different initial emigrant s˜m by definition equals ∆m(s˜m)
!
= 0. Note that the opportunity cost
of going abroad in all three cases materialise in form of the forfeit expected income stream
w (s¯N1, s˜m)+w (s¯N2, s˜m), that would result from domestic employment as a non-migrant (N× t)
at age t = 1, 2. On the contrary, when going abroad the indifferent emigrant s˜m at age t = 1
always earns an expected net wage of w (s¯M1, s˜m) − c. At age t = 2 the indifferent emigrant’s
expected (net) wage then, however, depends on the underlying migration scenario. In case (a)
with 0 < s˜m = s˜r < 1 everybody including the indifferent emigrant s˜m stays abroad for a second
(final) period and earns an expected net wage w (s¯M2, s˜m)− c. In case (b) with 0 < s˜m < s˜r < 1
only the best workers with s ∈ [s˜r, 1] stay permanently abroad, while the remaining workers
s ∈ [s˜m, s˜r), and in particular the indifferent emigrant s˜m, return home to get employed at an
expected wage w(s¯R2, s˜m). Finally, in case (c) everybody including the indifferent emigrant re-
turns to home and earns an expected wage rate w(s¯R2, s˜m). Substituting s¯ℓt with ℓ ∈ {N,M,R}
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and t = 1, 2 from Eq. (5.23) separately for the cases (a), (b) and (c) into Eq. (5.24) we obtain:
∆m (s˜m, s˜r) =

As˜m − 2c != 0 for (a),
A (1 + s˜r) s˜m/2− c != 0 for (b),
As˜m − c != 0 for (c).
(5.25)
Note that in the extreme cases (a) and (c) the return margin s˜r is fixed, resulting either in no or
in complete return migration, with s˜r = s˜m or s˜r = 1, respectively. In the intermediate case (b),
on the contrary, the return margin s˜r ∈ (s˜m, 1) is flexible and can be linked to the emigration
cutoff s˜m through Eq. (5.22). Workers take this link into account when forming their emigration
decisions at age t = 1 and anticipate that a lower (higher) return cutoff s˜r decreases (increases)
the average skills s¯R2 = (s˜m+ s˜r)/2 < s¯M2 = (s˜r+1)/2 within the groups of permanent migrants
(M × 2) and returnees (R× 2) likewise.31 Replacing s˜r in Eq. (5.25) by s˜r = 2cˆ/(1− s˜m) from
Eq. (5.22) we can solve for the emigration cutoff s˜lfm in the laissez-faire equilibrium:
s˜lfm (cˆ) =

2cˆ for 0 ≤ cˆ < cˆlfa ⇔ (a) 0 < s˜lfm = s˜lfr < 1,
1 + 4cˆ−√1 + 16cˆ2
2
for cˆlfa ≤ cˆ < cˆlfb ⇔ (b) 0 < s˜lfm < s˜lfr < 1,
cˆ for cˆlfb ≤ cˆ < cˆlfc ⇔ (c) 0 < s˜lfm < s˜lfr = 1.
(5.26)
Finally, using s˜lfm(cˆ) from Eq. (5.26) to replace s˜m in Eq. (5.22) we can also solve for the return
cutoff s˜lfr(cˆ) in the laissez-faire equilibrium:
s˜lfr (cˆ) =

2cˆ for 0 ≤ cˆ < cˆlfa ⇔ (a) 0 < s˜lfm = s˜lfr < 1,
4cˆ
1− 4cˆ+√1 + 16cˆ2 for cˆ
lf
a ≤ cˆ < cˆlfb ⇔ (b) 0 < s˜lfm < s˜lfr < 1,
1 for cˆlfb ≤ cˆ < cˆlfc ⇔ (c) 0 < s˜lfm < s˜lfr = 1.
(5.27)
Together s˜lfm(cˆ) from Eq. (5.26) and s˜
lf
r(cˆ) from Eq. (5.27) provide a comprehensive description
of the intertemporal migration pattern. In particular we find that for rising (relative) costs
cˆ ∈ [0,∞) of staying abroad the migration patterns (a), (b) and (c) become relevant in increasing
31The strategic link between initial emigration and later return decisions is explored in more detail in Section
5.8.2, where we introduce a discounting factor δ ∈ [0, 1], which allows for an asymmetric weighting of workers’
payoffs in the migration decisions at age t = 1 and t = 2, respectively.
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order, with the parameter spaces corresponding to each of these cases being separated by the
cost thresholds cˆlfa ≤ cˆlfb ≤ cˆlfc . The cost thresholds cˆlfa and cˆlfb thereby follow immediately from the
definitions of the limiting cases (a) and (c), restricting case (b) from above and below. Focusing
on case (b) and using the corresponding expressions s˜lfm(cˆ) and s˜
lf
r(cˆ) from Eqs. (5.26) and (5.27),
we find that s˜lfm (cˆ
lf
a )
!
= s˜lfr(cˆ
lf
a ) and s˜
lf
m(cˆ
lf
b )
!
= 1 imply cˆlfa = 0 and cˆ
lf
b = 1/3, respectively. Finally,
to identify the critical cost level cˆlfc which separates case (c) from an equilibrium without any
migration we focus on s˜lfm(cˆ
lf
c )
!
= 1 from Eq. (5.26) for case (c), and find cˆlfc = 1. Proposition
5.6.2 summarises the results:
Proposition 5.6.2 At prohibitive costs cˆ ≥ cˆlfc no migration occurs. In case (c) for high but
not prohibitively high costs cˆ ∈ [cˆlfb , cˆlfb ) high-skilled workers s ∈ [s˜lfm, 1] migrate temporary abroad,
while low-skilled workers s ∈ [0, s˜lfm) stay at home. Finally, in the low-cost scenario (b) with
cˆ ∈ (0, cˆlfb ) high-skilled workers s ∈ [s˜lfr, 1] emigrate permanently abroad, medium-skilled workers
s ∈ [s˜lfm, s˜lfr) migrate temporary, and low-skilled workers s ∈ [0, s˜lfm) do not migrate at all.32
Proof Analysis and formal discussion in the text.
To understand the migration pattern in Proposition 5.6.2 it is important to realise that high-
skilled workers are the only ones that can afford the costs c of staying abroad. A costly stay
abroad, hence, acts as a signalling device for these workers and gives them the opportunity to
indicate their high but otherwise unobservable skills towards potential employers. Firms, when
making their hiring decisions, take individual migration histories as an easy-to-verify signal into
account and form, in line with Lemma 5.6.1, more efficient and better paid matches at the labour
market. The wage premium resulting from the increased quality of matches is then what gives
workers an incentive to signal their skills in the first place.
32 Proposition 5.6.2 in combination with Lemma 5.6.1 implies that natives and migrants are perfectly segregated
at the workplace. While this extreme implication is counterfactual of course, Hellerstein and Neumark (2008);
Andersson, García-Pérez, Haltiwanger, McCue, and Sanders (2010); Aslund and Skans (2010); Glitz (2012) find
that there is indeed a substantial degree of workplace segregation between natives and migrants in the US, Sweden,
and Germany. As outlined in Section 5.4.1 our migration mechanism can plausibly replicate this outcome, once
we allow individual skills to be imperfectly observable (instead of unobservable).
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Since, workers are allowed to stay abroad for more than just one period, we find that sig-
nalling decisions are linked through time and give rise to the inter-temporal pattern of initial
emigration and (eventually) later return migration. We depict this pattern in the upper quad-
rant of Figure 5.10. Figure 5.10 thereby distinguishes between the groups of non-migrants N × t
Figure 5.10: The laissez-faire equilibrium
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at age t = 1, 2 (dark grey area), return migrants R × 2 (light grey area), and permanent mi-
grants M × 2 (white area), whose relative size crucially depends on the underlying migration
pattern and, thus, on the (relative) costs cˆ of staying abroad. If these costs are prohibitively
high, i.e. cˆ ≥ cˆlfc , not even the most high-skilled workers find it optimal to signal their skills
by staying at least one period abroad. On the contrary, for high but not prohibitively high
costs cˆ ∈ [cˆlfb , cˆlfc ) migration pattern (c) results. In this case the most high-skilled workers with
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s ∈ [s˜lfm, 1] emigrate abroad at age t = 1, thereby separating themselves from their low-skilled
counterparts with s ∈ [0, s˜lfm). Then, at age t = 2, all those who initially emigrated at age t = 1
return back home. The complete reversal of initial migration incentives is caused by the now
(at age t = 2) prohibitive costs cˆ of staying another period abroad, which render the use of
a repeated stay abroad as signalling device suboptimal, given the already achieved separation
from the group of the most low-skilled workers (comprising the non-migrants N × t ∀ t = 1, 2).
Let us now consider migration pattern (b), which results for low (relative) costs cˆ ∈ (0, cˆlfb ). As
in the previous case all workers with high skills s ∈ [s˜lfm, 1] use initial emigration at age t = 1 as
a signal to achieve a separation from their low-skilled counterparts with low skills s ∈ [0, s˜lfm).
However, then (at age t = 2) only the medium-skilled workers with skill s ∈ [s˜lfm, s˜lfr) return
home, while the most high-skilled workers with skills s ∈ [s˜lfr , 1] stay abroad for a second and
final period. High-skilled workers thereby generate an effective, since costly, signal which can
be used to tell apart high-skilled permanent migrants (M × 2) from medium skilled returnees
(R× 2). Permanent migrants (M × 2) are rewarded for their signalling efforts by more efficient
matches and, hence, higher average wages. On the contrary, returnees (R × 2) experience a
decline in the quality of their potential co-workers and, thus, a fall in average wages. However,
at the same time they also save on the costs c, which overcompensates their expected wage
losses and, hence, tips the scales in favour of return migration. Finally, migration pattern (a),
featuring permanent migration only, never results. To understand this outcome, it is helpful to
compare the marginal emigrant’s emigration and return decisions. By emigrating abroad under
costs c when still being young (i.e. at age t = 1) the marginal emigrant s˜lfm gets access to “good”
matches within the group of initial emigrants (M × 1) and avoids “bad” matches within the
group of non-migrants (N × 1). At age t = 2, staying abroad at the same costs c ensures the
continued access to “good” matches within the group of (now) permanent emigrants (M × 2).
However, even when not bearing the costs c there is no danger of ending up in a “bad” match
with low-skilled non-migrants (N × 2) as long as being identifiable as a returnee (R× 2). Thus,
for the critical emigrant s˜lfm the gain from using a costly stay abroad as signalling device is (by
definition) zero at age t = 1 and even smaller at age t = 2. Hence, for any costs cˆ > 0, which
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are non-decreasing in workers’ age, migration pattern (a) with 0 < s˜lfm = s˜
lf
r < 1 cannot exist.
33
Taking stock, our simple model is able to generate a rich pattern of temporary and perma-
nent two-way migration between two ex post and ex ante identical countries. Our framework
thereby offers an explanation for the balance in temporary and permanent bilateral migration
stocks documented in Section 5.5. As a key element of our model individual emigration and
return decisions are jointly derived from the (repeated) use of costly stays abroad as signalling
devices (cf. Spence, 1973) and, hence, do not follow from presupposed country asymmetries as
usually assumed in the literature on temporary migration (cf. Djajic and Milbourne, 1988; Dja-
jic, 1989; Dustmann, 2001; Dustmann and Weiss, 2007; Dustmann, Fadlon, and Weiss, 2011).
Self-selection of workers into (return) migration within our framework thereby is based on skills
that are private information, which we do not want to confuse with selection on observables
as analysed by Borjas (1987, 1991); Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). Supportive evidence for se-
lection patterns that are based on characteristics, which usually are regarded as unobservable
comes from Dostie and Léger (2009), who focus on the inter-provincial migration of Canadian
physicians and are able to decompose physicians’ earnings into an observable and an unobserv-
able component. Thereby it turns out that within this narrowly defined group of high-skilled
workers positive selection into migration is driven by unobservable rather than by observable
characteristics.34
5.7 Welfare effects of temporary migration
With the simple migration pattern in Proposition 5.6.2 at hand, we are now equipped for an
exploration of the individual welfare effects that initial emigration in combination with possible
later return migration may have. As a natural welfare measure at the individual level we focus
on workers’ expected (net) lifetime income, i.e. expected wages at age t = 1, 2 less the migration
33In Section 5.8.3 we allow the costs c of staying abroad to decline with the workers’ age t and show for which
precise parameter range the migration pattern (a) exists.
34Using data on (return) migration between Finland and Sweden Rooth and Saarela (2007) find no selection
with respect to unobservable skills, which they attribute to the fact that both countries are too similar in various
aspects.
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costs c, if applicable. We plot the economy’s wage profiles separately for the cases (c) and (b)
in the Figures 5.11 and 5.12 and begin our analysis with the high-cost case (c). Figure 5.11
depicts the expected gross wages, w (s¯Nt, s) ∀ t = 1, 2 for non-migrants (thick dot-dashed line)
with s ∈ [0, s˜lfm) as well as the expected gross wages w (s¯M1, s) = w (s¯R2, s) for initial emigrants
and later returnees (thick dashed line) with s ∈ [s˜lfm, 1]. For comparison the expected autarky
wage profile w(s¯, s) is depicted as a thin solid line. Since temporary migrants signal their skills
Figure 5.11: Wage distribution for migration pattern (c)
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by staying abroad, we find expected gross wage gains for initial emigrants and later returnees.
Non-migrants, on the contrary, suffer expected wage losses from the decreasing quality of co-
workers within their group. While the wage losses for non-migrants are directly welfare relevant,
wage gains for temporary migrants must be set off against the costs c of staying abroad at age
t = 1. Taking this signalling costs into account we find that expected net wages for initial
emigrants w(s¯M1, s) − c (thick solid line) are considerably smaller than the respective autarky
wages w(s¯, s). Of course, these income losses at age t = 1 must be seen in relation to the
return premium w(s¯R2, s)−w(s¯, s) > 0 that temporary migrants earn when being back in their
home economy. Averaging net wages, w(s¯M1, s)− c and w(s¯R2, s), over workers’ age (thick dot-
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dashed line) we find that both non-migrants and temporary migrants do not gain relative to an
equilibrium without migration.
The economy’s wage profile for the low-cost scenario (b) is depicted in Figure 5.12. Unlike
before (in Figure 5.11) we now have to distinguish between three subgroups of workers: Non-
migrants with s ∈ [0, s˜lfm), temporary migrants with s ∈ [s˜lfm, s˜lfr), and permanent migrants for
which s ∈ [s˜lfr , 1]. Non-migrants again suffer in terms of low expected wages w(s¯Nt, s) ∀ t = 1, 2
Figure 5.12: Wage distribution for migration pattern (b)
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(thick black dot-dashed line) as the quality of co-workers within their group falls if the most high-
skilled workers emigrate abroad. On the contrary, initial emigrants benefit from the signalling
effect of staying abroad and earn higher expected gross wages w(s¯M1, s) (thick black dashed line)
than in an equilibrium without migration (thin solid line). However, once the signalling costs
c are taken into account emigrants’ expected net wages w(s¯M1, s) − c (thick black solid line)
are below the respective autarky wage profile w(s¯, s) (thin solid line). At age t = 2 temporary
migrants earn expected wages w(s¯R2, s) (thick grey solid line) above w(s¯M1, s) − c and below
w(s¯M1, s).35 The reason for this outcome is simple: On the one hand, temporary migrants save
35Note that returnees’ expected wages w(s¯R2, s) can be below or above the respective autarky wages w(s¯, s).
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on costs c by returning home, while, on the other hand, the most high-skilled initial emigrants
decide to stay (permanently) abroad, thereby reducing the quality of available co-workers within
the group of returnees. Finally, permanent migrants signal their high skills through a repeated
and final stay abroad. As a consequence they enjoy higher expected gross wages w(s¯M2, s) (thick
grey dashed line), which, at least for the most high-skilled among the permanent migrants, are
always above the respective autarky wage, even when taking the signalling costs c into account
(thick grey solid line). To compare individual welfare in an equilibrium with and without
migration we again take the average of (net) wages over time (thick black dot-dashed line) and
find that in a migration equilibrium no worker is better off than under autarky.
Interestingly, aggregate (net) income not only is smaller than under autarky, it also is more
unequal distributed. To see this note that the expected income profile over age t = 1, 2 in a
migration equilibrium (thick black dot-dashed line) is kinked once in case (c) and twice in case
(b). As a consequence the (expected) returns to skill increase slower (faster) at the lower (upper)
end of the skill distribution, which renders the corresponding income distribution more unequal
than in an equilibrium without migration.
In order to compute aggregate welfare we start out from aggregate production
Y =
∑
t
∑
ℓ
∫
s∈ ℓ×t
w (s¯ℓt, s) ds, (5.28)
which in a zero-profit equilibrium is defined as the sum of workers’ expected wages over all skill
levels s within the subgroups ℓ × t with ℓ ∈ {N,M,R} and t = 1, 2. Using the definition of
w(s¯ℓt, s) in Eq. (5.20) in combination with s¯ℓt from Eq. (5.23) and replacing s˜m and s˜r by s˜lfm
and s˜lfr from Eqs. (5.26) and (5.27) we can solve separately for the cases (b) and (c) as well as
For expositional purpose Figure 5.12 depicts the knife-edge case w(s¯R2, s) = w(s¯, s). As a sufficient condition
for a return premium as documented in Co, Gang, and Yun (2000), Barrett and O’Connell (2001), Barrett and
Goggin (2010) the costs of staying abroad should not be too low, i.e. cˆ > 1/4, as otherwise too many high-skilled
workers decide in favour of permanent migration.
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for the autarky case:
Y lf (cˆ) =

A/2 +A (1− 2cˆ) cˆ for cˆ ∈ [cˆlfa , cˆlfb ) ⇔ (b) 0 < s˜lfm < s˜lfr < 1,
A/2 +A (1− cˆ) cˆ for cˆ ∈ [cˆlfb , cˆlfc ) ⇔ (c) 0 < s˜lfm < s˜lfr = 1,
A/2 for cˆ ≥ cˆlfc ⇔ s˜lfm = s˜lfr = 1.
(5.29)
Plotting Y lf (cˆ) in the lower quadrant of Figure 5.10 we find that aggregate production is higher
in any migration equilibrium than in an equilibrium without migration. Production gains from
migration thereby arise from the more efficient matches among workers, which firms can form ac-
cording to Lemma 5.6.1 when taking into account the information embodied in workers’ (return)
migration decisions.
Aggregate welfare can now be derived from Eq. (5.28) by taking into account the costs c
associated with staying abroad at age t = 1 and t = 2, respectively
W = Y −
∑
t
∫
s∈M×t
c ds. (5.30)
Substituting Y lf (cˆ) from Eq. (5.29), while aggregating the costs c over all initial migrantsM×1
with s ∈ [s˜lfm, 1] as well as over all permanent migrants (M × 2) with s ∈ [s˜lfr , 1] we obtain:
W lf (cˆ) =

A/2−A (1− 2cˆ) cˆ for cˆ ∈ [cˆlfa , cˆlfb ) ⇔ (b) 0 < s˜lfm < s˜lfr < 1,
A/2−A (1− cˆ) cˆ for cˆ ∈ [cˆlfb , cˆlfc ) ⇔ (c) 0 < s˜lfm < s˜lfr = 1,
A/2 for cˆ ≥ cˆlfc ⇔ s˜lfm = s˜lfr = 1.
(5.31)
Plotting W lf (cˆ) again in the lower quadrant of Figure 5.10 we find that in any migration equi-
librium aggregate welfare is lower than in an equilibrium without migration. Proposition 5.7.1
summarises the results.
Proposition 5.7.1 In a migration equilibrium aggregate welfare (production) is lower (higher)
than in an equilibrium without migration. Moreover, in a migration equilibrium no worker is
better off than under autarky.
Proof Analysis in the text and formal discussion in Appendix A.28.
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The reason behind the welfare loss described in Proposition 5.7.1 is a negative signalling exter-
nality, which renders initial and permanent emigration too attractive in the laissez-faire equi-
librium. As a consequence the production gains from the more efficient matching of workers at
the labour market are eaten up by the wasteful costs c of staying abroad, which are associated
with excessive initial and permanent emigration at age t = 1 and t = 2. Thereby, the negative
signalling externality can best be seen by means of a thought experiment, in which initial (per-
manent) emigration occurs sequentially, in the order of decreasing ability of emigrants: Every
initial (permanent) emigrant, apart from the most skilled one, by going (staying) abroad lowers
the average skill within the group of non-migrants (returnees) and within the group of initial
(permanent) emigrants. For the groups of non-migrants (returnees) this is the case because the
critical initial (permanent) emigrant leaves this group as the most high-skilled worker. For the
groups of initial (permanent) migrants this is the case because the critical initial (permanent)
emigrant enters this group as the most low-skilled worker. Thus, whenever a worker decides to
stay abroad he inflicts losses on the wages of everyone else. These social costs are rationally
ignored in individual emigration decisions and, hence, lead to excessive initial and permanent
emigration.
In order to characterise the optimal migration policy in the above model we assume, similar
to Benhabib and Jovanovic (2012), an omniscient, global social planner, which can freely choose
the initial emigration cutoff s˜m in combination with the return cutoff s˜r. The social planner
thereby ignores individual (return) migration incentives which link s˜lfm and s˜
lf
r to cˆ in the laissez-
faire equilibrium and maximises instead aggregate welfare in Eq. (5.30) with respect to s˜m and
s˜r. By deciding on a specific combination of s˜spm(cˆ), s˜
sp
r (cˆ) ∈ [0, 1] the social planner not only
determines whether the two economies end up in migration scenario (a), (b), or (c) instead of
autarky, but also links the extent of initial and permanent emigration (captured by s˜spm(cˆ) and
s˜spr (cˆ)) in an socially optimal way to the underlying (relative) cost cˆ. We depict the socially
optimal emigration and return cutoffs, s˜spm(cˆ) and s˜
sp
r (cˆ), in Figure 5.13 along with the implied
(optimal) level of aggregate welfare W sp(cˆ) and discuss the results in Proposition 5.7.2.
Proposition 5.7.2 The socially optimal level of initial and permanent emigration is strictly
lower than in the laissez-faire equilibrium, if the latter features positive migration levels. For
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cˆ < cˆspc = 1/2 (cˆ < cˆ
sp
b ≈ 1/20) the socially optimal level of initial (permanent) emigration is
strictly positive.
Proof Analysis in the text and formal discussion in Appendix A.29.
Figure 5.13: The social-planner equilibrium
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The social planner internalises the negative external effect of initial and permanent emigration
and chooses higher cutoffs s˜spk (cˆ) > s˜
lf
k(cˆ) ∀ k = m, r than in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Thereby the social planner not necessarily enforces a non-migration equilibrium. In particular
at low costs cˆ < cˆspb (cˆ < cˆ
sp
c ) we find that the aggregate production gains from improved
matching at the labour market exceed the associated costs of staying (repeatetly) abroad. As a
consequence migration pattern (b) featuring temporary and permanent migration is implemented
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for low costs 0 < cˆ < cˆspb , while the temporary-migration-only pattern (c) with s˜spm(cˆ) =
1
2+ s˜
lf
m(cˆ)
follows for high, but not prohibitively high costs cˆspb ≤ cˆ < cˆspc . Migration pattern (a), on the
contrary, is never chosen by the social planner and it is easy to see why: Each matching of
skills within the group of high-skilled permanent migrants (M × t) and the group of low-skilled
non-migrants (N × t) in the permanent-migration-only equilibrium (a) can always be replicated
by an identical matching result within the groups of high-skilled temporary migrants (M × 1 or
R × 2) and low-skilled non-migrants (N × t) in the temporary-migration-only equilibrium (c).
The only difference between both cases are the costs c, which accrue once for all temporary
migrants in case (c), but twice for all permanent migrants in case (a).
We now show that the social-planner equilibrium can alternatively be implemented by a
carefully chosen combination of emigration tax τm > 0 and return subsidy τr < 0. Thereby we
assume that any surplus in tax revenues is redistributed equally among all nationals, irrespective
of their residence, and, thus, has no effect individual (return) migration decisions. What both
countries then care about is emigration not immigration. Intuitively, given that migrants and
natives do not interact in the labour market (cf. Lemma 5.6.1), immigration has no effect on
natives’ wages and, hence, no impact on nationals’ well-being. At the same time, however,
temporary (permanent) emigration is associated with an negative external effect, depressing
nationals’ wages in the laissez-faire equilibrium at home and abroad. Hence, to replicate the
social-planner equilibrium both countries will set a combination of emigration tax τ spm and return
subsidy τ spr , which leads to s˜
lf
k(cˆ1, cˆ2) = s˜
sp
k (cˆ), with cˆ1 = cˆ + τˆm and cˆ2 = cˆ + τˆr, whereas
τˆk ≡ τk/A ∀ k = m, r. Thereby it is important to note that for τm 6= τr the cost of living
abroad ct at age t = 1, 2 no longer are the same. Allowing these cost to be age-dependent and
going through the same steps as in Section 5.6 we can generalise Eqs. (5.26) and (5.27) to:
s˜lfm (cˆ1, cˆ2) =

2cˆ1 for (a) 0 < s˜
lf
m = s˜
lf
r < 1,
1 + 2cˆ1 + 2cˆ2 −
√
(1 + 2cˆ1 + 2cˆ2)2 − 8cˆ2
2
for (b) 0 < s˜lfm < s˜
lf
r < 1,
cˆ1 for (c) 0 < s˜
lf
m < s˜
lf
r = 1,
(5.26′)
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and
s˜lfr (cˆ1, cˆ2) =

2cˆ1 for (a) 0 < s˜
lf
m = s˜
lf
r < 1,
4cˆ2
1− 2cˆ1 − 2cˆ2 +
√
(1 + 2cˆ1 + 2cˆ2)2 − 8cˆ2
for (b) 0 < s˜lfm < s˜
lf
r < 1,
1 for (c) 0 < s˜lfm < s˜
lf
r = 1.
(5.27′)
Using s˜lfk(cˆ1, cˆ2) = s˜
sp
k (cˆ), with k = m, r and s˜
lf
k(cˆ1, cˆ2) from Eqs. (5.26
′) and (5.27′) we can now
solve for the optimal emigration tax τ spm(cˆ) and the optimal return subsidy τ
sp
r (cˆ). As we would
expect optimal migration policies differ between the migration scenarios (b) and (c), which we
jointly depict in Figure 5.14. For the high-cost case (c) it follows immediately from s˜spm(cˆ) =
1
2 +
Figure 5.14: Optimal migration policies
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s˜lfm(cˆ) that both countries raise a constant emigration tax of τm(cˆ) = A/2 ∀ cˆ ∈ [cˆspb , cˆspc ) in order
to prevent excessive temporary migration at age t = 1. In the low-cost case (b) for cˆ ∈ [cˆspa , cˆspb )
migration policies are more complex: To achieve the socially optimal low levels of temporary and
permanent migration both sending countries tax emigration at age t = 1 and subsidise return
migration at age t = 2. The socially optimal combination of emigration tax τ spm(cˆ) and return
subsidy τ spr (cˆ) depicted in Figure 5.14 thereby not only replicates the social-planner equilibrium
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in Figure 5.13, but also generates a surplus in tax revenues τ spm(cˆ)[1−s˜spm(cˆ)]+τ spr (cˆ)[1−s˜spr (cˆ)] > 0,
which, if distributed equally among all nationals, mitigates the increased income inequality in
the migration equilibrium. The same logic of course also applies to the high-cost case (c) in
which no expenditures on return subsidies have to be covered. Proposition 5.7.3 summarises the
results:
Proposition 5.7.3 As optimal migration policies both countries choose symmetric emigration
taxes τ spm(cˆ) if the costs cˆ ∈ [cˆspb , cˆspc ) are high, and a symmetric combination of emigration taxes
τ spm(cˆ) and return subsidies τ
sp
r (cˆ) if the costs cˆ ∈ [cˆspa , cˆspb ) are low.
Proof Analysis and formal discussion in the text.
5.8 Extensions
5.8.1 Migration vs. education as signalling devices
In our baseline model the (repeated) use of costly stays abroad is the only option for workers to
signal their otherwise unobservable skills. In reality of course there is a wide range of possible
signalling devices with education presumably being the best known example (cf. Spence, 1973).
To see whether the existence of alternative signalling devices leads to a crowding out effect,
potentially replacing temporary and permanent migration as signals, we extend our baseline
model towards a setting with t = 1, 2, 3 periods, in which individuals have to decide whether
to get educated at age t = 1 before temporary or permanently going abroad at age t = 2, 3.
Education thereby purely acts as a signal and, hence, is assumed to have no human-capital-
accumulation effect.36 To ensure comparability with the baseline model from Section 5.6 we
furthermore assume that the (signalling) costs of education and migration are the same ce =
cm = c > 0 and moreover constant over time.37 Going through the same steps as in the baseline
36For models in which the human-capital-accumulation effect of education is instrumental for (temporary)
migration decisions see Dustmann and Weiss (2007); Dustmann, Fadlon, and Weiss (2011); Dustmann and Glitz
(2011).
37In Section 5.4.3 we and show in the static model version that two alternative signals (education vs. migration)
may coexists as long as the associated signalling costs ce 6= cm are not too similar. The simultaneous coexistence
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model from Section 5.6 we document the sequential use of education as well as temporary and
permanent migration as signalling devices in Appendix A.30. The resulting signalling pattern is
then depicted in Figure 5.15. As evident from scenario (f ) in Figure 5.15 education may indeed
Figure 5.15: Alternative signalling devices
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replace temporary and permanent migration as signalling devices if the associated costs for all
three signals are sufficiently high, i.e. cˆ ∈ [cˆlfe , cˆlff ) with cˆlfe = 3/5 < cˆlff = 3/2. However, for the
low- and medium-cost scenarios (d) and (e) we find that education, temporary migration and
even permanent migration may coexist as signalling devices, provided that the costs for these
signals are sufficiently low, i.e. cˆ < cˆlfe or cˆ < cˆ
lf
d , respectively, with cˆ
lf
d ≈ 3/10. Proposition 5.8.1
summarises the results.
Proposition 5.8.1 Provided the cost for education and migration are the same, we find that
education and temporary migration as well as education, temporary migration, and permanent
migration may coexist as signalling devices, if the associated costs are sufficiently small, i.e.
cˆ < cˆlfe or cˆ < cˆ
lf
d, respectively.
of both signals thereby is explained by the selection of high-skilled (medium-skilled) workers into the more (less)
expensive signal.
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Proof Analysis in the text and formal discussion in Appendix A.30.
5.8.2 The strategic effect of initial emigration
In order to highlight the strategic effect of initial emigration decisions on later return decisions
we introduce the discounting factor δ ∈ [0, 1]. Going through the same steps as in Section 5.6,
thereby discounting future costs and benefits at factor δ (cf. Appendix A.31), we are able to
rewrite the emigration cutoff:
s˜lfm (cˆ, δ) =

2cˆ ∀ cˆ ∈ [0, cˆlfa (δ)) ⇔ (a),
1 + 2(1 + δ)cˆ−√1− 4(1− δ)cˆ+ 4(1 + δ)2cˆ2
2
∀ cˆ ∈ [cˆlfa (δ), cˆlfb (δ)) ⇔ (b),
2cˆ
1 + δ
∀ cˆ ∈ [cˆlfb (δ), cˆlfc (δ)) ⇔ (c),
(5.26′′)
as well as for the return cutoff:
s˜lfr (cˆ, δ) =

2cˆ ∀ cˆ ∈ [0, cˆlfa (δ)) ⇔ (a),
4cˆ
1− 2(1 + δ)cˆ+√1− 4(1− δ)cˆ+ 4(1 + δ)2cˆ2 ∀ cˆ ∈ [cˆlfa (δ), cˆlfb (δ)) ⇔ (b),
1 ∀ cˆ ∈ [cˆlfb (δ), cˆlfc (δ)) ⇔ (c),
(5.27′′)
with cˆlfa (δ) = 0 < cˆ
lf
b (δ) = (1+ δ)/[2(2+ δ)] < cˆ
lf
c (δ) = (1+ δ)/2. We depict both cutoffs jointly in
Figure 5.16 and distinguish between the baseline scenario without discounting, i.e. δ = 1, and
a scenario with δ = 0 in which individuals are assumed to be myopic. The latter case thereby
serves as a natural benchmark for our baseline model, in which workers emigrate strategically
at age t = 1, thereby taking into account the later return decisions of their fellow-migrants at
age t = 2. By raising the discounting factor δ ∈ [0, 1] gradually from zero to one two effects can
be identified: On the one hand, both s˜lfm(δ) and s˜
lf
r(δ) rotate clockwise, while, on the other hand
s˜lfm(δ) (s˜
lf
r(δ)) becomes more (less) concave (convex) in the range cˆ ∈ [cˆlfa (δ), cˆlfb (δ)). The first
effect results as workers put more weight on the future benefits from staying abroad, which are
discounted at δ ∈ [0, 1]. The adjusted weighting is then what renders temporary migration more
attractive, given that the associated costs only accrue at age t = 1, while the expected gains
continue to pay off at age t = 2. The second effect is then what reflects the strategic interaction
143
Figure 5.16: The strategic effect of initial emigration
bb b
b
b
b
1
0
cˆlfb (1) cˆ
lf
c (1)cˆ
lf
b (0) cˆ
lf
c (0)
s˜m, s˜r
cˆ
s˜lf
m
(cˆ, 0) s˜lf
r
(cˆ, 0) s˜lf
r
(cˆ, 1)
s˜lf
m
(cˆ, 1)
between initial emigrants (M × 1) at age t = 1 and later permanent emigrants (M × 2) at
age t = 2. Thereby the initial emigrants (M × 1) anticipate at age t = 1 that the permanent
emigration of the most high-skilled initial emigrants (M × 2) with s ≥ s˜lfr(δ) at age t = 2 will
depress the wages of all returnees (R × 2) including the critical emigrant s˜lfm(δ). To alleviate
these wage losses we find that initial emigration at age t = 1 is strategically reduced (more
concave shape of s˜lfm(δ)) in order to limit the potential for permanent emigration 1 − s˜lfm(δ) at
age t = 2 in line with s˜lfr(s˜
lf
m) = 2cˆ/(1 − s˜lfm) from Eq. (5.22). As the potential for permanent
emigration 1− s˜lfm(δ) at age t = 2 is reduced, less workers will select into permanent emigration
at given cost cˆ, which finally explains the reduced convexity in the shape of s˜lfr(δ).
5.8.3 Existence of a permanent-migration-only equilibrium
In the Section 5.6 we argue that the permanent-migration-only scenario (a) with 0 < s˜m = s˜r < 1
cannot exist if the periodical costs ct > 0 of staying abroad are non-decreasing in workers’ age
t = 1, 2. We now extend our baseline model to account exactly for the case in which the costs ct
decline with workers’ age t = 1, 2. For this purpose let us normalise c1 to c1 = c > 0, such that
c2 can be expressed as c2 = (1−γ)c ≥ 0 with γ ∈ [0, 1] being the percentage decline in costs c as
144
individuals become older. Replacing c1 and c2 in Eqs. (5.26′) and (5.27′) by c and (1− γ)c then
gives us the corresponding emigration and return cutoffs, s˜lfm(cˆ, γ) and s˜
lf
r(cˆ, γ), which allow us
to solve for the cost thresholds 0 ≤ cˆlfa (γ) = γ/(2− γ)2 ≤ cˆlfb (γ) = 1/(3− 2γ) ≤ cˆlfc (γ) = 1. As we
would expect the baseline model, featuring no permanent-migration-only equilibrium, results for
γ = 0, since then cˆlfa (0) = 0. On the contrary if cˆ
lf
a (γ) ∈ (0, 1) for γ ∈ (0, 1), there always exists
a low-cost scenario (a) with 0 < s˜lfm(cˆ, γ) = s˜
lf
r(cˆ, γ) < 1, in which all initial emigrants with
s ≥ s˜lfm(cˆ, γ) find it optimal to use a repeated stay abroad (permanent migration) as a signalling
device at age t = 2. Moreover, since cˆlf′a (γ), cˆ
lf′
a (γ) > 0 imply limγ→1 cˆ
lf
a (γ) = limγ→1 cˆ
lf
b (γ) =
cˆlfc (γ) = 1, we find that the medium- and high-cost scenarios, (c) and (b), are gradually replaced
by the low-cost scenario (a) as the costs c2 = (1−γ)c at age t = 2 decline from c2 = c to c2 = 0.
Instrumental for the expansion of scenario (a) is thereby the contraction of scenario (b), in which
a separating equilibrium with 0 < s˜lfm(cˆ, γ) < s˜
lf
r(cˆ, γ) < 1 can only exist if the signalling costs
c2 > 0 at age t = 2 are sizeable enough.
5.9 Summary
In this chapter we have developed a model that can explain permanent and temporary two-way
migration of high-skilled individuals between countries at the same level of economic develop-
ment. In our model high-skilled individuals use costly migration as a way to signal their true
skill level. Support for our theory can be found in the pattern of high-skilled permanent and
temporary migration among rather similar countries (like the EU15), which, as we have shown,
is characterised by a substantial degree of “two-way-ness”.
Our static baseline model is extremely simple, but for this very reason it is transparent
as well, and it furthermore lends itself to a comprehensive welfare analysis. We identify a
negative externality from migration, resulting from the fact that the marginal migrant ignores
the negative effect her migration decision has on expected wages of both natives and migrants.
As a consequence, there is too much migration in the laissez-faire equilibrium with positive
migration cost, and aggregate welfare is lower than in autarky. This does not mean, however,
that all migration in our model is socially harmful. We show that, if migration cost is sufficiently
low, a social planner would choose strictly positive migration levels. The negative migration
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externality in this case has to be traded off against the better quality of matches within firms
that can be achieved due to the existence of a well-defined high-skill group, comprising the
migrants.
The negative migration externality is a fundamental feature of our framework, which sur-
vives in more general versions of our static model. The persistence of the negative externality
notwithstanding, aggregate gains from migration re-emerge as a possible feature of the laissez-
faire equilibrium once our baseline framework is amended by standard features known from
other migration models. In particular, once we introduce a second factor that is internationally
immobile and a complement to labour in production, aggregate gains from migration exist, pro-
vided the income share of this factor is sufficiently high and migration cost is sufficiently low.
The welfare gains in this case result from a more efficient domestic allocation of internationally
immobile factors of production, notably in the absence of any country asymmetries that would
normally be responsible for positive welfare effects of migration.
Finally we show that all the results from our static baseline model carry over to a dynamic
two-period setting, in which individuals can choose between temporary and permanent migra-
tion. Within this framework costly stays abroad generate an easy-to-verify signal for workers,
whose skills would otherwise be unobservable, and it is the repeated use of this costly signalling
option, which shapes the strategic selection of workers into temporary and permanent migration.
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Chapter 6
The political economy of high-skilled
migration when inequality matters
From 1975 to 2005 the number of high-skilled migrants soared by 2 million tertiary educated
individuals (cf. Lowell, 2007).1 In relative terms, high-skilled migration appears to be even
more important as the world-wide average skilled emigration rate of 5.4% in 2000 is nearly six
times higher than the emigration rate of unskilled workers (cf. Docquier and Marfouk, 2006).
While much has been written about the effects of high-skilled migration on sending countries,
the welfare and distribution effects for the host countries have only recently been put on the
research agenda (cf. Bougheas and Nelson, 2012, 2013).2
This chapter extends the work of Bougheas and Nelson (2012), who analyse the political
economy of high-skilled migration between two asymmetric countries in a Ricardian-style gen-
eral equilibrium model. Unlike in Bougheas and Nelson (2012), individuals display an aversion
against (disadvantageous) inequality, as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).3 A democratic
1For detailed breakdown of migration flows to the six main destination countries from 1975 to 2000 refer to
Defoort and Rogers (2008), non-OECD destination countries are covered in Docquier, Özden, Parson, and Artuc
(2012).
2For the literature on the “brain drain” see Grubel and Scott (1966a), Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1975) and
Kwok and Leland (1982). For more recent models emphasizing the possibility of a “brain gain” refer to Mountford
(1997), Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997, 1998) and Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2001).
3For empirical evidence supporting the “relative income” hypothesis see Alpizar, Carlsson, and Johansson-
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referendum with respect to the host country’s (high-skilled) immigration policy will hence not
only depend on whether the median voter benefits from immigration through a higher abso-
lute (real) income, but also on the change of median voter’s rank (i.e. its relative position) in
the host country’s (real) income distribution. Thereby, the median voter in the host country’s
labour-intensive sector – as in Bougheas and Nelson (2012) – benefits from the indirect terms of
trade effect induced by skilled immigration, which at a global scale shifts resources into the host
country’s more efficient skill-intensive industry. To absorb the resulting expansion in the global
production of the skill-intensive good, the (relative) world market price of the skill-intensive
good has to decline, and this is what leaves the median voter, who is employed in the host coun-
try’s labour-intensive sector, better off, both in absolute and in relative terms. Apart from this
indirect terms of trade effect skilled immigration has another more direct effect on individuals,
which displays an aversion against (disadvantageous) inequality, as it changes the composition
of the host country’s (real) income distribution. Since skilled workers from the source coun-
try immigrate into the top-ranks of the host country’s income distribution, the median voter
compares to a group of workers, whose skills and hence incomes are upward biased relative
to a situation without migration. The increase in disutility from (disadvantageous) inequality
aversion associated with this direct composition effect then – of course – must be set against
the individual welfare gains from the indirect terms of trade effect and it is a priori not clear,
which of both effects dominates. However, following Bougheas and Nelson (2012) in assuming
a uniform distribution of workers skills, it can be shown, that the composition effect is always
dominated by the terms of trade effect, such that the median voter prefers an equilibrium with
high-skilled migration over an equilibrium without migration, even if preferences are specified
to reflect an aversion against (disadvantageous) inequality.
Except for the preference specification, which is borrowed from Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
the baseline model resembles the one in Bougheas and Nelson (2012), who rely on a standard
two-country-two-sector-model with Ricardian technology differences and heterogeneous workers
as proposed by Davidson and Matusz (2006), Davidson, Matusz, and Nelson (2007), Bougheas
Stenman (2005), Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005) and Luttmer (2005). For a more direct test of the preference specifi-
cation by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) refer to Charness and Grosskopf (2001) as well as to Engelmann and Strobel
(2004) who try to validate the theoretical results in experimental settings.
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and Riezman (2007) to study various aspects in international trade. The choice of the un-
derlying framework thereby reflects the necessity to analyse migration flows within a general
equilibrium model with two countries, that are integrated through trade, instead of relying on a
partial equilibrium analysis of a single receiving country in order to arrive at reliable conclusions
with regard to the political economy of high-skilled migration between democratically governed
partner countries in a globalised world economy. In an equilibrium with costly migration, the
most high-skilled workers select into the country guaranteeing a higher reward to skill given its
superior technology in the skill-intensive sector, as it would be the case in the Roy-Borjas model
(cf. Borjas, 1987). The clustering of skilled workers in the country with the more productive
skill-intensive industry reinforces this country’s comparative advantage in the production of the
skill-intensive good and gives rise to a complementarity between migration and trade. An in-
evitable consequence of the resulting concentration of skills is a decline in the relative price of
the skill-intensive good, which benefits workers employed in the labour-intensive sector and thus
makes free migration more likely to be the outcome of a democratic referendum.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 presents the baseline model. In Section 6.2
the autarky equilibrium is explored, before turning to the migration equilibrium in Section 6.3.
Section 6.4 discusses the political economy equilibrium. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.1 Endowments, preferences, and technology
Imagine two countries, Home and Foreign, where the latter is denoted by an asterisk. Both
countries are populated by L and L∗ heterogeneous individuals, which are all endowed with one
unit of raw labour but differ with respect to their skills s. Individuals skills in both countries
thereby are defined over the unit interval s ∈ [0, 1] and follow the same distribution function
F (s) with density function f(s) = dF (s)/ds.
As in Bougheas and Nelson (2012) the technology is Ricardian and workers either supply
raw labour in the labour-intensive sector (with subindex L) or alternatively make use of their
skills, when being employed in the skill-intensive sector (with subindex S). Employing their
skills in the skill-intensive sector, workers in Home generate A-times the output of worker in
Foreign (with A > A∗
!
= 1). Evaluated at perfectly competitive prices pS and p∗S this technology
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justifies wages
wS (s) = pSAs, and w
∗
S (s) = p
∗
Ss, (6.1)
which positively depend on the respective worker’s skill level s or s∗, respectively. On the
contrary, when being employed in the labour-intensive sector, each worker inelastically supplies
one unit of raw labour, which is converted into one unit of output. Under perfect competition
and evaluated at prices pL and p∗L the corresponding wages then follow as
wL = pL, and w
∗
L = p
∗
L. (6.2)
To sum up, Home has an absolute and a comparative advantage in the production of the skill-
intensive good.
Individuals in Home and in Foreign have the same, homothetic preferences, which are ex-
plicitly specified for Home but of course apply in the same way for Foreign. In particular,
the preference specification follows Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and accounts – in addition to the
usual (real) income maximisation motive – for a (possible) aversion against an economy-wide
unequal distribution of (real) incomes. Individuals thereby compare their own (real) income
within a reference group of constant size, which is assumed to be a representative sub-sample
of the respective country of residence’s total population.4 Since nominal income N(s) depends
(positively) on individual skill s, the indirect utility function for individual sˆ can be written as
V [pL, pS, I (sˆ)] = R [pL, pS, N (sˆ)]
− β
∫ 1
0
max {R [pL, pS, N (s)]−R [pL, pS, N (sˆ)] , 0} f (s) ds
− α
∫ 1
0
max {R [pL, pS, N (sˆ)]−R [pL, pS, N (s)] , 0} f (s) ds.
(6.3)
As usual, indirect utility depends on the individual real-income level R [pL, pS, I (sˆ)], which is
multiplicatively separable into nominal income N(sˆ) and the inverse of the aggregate price index
1/P (pL, pS), as long as preferences are homothetic. In addition to their real incomes, individuals
care about the disutility resulting from disadvantageous inequality, which is measured as the
4As an alternative way to capture aggregate inequality Yitzhaki (1979) and Stark and Taylor (1991) propose
a measure of “relative deprivation”, which takes into account only disadvantageous inequality. Aggregate relative
deprivation thereby also depends on the economy-wide population size.
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average real income in excess of individual sˆ’ real income level R[pL, pS, N(sˆ)]. The parameter
β ≥ 0 thereby reflects the sensitivity towards this type of inequality. Similarly, individuals care
about advantageous inequality with α ≷ 0 again denoting the sensitivity towards this kind of
inequality.5 In the baseline model, β ≥ 0 and α = 0 are assumed. Individuals thus show an
aversion against disadvantageous inequality, while being neutral with respect to advantageous
inequality. Support for this assumption comes from Ferrer-i Carbonell (2005), who finds that
individuals mostly compare “up-wards”. Similarly, Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman
(1989) observe that individuals have a stark aversion against inequality which works to their
disadvantage, while the aversion against advantageous inequality seems to be significantly weaker
and less robust. Assuming that individuals’ nominal income N (s) is non-decreasing in skill s,
Eq. (6.3) simplifies to
V (pL, pS, sˆ) =
N (sˆ)− βΩ(sˆ)
P (pL, pS)
, (6.4)
with
Ω (sˆ) ≡
∫ 1
sˆ
[N (s)−N (sˆ)] f (s) ds, (6.5)
in which βΩ(sˆ) /P (pL, pS) ≥ 0 measures the disutility from disadvantageous inequality aversion,
which can be small or large, depending on individual sˆ’ rank in Home’s income distribution being
either high or low.
Notably, with homothetic preferences, individuals’ relative consumption choice is not altered
through the introduction of inequality aversion. Given their absolute and relative position in the
income distribution, reflected by N(sˆ) and βΩ(sˆ) in Eq. (6.4), individuals still seek to minimise
their consumption expenditure, which for the optimal consumption ratio of xS to xL equals
the aggregate price index P (pS, pL) in Eq. (6.4). Optimality thereby requires that the relative
goods price pS/pL are equated to the marginal rate of substitution between both commodities.
Denoting the elasticity of substitution between both goods by σ > 0, the corresponding inverse
relative demand function follows as
pS
pL
=
(
xS
xL
)
−
1
σ
. (6.6)
5For an alternative specification of preferences incorporating both, advantageous and disadvantageous inequal-
ity aversion, see Ockenfels and Bolton (2000).
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6.2 The autarky equilibrium
The derivation of the autarky equilibrium in both economies follows in three steps. At first, the
labour market equilibrium is described in Lemma in 6.2.1, before the goods markets equilibrium
is explained in Lemma 6.2.2. Finally, both Lemmas are combined, which gives the solution to
the autarky equilibrium.
Labour markets in both countries clear if critical workers s˜, s˜∗ ∈ [0, 1] exist, who are indif-
ferent between getting employed in the labour- or in the skill-intensive sector. Choosing the
labour-intensive good as numéraire (i.e. pL
!
= 1 such that p = pS/1), the corresponding indiffer-
ence conditions can be summarised in Lemma 6.2.1, which follow directly from the comparison
of indirect utilities in Eq. (6.4) evaluated at the sectoral wage rates from Eqs. (6.1) and (6.2),
respectively.
Lemma 6.2.1 The indifferent workers s˜ and s˜∗ are implicitly defined by
V (p, wL) = V [p, wS (s˜)] ⇔ p = 1
As˜
, (6.7)
V ∗ (p∗, w∗L) = V
∗ [p∗, w∗S (s˜
∗)] ⇔ p∗ = 1
s˜∗
. (6.8)
Proof Analysis and formal discussion in the text.
Intuitively, all workers with skills below s˜ and s˜∗, respectively, are employed in the labour-
intensive sector, while all workers with skills above these thresholds are employed in the skill-
intensive sector. Thereby, the allocation of workers is driven by both the workers’ absolute and
relative position in the country’s overall income distribution. High-skilled workers with s > s˜
(s∗ > s˜∗) not only have higher absolute incomes, they also accompany a higher rank in the overall
income distribution, which, in addition to the utility gain from higher absolute consumption,
reduces the disutility from workers’ inequality aversion. Consequently, if relative prices change
in favour of the skill (labour)-intensive good, the cutoffs s˜ and s˜∗ fall (rise), which leads to an
expansion of the skill (labour)-intensive sector.
Goods markets clearing in Home and Foreign requires the equality of relative demand and
relative supply. While relative demand (for Home) is given by Eq. (6.6), relative supply follows
directly from the sorting of workers into sectors, implying sectoral supplies yL = F (s˜)L as well
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as yS = A
∫ 1
s˜ sf(s)dsL for Home and y
∗
L = F (s˜
∗)ds∗L∗ as well as y∗S =
∫ 1
s˜∗ s
∗f(s∗)ds∗L∗ for
Foreign. Equating relative demands and supplies in both countries finally yields the equilibrium
conditions for the goods markets, which are summarised in Lemma 6.2.2.
Lemma 6.2.2 Equilibrium conditions for the goods markets are given by
p =
(
yS
yL
)
−
1
σ ⇔ p = g (s˜) ≡
(
F (s˜)
A
∫ 1
s˜ sf (s) ds
) 1
σ
, (6.9)
p∗ =
(
y∗S
y∗L
)− 1
σ ⇔ p∗ = g∗ (s˜∗) ≡
(
F (s˜∗)∫ 1
s˜∗ s
∗f (s∗) ds∗
) 1
σ
, (6.10)
with ∂g (s˜) /∂s˜ > 0 and ∂g∗ (s˜∗) /∂s˜∗ > 0.
Proof Analysis and formal discussion in the text.
According to Lemma 6.2.2 the (relative) prices of the skill-intensive good p in Home and p∗ in
Foreign depend on the relative size of the skill-intensive sectors in the two economies, which
is captured by the cutoffs s˜, s˜∗ ∈ [0, 1], respectively. Thus, if for example the labour-intensive
sector in Home expands, because the cutoff s˜ has increased, this will shift relative supply yS/yL
towards the labour-intensive good. To absorb the excess supply of the labour-intensive good,
the (relative) price for the skill-intensive good p has to go up and this is why g(s˜) is upward
sloping in s˜.
The autarky equilibrium can now be graphically solved in Figure 6.1 by combining the
conditions for the labour market and goods market equilibrium from the Lemmas 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.
In equilibrium, the cutoffs s˜, s˜∗ ∈ [0, 1] along with the corresponding (relative) prices p and p∗
are uniquely pinned down through the intersection points of the two equilibrium conditions in
Home and Foreign. The labour market equilibrium in Foreign thereby at each (relative) price
p∗ has employed less workers in the skill-intensive sector, which, due to Foreign’s less efficient
production technology, pays lower wages than the comparable sector in Home. Nevertheless, a
factor allocation characterised by s˜∗ > s˜ should not be taken for granted, given that the goods
market equilibrium in Foreign, at the same time, supports a higher (relative) price for the skill-
intensive good p∗, for each allocation of factors implied by the cutoff s˜∗. The price in Foreign is
higher, since compared to Home, less skill-intensive output is produced at a given allocation of
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Figure 6.1: The autarky equilibrium in Home and Foreign
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factors, such that the skill-intensive good is relatively scarce in Foreign. Both effects (partially)
offset each other and it is hence a priori not clear, in which country (relatively) more workers
are employed in the labour- or the skill-intensive sector. Figure 6.1 depicts the knife-edge case
with s˜ = s˜∗, which results for σ = 1 and resembles the familiar result that sector-specific Hicks-
neutral technological change has no effect on the allocation of workers and on relative factor
prices with Cobb-Douglas preferences (cf. Krugman, 2000; Xu, 2001).
6.3 The migration equilibrium
The migration equilibrium again is derived in three steps. At first Lemma 6.3.1 addresses
the selection into migration. Goods markets are assumed to clear at a global scale and the
corresponding goods market equilibrium for the integrated world economy is derived in Lemma
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6.3.2. Finally, the goods market equilibrium condition from Lemma 6.3.2 and the (unchanged)
labour market equilibrium condition from Lemma 6.2.1 are combined and jointly determine the
migration equilibrium and the terms of trade between Home and Foreign.
Migration is costly and the cost of migration are paid in units of the final goods, whose
relative spending ratio is assumed to be the same as the relative consumption ratio implied by
Eq. (6.6). As a consequence, the resource use associated with migration (γ ≥ 0) is evaluated
at the aggregate price index PW (pW , 1) and individual migration decisions do not depend on
the terms of trade. Thus, if international migration and the associated reallocation of labour
across sectors in Home and Foreign feeds back into the relative world market price, this does
not distort individual migration decisions.
From the perspective of a skilled foreign worker with s∗ > s˜ migration is beneficial if the
access to Home’s superior production technology (A > A∗ = 1) compensates for a compara-
tively lower rank in Home’s income distribution and moreover covers the migration cost γ > 0.
Formally, a threshold-level s˘∗ ∈ [s˜, 1] can be defined such that all workers with s∗ ≥ s˘∗ prefer
to work in Home, while workers with s∗ < s˘∗ prefer to stay in Foreign. The critical worker
s˘∗ ∈ [s˜, 1] thereby trades off a higher absolute income, due to the access to Home’s superior
technology, against the top rank in Foreign’s income distribution, which is associated with zero
disutility from disadvantageous inequality aversion. High skills in this trade off not only ensure
a higher absolute income but also a higher rank in Home’s income distribution, which renders
migration to Home – ceteris paribus – more attractive. The corresponding indifference condi-
tion then follows from V [pW , wS(s˘∗)] − P (pW , 1)γ = V ∗[pW , w∗(s˘∗)], which evaluated at wages
wS(s˘
∗) = pWAs˘∗ ≥ w∗(s˘∗) = max{w∗S(s˘∗), w∗L} with w∗S(s˘∗) = pW s˘∗ and w∗L = 1 simplifies to
A [s˘∗ − βΩ(s˘∗)]− γ = max {s˘∗, s˜∗} , (6.11)
in which γ < A− 1 is assumed to ensure that a migration equilibrium with s˘∗ < 1 exists.
For skilled workers in Home with s > s˜ migration is considerably less attractive, which has
two reasons. At first, these workers already start with Home’s superior technology (A > 1),
which they have to give up when migrating abroad. And secondly, migration as such is costly
(γ > 0). The corresponding indifference condition follows from the comparison of V [pW , wS(s˘)] =
V ∗[pW , w∗S(s˘)] − P (pW , 1)γ, which evaluated at wages wS(s˘) = pWAs˘ ≥ w∗S(s˘) = pW s˘ simplifies
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to
A [s˘− βΩ(s˘)] = s˘− γ, (6.12)
in which s˘ assumes the role of the skill threshold above (below) which workers stay in Home
(migrate to Foreign). Comparing Eqs. (6.11) and (6.12), it can be safely concluded that workers
from Home are relatively more inclined to live in Home (i.e. s˘ < s˘∗) whenever γ > 0. A
sufficient condition to rule out migration from Home to Foreign is γ > AβΩ(0), which states
that the disutility from disadvantageous inequality aversion in Home should not exceed the cost
of migration for any worker. Lemma 6.3.1 summarizes:
Lemma 6.3.1 For migration cost AβΩ(0) < γ < A− 1 workers with s∗ ≥ s˘∗ migrate to Home,
while workers with s∗ < s˘∗ stay in Foreign. Thereby the cutoff s˘∗ ∈ [s˜∗, 1] is decreasing in A
and increasing in β and γ.
Proof Analysis and formal discussion in the text.
Goods markets clear at a global scale. Hence, the relative world market supply yWS /y
W
L with
yWS = yS + y
∗
S and y
W
L = yL + y
∗
L has to equal the relative world market demand in Eq. (6.6)
evaluated at the (relative) world market price pW . Thereby, it can be inferred from Lemma
6.2.1, that, at a common (relative) world market price pW = p = p∗, Home – due to its superior
technology – employs (relatively) more workers in its skill-intensive sector (As˜ = s˜∗ implies
s˜ < s˜∗). Hence for a given migration cutoff s˘∗ ∈ [s˜, 1] two possible patterns of specialisation
exist. Suppose s˜ < s˜∗ < s˘∗. Then both countries are incompletely specialised and produce both
goods. Thereby the employment of domestic workers in Home is divided across sectors. Workers
with skills s ≥ s˜ are employed in the skill-intensive industry and workers with skills s < s˜ end
up in the labour-intensive industry. On the contrary, migrants in Home with skills s∗ ≥ s˘∗
are solely employed in Home’s skill-intensive industry. In Foreign the remaining non-migrants
find employment in both industries, such that all workers with skills s∗ < s˜∗ are employed in
the labour-intensive sector, while those workers with skills s˜∗ ≤ s∗ < s˘∗ are employed in the
skill-intensive sector. Now suppose s˜ < s˘∗ ≤ s˜∗. Then only Home produces both goods and
Foreign specialises in the production of the skill-intensive good. While the sorting of workers
according to the thresholds s˜ and s˘∗ in Home is the same as before, in Foreign the migration
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cutoff s˘∗ replaces the industry cutoff s˜∗ and all workers with skills s < s˘∗ are employed in the
labour-intensive industry. Aggregating up the sectoral outputs and replacing xWS /x
W
L = y
W
S /y
W
L
in Eq. (6.6) then yields the global goods market equilibrium, which is summarised in Lemma
6.3.2.
Lemma 6.3.2 The global goods market clearing condition is given by
pW =
(
yWS
yWL
)− 1
σ ⇔ pW = gW (s˜, s˜∗, s˘∗) , (6.13)
where
gW (s˜, s˜∗, s˘∗) ≡

(
F (s˜)L+F (s˜∗)L∗
A
∫ 1
s˜
sf(s)dsL+A
∫ 1
s˘∗
s∗f(s∗)ds∗L∗+
∫ s˘∗
s˜∗
s∗f(s∗)ds∗L∗
)1/σ
if s˜ ≤ s˜∗ ≤ s˘∗,(
F (s˜)L+F (s˘∗)L∗
A
∫ 1
s˜
sf(s)dsL+A
∫ 1
s˘∗
s∗f(s∗)ds∗L∗
)1/σ
if s˜ ≤ s˘∗ < s˜∗.
(6.14)
Proof Analysis and formal discussion in the text.
Replacing s˜∗ in Eq. (6.14) by s˜∗ = As˜, which follows from Lemma 6.2.1 for pW = p = p∗, reveals
that pW and s˜ are positively linked through the global goods market equilibrium. The intuition
between this link is the following: A parallel rise in s˜ and, hence, in s˜∗ shifts resources from the
skill to the labour-intensive sector and, thus, expands the relative supply of the labour-intensive
good, which can only be absorbed by the market if at the same time the consumption of the
skill-intensive good becomes less attractive, which is the case when the relative world market
price pW goes up.
Given that s˘∗ in Eq. (6.13) according to Eq. (6.11) only depends on exogenous parameters,
the goods market equilibrium condition in Eq. (6.13) can be plotted as an upward sloping curve
g(s˜, s˘∗) in Figure 6.2, whereas g(0, s˘∗) = 0, ∂g(s˜, s˘∗)/∂s˜ > 0 as well as g(1, s˘∗) → ∞ follow
from Eq. (6.14), when replacing s˜∗ by s˜∗ = As˜. In order to find the equilibrium values of pW
and s˜, the goods market equilibrium condition g(s˜, s˘∗) can be combined with Home’s labour
market equilibrium condition in Eq. (6.7), which is depicted as downward sloping curve in
Figure 6.2. The intersection point of both curves then determines the equilibrium values of pW
and s˜. Finally, the cutoff s˜∗ can be read off from Foreign’s labour market equilibrium condition
pW = 1/s˜∗ once pW has been determined.
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Figure 6.2: The migration equilibrium
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To explore how migration alters the allocation of factors (i.e. the cutoffs s˜ and s˜∗) as well
as the terms of trade pW , consider a reduction in migration cost γ > 0, which is reflected by a
decline in the migration cutoff s˘∗. From the inspection of Eq. (6.14) it follows that the influx of
migrants is associated with a clockwise rotation of goods market equilibrium condition g(s˜, s˘)
in Figure 6.2. As an immediate consequence the relative world market price pW declines, while
the industry cutoffs s˜ and s˜∗ go up. Interestingly, the intuition for these adjustments depend
on the underlying specialisation patterns in both economies. If both countries are incompletely
specialised (i.e. s˜ ≤ s˜∗ ≤ s˘∗), worker migrate between countries but within the skill-intensive
sector. At a global scale then more workers are employed at Home’s superior technology, which
– at a notionally fixed world market price – leads to an excess supply of the skill-intensive good
and, hence, to a downward shift in the goods market equilibrium condition g(s˜, s˘∗). For the
world market to rebalance, the relative price of the skill-intensive good pW has to decline, which
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– ceteris paribus – makes employment in both countries’ skill-intensive industries less attractive
and, hence, results in an increase in s˜ and s˜∗. For s˜ ≤ s˘∗ < s˜∗ a different mechanism is in
place. Since Foreign is specialised in the production of the skill-intensive good, workers migrate
from Foreign’s labour-intensive sector into Home’s skill-intensive sector. Thus, at a global scale
migration is associated with a shift of resources from labour to skill-intensive production. As
before the skill-intensive production expands globally, which shifts the goods market equilibrium
condition downwards and hence results in a smaller relative world market price pW and higher
cutoffs s˜ and s˜∗. Summing up we can conclude:
Proposition 6.3.3 Migration from Foreign to Home is associated with a decline of the relative
world market price and a reduction in the employment of domestic workers in the production of
the skill-intensive good.
Proof Analysis and formal discussion in the text.
Note that the resulting migration pattern implicitly determines the trade flows between
Home and Foreign. If a larger fraction of workers emigrate from Foreign, disproportionally
more workers are employed at Home’s advanced technology in the skill-intensive sector. As
a consequence the relative supply of the skill-intensive good from Foreign falls short of the
corresponding relative supply from Home. With identical preferences, the free trade equilibrium
then features skill-intensive exports from Home, and labour-intensive exports from Foreign.6.
6.4 The political economy
With Proposition 6.3.3 at hand the political economy of high-skilled migration can be explored
by focussing on the impact that high-skilled migration from Foreign to Home has on the median
voter in both countries. Thereby, it is assumed that the median voter is low-skilled and hence in
an equilibrium without migration employed in the labour-intensive sector. Moreover, migrants,
which by construction always benefit from migration, are excluded from elections to make sure
6For a detailed analysis of the complementarity between migration and trade in the underlying modeling
framework compare to Bougheas and Nelson (2012)
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that results are not driven by migration induced composition effects in the destination country’s
labour force.
Beginning the analysis with the median voter in Foreign, it is obvious that any migration
equilibrium is supported by a majority of Foreign’s population. The median voter thereby
prefers an equilibrium with migration over an equilibrium without migration for two reasons.
On the one hand, such an equilibrium supports a lower relative world market price for the
skill-intensive good, which is equivalent to a real income gain for low-skilled workers. On the
other hand, the equilibrium is characterised by the outmigration of the most high-skilled workers
from Foreign and hence features less disadvantageous inequality for those workers left behind.
Figure 6.3 (right panel) illustrates both effects. As predicted by Proposition 6.3.3, the (relative)
price of the skill-intensive good pm < pa declines, which is reflected by a downward rotation
of the wage function from Eq. (6.1) in Figure 6.3. The associated real income gain (loss) for
workers in the labour (skill)-intensive sector renders employment in the labour (skill)-intensive
sector relatively more (less) attractive, such that some domestic workers leave the skill-intensive
sector to find employment in the labour-intensive sector. As the industry cutoff s˜∗ goes up,
there are less workers with skill s∗ ≥ s˜∗, who earn a wage rate w∗S(s∗) ≥ w∗L = 1. At the same
time, workers with skill s∗ ≥ s˘∗ migrate abroad, which thins out the income distribution from
the top and only leaves workers with skills s˜∗ ≤ s∗ < s˘∗ (light grey area) in Foreign’s skill-
intensive industry. Taking stock, for Foreign’s median voter the disutility from disadvantageous
inequality is reduced in two ways. The direct outmigration of skilled workers from the top of
Foreigns income distribution directly reduces disadvantageous inequality, while the migration-
induced terms of trade effect indirectly raises (lowers) the real income of workers in the labour
(skill)-intensive sector, which further reduces the disutility from disadvantageous inequality.
Home’s median voter may benefit or lose from migration. Similar to the median voter
in Foreign, the median voter in Home thereby welcomes the induced terms of trade effect (i.e.
pm < pa) that is associated with high-skilled migration from Foreign to Home. As a consequence
of this price change the wage rate w∗S(s
∗) from Eq. (6.1) in Figure 6.3 declines, which translates
into a real income gain (loss) for workers in the labour (skill)-intensive sector. On top of these
(real) income gains the median voter also benefits from the (real) income losses of the better
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Figure 6.3: The political economy of high-skilled migration
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paid workers in the skill-intensive sector, whose wage premium wS(s) ≥ wL shrinks in relation
to the wage wL = 1 in the labour-intensive sector and hence is associated with less disutility
from disadvantageous inequality aversion. Negative consequences for the median voter may
arise from the direct effect of migration, i.e. the influx of high-skilled Foreign workers, who
find themselves at the top of Home’s income distribution after migrating to Home. This inflow
of high-skilled workers not only renders Home’s income distribution less equal, but also affects
the median voter, who now compares to a group of workers whose skills and wages are upward
biased compared to an equilibrium without migration. To highlight this composition effect, the
mass of domestic workers with skills s˜ ≤ s < s˘∗ is depicted in the left panel of Figure 6.3 in light
grey, while the masses of domestic and foreign workers with skills s˘∗ ≤ s ≤ 1 and s˘∗ ≤ s∗ ≤ 1,
respectively, are depicted in dark grey. Thus, it is a priori not clear whether there are net gains
for median voter from the migration induced terms of trade effect, or net losses due to increased
disutility from disadvantageous inequality aversion.
One way to resolve this ambiguity is to assume a specific functional form for the distribution
of workers’ skills in both economies. Hence – as in Bougheas and Nelson (2012) – workers’ skills
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are assumed to follow an uniform distribution over the unit interval s, s∗ ∈ [0, 1]. The median
voter then always prefers an equilibrium with migration over an equilibrium without migration.
Proposition 6.4.1 summarizes the result:
Proposition 6.4.1 If skills are uniformly distributed, i.e. f (s) = f (s∗) = 1, the median voter
prefers any migration equilibrium with s˘∗ ∈ [s˜, 1) over an equilibrium without migration.
Proof See Appendix A.32.
Another way to ensure that Home’s median voter benefits from migration is to consider a
migration scenario in which the aforementioned composition effect does not exist. For this to
happen, Foreign’s migration cutoff s˘∗ and Home’s industry cutoff s˜ must coincide. Only then
the skill bias, that would otherwise result from the positive selection of Foreign migrants for
s˘∗ > s˜, does not exist. The corresponding migration scenario with s˘∗ = s˜ emerges for γ = 0
in combination with A [s˜− βΩ(s˜)] > s˜, because only if migration costs are absent and Home’s
technology is advanced enough to outweigh the utility loss from disadvantageous inequality for
all Foreign workers with skill s∗ ≥ s˜, these workers will migrate to Home and nobody find
it optimal to migrate from Home to Foreign. While – admittedly – this is a special case, it
nevertheless directs our attention to the fact that the migration induced composition effect has
a non-monotonic nature, being strong for intermediate levels of migration and weak for very
high (s˘∗ → s˜) or very low (s˘∗ → 1) migration flows. Holding the induced terms of trade effect
fixed, this implies that high-skilled migration is more likely to be welcome by Home’s median
voter if it has a moderate effect on the skill composition of Home’s skill-intensive sector.
6.5 Summary
This chapter develops a theory of high-skilled migration with individuals that display an aversion
against disadvantageous inequality. Thereby, individuals not only maximise the absolute of their
(real) income, but are also concerned about their relative position within the economy-wide (real)
income distribution. The median voter in the destination country is affected through high-skilled
immigration in two ways: As in Bougheas and Nelson (2012), there are absolute income gains as
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high-skilled immigration changes the terms of trade to the advantage of the median voter, who
is employed in the destination country’s labour-intensive industry. However, since the median
voter is also concerned about its rank in the destination country’s (real) income distribution,
there is a second potentially offsetting effect: skilled immigration into the top of the destination
country’s income distribution increases the disutility from disadvantageous inequality aversion
and hence works to the disadvantage of the median voter in the destination country. Taking
stock, individuals, which display an aversion against disadvantageous inequality are less likely
to benefit and hence to support high-skilled immigration, which could be an explanation why
many advanced countries still hesitate to allow for large scale skilled immigration.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis takes up a bipolar stance on the international integration of national labour markets
focussing, on the one hand, on offshoring, i.e. the relocation of production steps towards low-
cost locations abroad, and, on the other hand, on labour migration, and in particular the
migration of high-skilled workers. Both phenomena are of particular importance in context of the
recent wave of globalisation, which unlike previous internationalisation periods, predominantly
characterised by the integration of (final) goods markets through international trade, directly
impacts previously (more or less) isolated national labour markets. The thesis thereby explores
four broad topics: The first two devoted to the analysis of offshoring and the remaining two
referring to the analysis of high-skilled migration.
The first topic deals with the welfare and distributional consequences of offshoring when
firms are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity. Acknowledging that firms are positively
selected with regard to different internationalisation strategies (such as international trade or
horizontal foreign direct investments), it is explored how the selection of firms into offshoring
affects the outcomes for individual firms, represented through an entrepreneur and its employees,
as well as the outcomes for the aggregate economy. Thereby, it turns out that adjustments
along the extensive margin of offshoring (between multinational and domestic firms) give rise to
novel effects that can not be analysed within traditional neoclassical trade models. Particularly
useful in this context is the possibility to differentiate between what happens at the micro-
level within single firms and at the macro-level within the aggregate economy, since often,
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what happens in the aggregate is quite the opposite of what one would expect when guided by
firm-level results. For example, it may be well possible that, while offshoring firms become more
productive through the access to cheap labour from abroad, average (industry or economy-wide)
productivity declines at the same time. Instrumental for such diverging micro- and macro-level
effects is the reallocation of employment shares between domestic and offshoring firms, which are
differently affected by possibility to source cheap inputs from abroad. In this way, the analysis
not only provides a so far missing link between empirically well observed firm-level results and
the outcomes for the aggregate economy, but also may serve as a promissing point of departure
for further empirical analysis.
The second topic of this thesis takes a closer look on how workers (instead of firms) may
react on a given offshoring shock, when they have the possibility to upgrade their skills through
investing in costly on-the-job training. In general equilibrium, where all rents from offshoring
unavoidably incur to workers, offshoring creates previously unexploited skill-upgrading possibil-
ities by raising workers wages beyond the cost of skill acquisition. The resulting positive link
between increased offshoring and individual propensity of skill upgrading is tested using sur-
vey data from the German manufacturing. Thereby, it turns out that industry-level offshoring
growth rates indeed correlate with the individual probability of on-the-job training in a positive
and highly significant way. In obtaining this result, a wide set of individual and firm related
characteristics such as technological change at the workplace among other major determinants
of individual on-the-job training are taken into account.
Starting out from the empirical observation of remarkably balanced bilateral (temporary and
permanent) high-skilled migration stocks, the third topic of my thesis explores the determinants
and consequences of two-way high-skilled migration between similar countries. In absence of
natural migration incentives (i.e. cross-country asymmetries) the selection of high-skilled work-
ers into costly (temporary and permanent) migration serves as a signalling device, which enables
workers to reveal their high but otherwise unobservable skills to future employers abroad. As
shown in several extensions, the signalling theory of two-way migration is able to replicate differ-
ent (observable) stylised fact of international (temporary and permanent) migration. Moreover,
it gives rise to some interesting welfare effects. A negative externality from migration, result-
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ing from the fact that the marginal migrant ignores the negative effect her migration decision
has on expected wages of both natives and migrants is identified. As a consequence, there is
too much migration in the laissez-faire equilibrium with positive migration cost, and aggregate
welfare is lower than in autarky. This does not mean, however, that all migration in our model
is socially harmful. We show that, if migration cost is sufficiently low, a social planner would
choose strictly positive migration levels. The negative migration externality in this case has to
be traded off against the better quality of matches within firms that can be achieved due to the
existence of a well-defined high-skill group, comprising the migrants.
The fourth topic analyses the political economy of high-skilled migration, when individuals
not only care about their absolute income but are also concerned about their (relative) position
within the income distribution of their reference group. The median voter in the immigration
country then is affected through high-skilled immigration in two ways: On the one hand, there
are absolute income gains as high-skilled immigration changes the terms of trade to the advantage
of the (rather) low-skilled median voter, who is employed in the destination country’s labour-
intensive industry. On the other hand, since the median voter is also concerned about its rank in
the immigration country’s income distribution, there is a second potentially offsetting effect as
skilled immigration into the top of the immigration country’s income distribution increases the
disutility from disadvantageous inequality aversion and hence works to the disadvantage of the
median voter in the destination country. Taking stock, individuals, which display an aversion
against disadvantageous inequality are less likely to benefit and hence to support high-skilled
immigration, which could be an explanation why many advanced countries still hesitate to allow
for large scale skilled immigration.
Taken together, this thesis contributes to a ongoing debate on the pros and cons of two highly
relevant forms on international labour market integration: offshoring and high-skilled labour
migration. Thereby, the analysis is undertaken in form of four different modelling frameworks,
tailored to replicate and explain up-to-date empirical observations on the respective topics. The
obtained insights together with the tractability of the underlying frameworks may provide a
fruitful guidance to the rapidly growing empirical literature on both topics, being, at the same
time, a useful point of departure for further theoretical work in these fields.
166
Chapter 8
Appendix
A Theory appendix
A.1 A continuum of tasks that differ in offshorability
In this extension, we shed light on the firm-internal margin of offshoring, by considering a
continuum of tasks that differ in offshorability, as suggested by Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
For this purpose, we replace our production function for intermediates in Eq. (3.3) by
q(v) = ϕ(v) exp
∫ 1
0
ln ℓ(v, η˜)dη˜, (A.1)
in which ℓ(v, η˜) is the input of task η˜ ∈ [0, 1] in the production of q(v). Tasks are symmetric
in the labour input they require to be performed and, as in the main text, we impose the
additional assumption that one unit of labour must be employed to produce one unit of task
η˜. However, as in Grossman and Ross-Hansberg (2008), tasks differ in their offshorability and
this is captured by an iceberg cost parameter t that is task specific: t(η˜). An intuitive way to
interpret parameter t is to think of it as task-specific trade cost parameter, implying that total
costs of shipping the output of a task η˜, whose production has been moved offshore, back to
the source country amounts to t(η˜)τ > 1. To facilitate the analysis, we impose the additional
assumption that t(1) = 1, t(0) =∞ and t′(η˜) < 0. This implies that tasks are ranked according
to their offshorability and it allows us to identify a unique firm-specific η(v), which separates
the tasks performed at home, η˜ < η(v), from the tasks performed abroad η˜ ≥ η(v).
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Once a firm has decided to engage in offshoring, it is left with two further decisions on how
to organise its production, which are taken in two consecutive stages. In stage one, the firm
chooses how many tasks to move offshore and sets η(v) accordingly, while in stage two, the
firm chooses optimal employment in domestic and offshored tasks. As it is common practice,
we solve this two stage problem through backward induction and first determine the profit-
maximising employment levels for a given η(v). For this purpose, we can recollect from the main
text that wages paid to domestic and foreign workers are given wo(v) and w∗(v), respectively.
We can write labour demand for domestic and foreign task production as follows: ln(v) =∫ η(v)
0 ℓ
n(v, η˜)dη˜ = η(v)ℓn(v) and lr(v) =
∫ 1
η(v) t (η˜) ℓ
r (v, η˜) dη˜ =
∫ 1
η(v) t (η˜) dη˜ℓ
r (v).1 Therefore,
firm v’s cost minimisation problem can be expressed as follows:
min
ln(v), lr(v)
ωn (v) ln (v)+ωr(v)lr (v) s.t. 1 = ϕǫ[η (v)]1−η(v)
[
ln (v)
η (v)
]η(v) [ lr (v)
1− η (v)
]1−η(v)
, (A.2)
where ωn(v) = wo(v), ωr(v) = τw∗(v) hold according to the main text and
ǫ[η (v)] ≡ 1− η(v)∫ 1
η(v) t (η˜) dη˜
(A.3)
reflects the average productivity loss arising from the extra labour costs t(η˜), when producing
a task abroad. Solving maximisation problem (A.2) gives marginal production costs c (v) =
wo (v) / [ϕ (v) z˜ (v)], where2
z˜(v) ≡
{
wo(v)
w∗(v)τ
ǫ[η (v)]
}1−η(v)
. (A.4)
At stage one, the firm sets η(v) to minimise its marginal cost c(v). Thus, for the optimal
η(v)-level the following first-order condition must hold: ∂c(v)/∂η(v)
!
= 0. In view of Eqs. (A.3)
1As in the main text, we define lr(v) such that foreign labour demand of offshoring firm v is given by τ lr(v).
While this definition of lr(v) might seem awkward at a first glance, it is useful for our purpose because it allows
us to directly compare the production technology in Eq. (A.2) with the respective technology in Eq. (3.3).
2It is notable that z˜(v) degenerates to z(v), when considering a discrete offshoring technology, with
t(η˜) =
∞ ∀ η˜ ∈ [0, η)1 ∀ η˜ ∈ [η, 1] .
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and (A.4), this is equivalent to
∂ ln z˜(v)
∂η(v)
= − ln
(
wo(v)
w∗(v)τ
ǫ[η (v)]
)
+ t[η(v)]ǫ[η (v)]− 1 != 0. (A.5)
Acknowledging Eq. (3.23) in the main text, we know that wo(v)/w∗(v) is the same for all
producers, and hence Eq. (A.5) determines the same cost-minimising η for all firms. Since the
second-order condition of the stage one cost-minimisation problem requires ∂2 ln z˜(v)/∂η(v)2 <
0, while ∂2 ln z˜(v)/∂η(v)∂τ > 0 follows from inspection of Eq. (A.5), we can finally conclude
that dη/dτ > 0, and hence firms offshore a lower share of tasks if the costs of shipping foreign
output back to the source country increase. This completes our formal discussion.
A.2 Derivation of γ(χ, η)
We first show that the two averages π¯o and π¯d are proportional to πd(ϕd). An analogous result
has already been shown in the main text for π¯. It is an immediate implication of the Pareto
distribution of productivities that the average operating profits of offshoring firms π¯o are a
multiple ζ of the marginal offshoring firm’s operating profits πo(ϕo). Hence, we can write:
π¯o = ζπo (ϕo) = ζ
[
πo (ϕo)
πd (ϕo)
][
πd (ϕo)
πd (ϕd)
]
πd(ϕd) = ζ
(
1 + χ−
ξ
k
)
πd(ϕd), (A.6)
where πo (ϕo)/πd (ϕo) = 1 + χξ/k from Eq. (3.6) and the definition of χ reflects the firm-level
productivity effect, while πd (ϕo)/πd(ϕd) = (ϕd/ϕo)−ξ = χ−ξ/k from Eq. (3.7) and the definition
of χ captures the positive selection of offshoring firms. Using π¯ = (1−χ)π¯d+χπ¯o as well as the
solutions we have derived for π¯ and π¯o in terms of πd(ϕd), we get:
π¯d =
π¯ − χπ¯o
1− χ = ζ
1− χ k−ξk
1− χ π
d(ϕd). (A.7)
Substituting for π¯, π¯o, and π¯d in the definition of γ, we then obtain γ(χ; η) as given in the main
text.
A.3 Derivation of the Gini coefficient in Eq. (3.20)
For characterising the Gini coefficient in Eq. (3.20), we must distinguish between firms which
offshore and those that produce only domestically. Cumulative profits of purely domestic
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firms with productivity ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕd, ϕo) are given by Ψ(ϕ¯) ≡ N ∫ ϕ¯
ϕd
πd(ϕ)dG (ϕ). Considering
πd (ϕ) /πd(ϕd) = (ϕ/ϕd)ξ from Eq. (3.7), we can solve for
Ψ(ϕ¯) = Mπd(ϕd)ζ
[
1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)ξ−k]
. (A.8)
Economy-wide profit income is given by Ψ = M(1+χ)ζπd(ϕd)−Mχs. Accounting for s = πd(ϕd)
from Eq. (3.8), gives Ψ = Mπd(ϕd)[ζ + (ζ − 1)χ]. The share of cumulative profits realised by
firms with a productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕd, ϕo) is therefore given by
Ψ(ϕ¯)
Ψ
=
ζ
ζ + (ζ − 1)χ
[
1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)ξ−k]
. (A.9)
Denoting the fraction of firms with a productivity level ϕ ≤ ϕ¯ by µ ≡ 1(ϕ¯/ϕd)−k, Eq. (A.9) can
be rewritten as the first segment of the Lorenz curve for the distribution of profit income:
Q1M (µ) =
ζ
ζ + (ζ − 1)χ
[
1− (1− µ) k−ξk
]
, (A.10)
which is relevant for parameter domain µ ∈ [0, 1− χ).
We now follow the same steps as above to calculate the second segment of the Lorenz curve
for the distribution of profit income. We can first note that cumulative profits of all firms with
productivities up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕo,∞) are given by Ψ(ϕ¯) = Ψ(ϕo)+N ∫ ϕ¯ϕo πo(ϕ)dG(ϕ)−N ∫ ϕ¯ϕo sdG(ϕ).
Accounting for πd (ϕ) /πd(ϕd) = (ϕ/ϕd)ξ from Eq. (3.7) and πo(ϕ)/πd(ϕ) = 1+χξ/k, according
to Eqs. (3.6) and (3.17), we can calculate
Ψ(ϕ¯) = Ψ(ϕo) +Mπd(ϕd)
{
ζ
(
1 + χ
ξ
k
) [
χ
k−ξ
k −
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)ξ−k]
−
[
χ−
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)
−k
]}
. (A.11)
Dividing the latter by economy-wide profit income Ψ gives the share of profit income accruing
to entrepreneurs with an ability up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕo,∞):
Ψ(ϕ¯)
Ψ
= Q1M (1− χ) +
ζ
(
1 + χ
ξ
k
) [
χ
k−ξ
k −
(
ϕ¯/ϕd
)ξ−k]
ζ + (ζ − 1)χ −
χ−
(
ϕ¯/ϕd
)
−k
ζ + (ζ − 1)χ . (A.12)
Substituting µ from above, Eq. (A.12) can be reformulated to the second segment of the Lorenz
curve, which is relevant for µ ∈ (1− χ, 1]
Q2M (µ) = Q
1
M (1− χ) +
ζ
(
1 + χ
ξ
k
) [
χ
k−ξ
k − (1− µ) k−ξk
]
ζ + (ζ − 1)χ −
µ− 1 + χ
ζ + (ζ − 1)χ, (A.13)
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with Q2M (1− χ) = Q1M (1− χ). Together Eqs. (A.10) and (A.13) form the Lorenz curve3
QM (µ) ≡

Q1M (µ) if µ ∈ [0, 1− χ)
Q2M (µ) if µ ∈ [1− χ, 1]
. (A.14)
The Gini coefficient for the distribution of profit income in Eq. (3.20) can then be computed
according to AM (χ) ≡ 1− 2
∫ 1
0 QM (µ)dµ.
A.4 Income inequality among self-employed agents
To characterise income inequality among all self-employed agents, we rely on the Lorenz curve
for this income group, which now has three segments.4 The first segment captures the share
of income attributed to service providers. It is given by Q0S(µ) = µ/ζ and relevant for all µ ∈[
0, χ/(1+χ)
)
. The second segment of the Lorenz curve captures the income of service providers
plus cumulative profits of purely domestic firms with a productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕd, ϕo).
Following the derivation steps in Appendix A.3, we can compute
Ψˆ(ϕ¯) = Mπd(ϕd)
{
χ+ ζ
[
1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)ξ−k]}
. (A.15)
Economy-wide profits plus service fees add up to total operating profits Ψˆ = Mπd(ϕd)(1 +
χ) [k/ (k − ξ)]. Hence, the cumulative share of (profit) income realised by service providers and
firms with a productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕd, ϕo) is given by
Ψˆ (ϕ¯)
Ψˆ
=
1
ζ
χ
1 + χ
+
1
1 + χ
[
1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)ξ−k]
. (A.16)
We have to link Eq. (A.16) with the ratio of self-employed agents receiving the respective income
share. Denoting the fraction of these agents by µ ≡ (1 + χ)−1 [1 + χ − (ϕ¯/ϕd)−k], Eq. (A.16)
can be reformulated to the second segment of the Lorenz curve
Q1S (µ) =
1
ζ
χ
1 + χ
+
1
1 + χ
{
1− [ (1 + χ) (1− µ) ] k−ξk } , (A.17)
3The Lorenz curve in Eq. (A.14) has the usual properties: QM (0) = 0, QM (1) = 1 andQ′M (µ) > 0 ∀ µ ∈ (0, 1).
4In this subsection, we consider the basic model variant without rent sharing. The respective results for the
model variant with rent sharing are obtained when replacing ξ by ξ¯.
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which is relevant for parameter domain µ ∈ [χ/(1 + χ), 1/(1 + χ)).
In a final step, we compute the cumulative income of all service providers and entrepreneurs
with an ability up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕo,∞) as a share of the total income of self-employed agents, Ψˆ.
Substituting µ from above, this gives the third segment of the Lorenz curve
Q2S(µ) = Q
1
S
(
1
1 + χ
)
+
1
1 + χ
{(
1 + χξ/k
) [
χ
k−ξ
k − [(1 + χ)(1− µ)] k−ξk ]
−1
ζ
[
χ− (1 + χ)(1− µ)]} . (A.18)
Putting the three segments together, we obtain the new Lorenz curve
QS(µ) ≡

Q0S(µ) if µ ∈
[
0, χ1+χ
)
Q1S(µ) if µ ∈
[
χ
1+χ ,
1
1+χ
)
Q2S(µ) if µ ∈
[
1
1+χ , 1
] . (A.19)
The Gini coefficient for the distribution of income among self-employed agents can then be
calculated according to AS(χ) ≡ 1 − 2
∫ 1
0 QS(µ)dµ. Substituting Eq. (A.19), we can compute
the respective expression in Footnote 19.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.2.3
Substitution of Eqs. (3.14) and (3.16) for M and ϕd, respectively, in Eq. (3.22) and using the
resulting expression in Φ(χ) = I(χ)/I(0), we obtain after tedious but straightforward computa-
tions: Φ(χ) = T1(χ)× T2(χ)× T3(χ), with
T1(χ) ≡ [1 + γ(σ − 1)] [1 + ζ(σ − 1)]
σ [1 + γζ(σ − 1)] , T2(χ) ≡
{
(1 + χ) [1 + γζ(σ − 1)]
1 + ζ(σ − 1)
}σ−1−εk
k(σ−1)
, (A.20)
and T3(χ) ≡ (1 + χ)1/(σ−1). Differentiation of Φ(χ) establishes
Φ′(χ) =
Φ(χ)
1 + γ(σ − 1)
{
−
[
κˆ(χ; ε) + ξ(σ − 1)
γk(σ − 1) + k − ξ
]
∂γ
∂χ
+
[
(1− ε) k + σ − 1
k(σ − 1)
]
1 + γ(σ − 1)
1 + χ
}
,
(A.21)
with κˆ(χ; ε) ≡ [kε− σ + 1] [1 + γ(χ; η) (σ − 1)]. In view of ∂γ/∂χ < 0, it is immediate that
κˆ(χ; ε)+ξ(σ−1) ≥ 0 is sufficient for Φ′(χ) > 0. Φ′(χ) > 0 is therefore guaranteed if ε ≥ (σ−1)/k,
because in this case we have κˆ(χ; ε) ≥ 0. Things are less obvious for parameter domain ε <
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(σ− 1)/k, because in this case we have κˆ(χ; ε) < 0. However, noting that for parameter domain
ε < (σ − 1)/k we have ∂κˆ(χ; ε)/∂χ > 0, it follows that in this case κˆ(χ; ε) + ξ(σ − 1) > 0 must
hold for all possible χ if κˆ(0; ε) + ξ(σ − 1) ≥ 0 or, equivalently, if ε ≥ (σ − ξ)(σ − 1)/ (σk) ≡ ε¯.
We can thus safely conclude that Φ′(χ) > 0 is guaranteed if ε ≥ ε¯. Put differently, if ε ≥ ε¯
source country welfare is monotonically increasing in the share of offshoring firms, and hence
welfare in the source country is unambiguously higher with offshoring than in autarky.
We now consider the parameter domain ε < ε¯. In this case, Φ′(0) < 0 follows from κˆ(0; ε) +
ξ(σ−1) < 0 and the fact that limχ→0 ∂γ/∂χ = −∞, and hence offshoring lowers source country
welfare relative to autarky if χ is small. Furthermore, evaluating the derivative in Eq. (A.21) at
χ = 1, we obtain
Φ′(1) =
Φ(1)
2k
[b(η) + k(k − ξ)(1− η)] [1 + η(σ − 1)] + ξ(σ − 1)(k − ξ)(1− η)
[1 + η(σ − 1)] [ηk(σ − 1) + k − ξ] , (A.22)
with b(η) ≡ [(1− ε)k + σ − 1] [(2η − 1)k + ξ(1− η) + (k − ξ)/(σ − 1)]. It is immediate that
η > 0.5 is sufficient for b(η) > 0 and in this case we have Φ′(1) > 0. Hence, if η > 0.5, offshoring
exerts a non-monotonic effect on source country welfare. Noting that T1(χ) > 1 and T3(χ) > 1
hold for any χ > 0, whereas η > 0.5 is sufficient for T2(1) > 1 if ε < (σ − 1)/k, we can safely
conclude that Φ(1) > 1, and hence the source country benefits from offshoring if χ is large.
Taking stock, our previous analysis has identified a critical level of external increasing returns
to scale in the production of Y : ε¯. If external increasing returns to scale are larger than the
critical level, offshoring exerts a positive monotonic effect on source country welfare. In contrast,
if the external increasing returns to scale are smaller than the critical level, offshoring exerts a
non-monotonic effect on source country welfare. In this case, the source country is worse off with
offshoring than under autarky if χ is small, while it benefits from offshoring if χ is large. Using
the parameter estimates from Section 3.5, we can determine 0.61 as an empirically plausible
value for ε¯. Empirical estimates for parameter ε are reported by Ardelean (2011). Relying on
UN COMTRADE data, Ardelean identifies an average value of ε = 0.56 across all industries in
her data-set. This lends support to the non-monotonic welfare effect of offshoring in Proposition
3.2.3.5 This completes the proof.
5Ardelean (2011) does not distinguish between final and intermediate goods, and hence her ε estimates capture
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A.6 The social planner problem for ε = 1 under autarky
In autarky, the social planner sets ϕd and the quantity q(v) > 0 of all varieties v to maximize
output Y , subject to the binding resource constraint. We first consider the problem of set-
ting optimal quantities q(v) for a given ϕd. Holding ϕd constant under autarky is tantamount
to fixing the amount of resources used as variable production input: L = NG(ϕd). The so-
cial planner’s problem in this case is therefore to maximize Y =
[ ∫
v∈V q(v)
ρdv
]1/ρ
, subject to∫
v∈V
[
q(v)/ϕ(v)
]
dv = NG(ϕd). The first-order conditions for this maximization problem estab-
lish for any two varieties v1, v2 the following output ratio: q(v1)/q(v2) = [ϕ(v1)/ϕ(v2)]σ. This
implies that output increases with productivity and hence, we can refer to varieties by means of
the underlying productivity parameter. The marginal variety is the one with the lowest output
and produced with productivity ϕd. We can define a ≡ q(ϕd)/(ϕd)σ. An optimal allocation
of resources then requires that the output level of any firm with productivity ϕ ≥ ϕd is set to
q(ϕ) = aϕσ, with a > 0.
With these insights at hand, we can reformulate the social planner’s problem as
max
ϕd,a
Y =
[
N
∫
∞
ϕd
q (ϕ)ρ dG(ϕ)
] 1
ρ
s.t.
∫
∞
ϕd
[
q (ϕ)
ϕ
]
dG(ϕ) = G(ϕd), q(ϕ) = aϕσ. (A.23)
Applying q(ϕ) = aϕσ, we can rewrite the resource constraint as follows: ζa(ϕd)σ−1−k = 1 −
(ϕd)−k. Furthermore, economy-wide output can be written as Y =
[
Nζaρ(ϕd)σ−1−k
]1/ρ
. Solving
the resource constraint for a and substituting the resulting expression into Y , we can simplify
the social planner’s problem to
max
ϕd
N
σ
σ−1 ζ
1
σ−1
[
1−
(
ϕd
)
−k
] (
ϕd
)σ−1−k
σ−1 . (A.24)
The first-order condition to this maximization problem establishes ϕd =
[
1+ζ(σ−1)]1/k and this
coincides with the outcome of decentralized firm entry in Eq. (3.16), when considering χ = 0.
Hence, for ε = 1 the market equilibrium under autarky is allocationally efficient.
external increasing returns to scale due to a love of variety of consumers in a Krugman-type model as well as
external increasing returns to scale in final goods production due to labor division in an Ethier framework.
Furthermore, it is notable that variation in the ε estimates is large, ranging from a low level of 0.19 in the
‘Headgear and Parts Thereof’ industry to a relatively high level of 0.88 in the ‘Soap etc.; Waxes, Polish, etc;
Candles; Dental Preps’ industry.
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A.7 Derivation details for the model variant with θ > 0
In this subsection, we show in detail how the equations in Section 3.1 must be modified, when
allowing for rent sharing between workers and firms. The first equation that has to be modified
is Eq. (3.4). With rent sharing wages are firm-specific, and hence we can rewrite marginal
production costs as follows:
c(v) =
ωn(v)
ϕ(v)z(v)
with z(v) ≡
[
ωn(v)
ωr(v)
]1−η
, (A.25)
where ωn(v) is the domestic wage rate paid by firm v to workers conducting non-routine tasks.
Thereby, we have ωn(v) = wd(v) if the firm produces all tasks at home, while we have ωn(v) =
wo(v) if routine tasks are produced offshore. As in Section 3.1, we have z(v) = 1 and thus
cd(v) = wd(v)/ϕ if the firm produces purely domestically. For an offshoring firm, we obtain
z(v) = zo(v) and, instead of Eq. (3.4),
co(v) =
wo(v)
ϕ(v)zo(v)
, where zo(v) ≡
[
wo(v)
τw∗(v)
]1−η
=
[
(1− U) w¯
(1− U∗)w¯∗
](1−η)(1−θ)
τη−1.
(A.26)
Thereby, we have made use of the fair-wage constraint in Eq. (3.23) in order to substitute for
wo(v)/w∗(v). Combining Eqs. (3.6) and (3.23), we can furthermore compute
πo(v)
πd(v)
= κ(σ−1) and
wo(v)
wd(v)
= κθ(σ−1), (A.27)
where
κ ≡ c
d(v)
co(v)
=
{[
(1− U) w¯
(1− U∗)w¯∗
](1−η)(1−θ) (1
τ
)1−η} ξ¯σ−1
. (A.28)
Using Eqs. (3.7) and (A.27) in indifference condition (3.9), and accounting for πd(ϕd) = s from
Eq. (3.8′), we can easily verify that the link between χ and κ continues to be given by Eq.
(3.17), with ξ¯ assuming the role of ξ if θ > 0. Labour income per capita in the source and host
country are given by
(1− U)w¯ = γρY
L
and (1− U∗)w¯∗ = (1− γ) ρY
N∗
, (A.29)
respectively. Substituting Eqs. (A.29) and (3.15) into Eq. (A.28) allows us to compute
κ =

[
γk(σ − 1) + k − ξ¯
(1− γ) k(σ − 1)
(
N∗
N
)](1−η)(1−θ) (
1
τ
)1−η
ξ¯
σ−1
. (A.30)
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And combining Eqs. (3.17) and (A.30) we can conclude that the relationship between κ and χ
in the model variant with θ > 0 is characterised by the implicit function
F (χ, τ) ≡

[
γk(σ − 1) + k − ξ¯
(1− γ) k(σ − 1)
(
N∗
N
)](1−η)(1−θ) (
1
τ
)1−η
ξ¯
σ−1
−
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
) 1
σ−1
= 0.
This completes our discussion on how rent sharing affects the equations reported in Section 3.1.
A.8 Derivation of Eq. (3.24)
Adding up domestic employment over all purely domestic and offshoring firms in the source coun-
try gives (1− U)L = N
[∫ ϕo
ϕd
ld (ϕ) dG (ϕ) +
∫
∞
ϕo l
o (ϕ) dG (ϕ)
]
. Using ld (ϕ) /ld(ϕd) = (ϕ/ϕd)(1−θ)ξ¯
and lo (ϕ) /ld(ϕd) = ηκ(σ−1)(1−θ)(ϕ/ϕd)(1−θ)ξ¯, according to Eqs. (3.2), (3.7), the equivalent of
Eq. (3.19) for the scenario with θ > 0, and Eq. (3.23), and accounting for the definition of
β(χ; η) in Eq. (3.25), we can calculate
(1− U)L = Mld(ϕd)β(χ; η) ζ¯
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1) . (A.31)
Furthermore, combining Eqs. (3.8′), (3.10), (3.11) and noting that constant markup pricing
implies (σ− 1)π(ϕd) = ld(ϕd)w(ϕd), we can express the total wage bill in the source country as
follows:
(1− U)Lw¯ = Mld(ϕd)w(ϕd)α(χ; η)ζ¯ . (A.32)
Together Eq. (A.31) and Eq. (A.32) determine the wage ratio w(ϕd)/w¯ = ∆(χ; η)/[1+θ(ζ¯−1)],
where ∆(χ; η) = β(χ; η)/α(χ; η) has been considered. Applying the fair-wage constraint (3.23)
for the marginal firm and considering indifference condition (3.8), we can compute U = 1 −
w(ϕd)/w¯. Substituting for w(ϕd)/w¯, then gives Eq. (3.24).
A.9 Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
Let us first consider the impact of offshoring on U . From Eq. (3.25), we can conclude that, for
all χ ∈ (0, 1], ∆(χ; η) >,=, < 1 is equivalent to Ω(ϑ) ≡ (ηϑ1−θ−1) (ϑ− 1)θ−(ηϑ− 1) >,=, < 0,
with ϑ ≡ 1 + χξ¯/k ∈ (1, 2]. Differentiating Ω(ϑ) gives Ω′(ϑ) = −η[1 − (1 − θ)ϑ−θ(ϑ − 1)θ] +
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θ (ϑ− 1)θ−1 (ηϑ1−θ − 1) and Ω′′(ϑ) = θ(1− θ)(ϑ− 1)θ−2[1− η/ϑ1+θ]. Accounting for Ω′′(ϑ) > 0
and Ω′(2) = −η(1−2−θ)−θ(1−η2−θ) < 0, it follows that Ω′(ϑ) < 0 must hold for all ϑ ∈ (1, 2).
Noting finally that Ω(1) = 1 − η > 0 and Ω(2) = −2η[1 − (1/2)θ] < 0, we can define a unique
χˆ ∈ (0, 1), such that offshoring lowers U if χ < χˆ, while it raises U if χ > χˆ.
From inspection of Eq. (3.26) we can note that Λ > 1 requires∆ < 1 and thus a positive effect
of offshoring on U . This implies that Λ(χ; η) > 1 can only materialise if χ > χˆ. Furthermore, it
is worth noting that partially differentiating ∆(χ; η) with respect to η gives
∂∆(χ; η)
∂η
= −
χ
k−ξ¯
k
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)[(
1− χ k−(1−θ)ξ¯k
)
−
(
1− χ k−ξ¯k
)
χ
θξ¯
k
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)
−θ
]
α(χ; η)2
< 0. (A.33)
Additionally accounting for ∂γ (χ; η) /∂η > 0, it follows from Eq. (3.26) that ∂Λ (χ; η) /∂η > 0.
Considering Λ(1; 0) = 0 and Λ(1; 1) > 1, this implies that Λ(1; η) = 1 has a unique solution in
η ∈ (0, 1), which is given by ηˆ in Proposition 3.3.1. We can thus safely conclude that u/ua is
non-monotonic in χ if η > ηˆ, with u/ua < 1 if χ sufficiently small and u/ua > 1 if χ close to
one.
We finally show that ηˆ < 0.5 if k ≥ 2. For this purpose, we can note that ηˆ >,=, <
0.5 is equivalent to Γ(θ, k, ξ¯) ≡ 2θθξ¯ − (2θ − 1)(kσ − ξ¯) >,=, < 0. To determine the sign of
Γ(θ, k, ξ¯), let us first consider a parameter domain with k ≥ ξ¯ ≥ 2. In this case, we have
Γ(θ, k, ξ¯) ≤ Γ(θ, ξ¯, ξ¯) = g(θ)ξ¯, with g(θ) ≡ (σ − 1) − 2θ(σ − 1 − θ). Since ξ¯ ≥ 2 implies
σ− 1 ≥ 2 and g(θ) decreases in σ− 1, we can further conclude that g(θ) ≤ 2− 2θ(2− θ) ≡ g(θ).
Differentiation of g(θ) gives g′(θ) = 2θ [1− ln 2(2− θ)] and g′′(θ) = 2θ ln 2 [2− ln 2(2− θ)] > 0.
From inspection of these derivatives, it follows that g(θ) has a unique extremum, which is a
minimum. Noting further that g(0) = g(1) = 0, it is clear that g(θ) < 0 must hold for all
θ ∈ (0, 1). This proves that Γ(θ, k, ξ¯) < 0 and thus ηˆ < 0.5 if k ≥ ξ¯ ≥ 2. Let us now consider
a parameter domain with k ≥ 2 > ξ¯. In this case, we have Γ(θ, k, ξ¯) ≤ Γ(θ, 2, ξ¯) = gˆ(θ)ξ¯, with
gˆ(θ) ≡ 2θθ − (2θ − 1)[(σ + 1)/(σ − 1) + 2σθ]. Noting that σ + 1 + 2σθ(σ − 1) = (σ − 1)[1 +
2/ξ¯+2θ(σ− 1)], it follows from ξ¯ < 2 that σ+1+2σθ(σ− 1) > 2(σ− 1)[1+ θ(σ− 1)] and thus
gˆ(θ) < 2[1 + θ(σ − 1)] − 2θ{2[1 + θ(σ − 1)] − θ} < g(θ). From above, we know that g(θ) < 0
holds for all θ ∈ (0, 1). This confirms that Γ(θ, k, ξ¯) < 0 and thus ηˆ < 0.5 if k ≥ 2 > ξ¯, which
completes the proof.
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A.10 Derivation of the Gini coefficient in Eq. (3.27)
To characterise the Gini coefficient for the distribution of wage income we must distinguish
workers employed in purely domestic firms from those employed in offshoring firms. Cumulative
labour income of workers employed in purely domestic firms with a productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈
[ϕd, ϕo) is given byW (ϕ¯) ≡ N ∫ ϕ¯
ϕd
wd(ϕ)ld(ϕ)dG(ϕ). Since constant markup pricing implies that
a firm’s wage bill is proportional to its revenues, we can make use of wd(ϕ)ld(ϕ) = (σ−1)πd(ϕ).
Considering πd(ϕ)/πd(ϕd) = (ϕ/ϕd)ξ¯ from Eq. (3.7), then gives
W (ϕ¯) = (σ − 1)Mπd(ϕd)ζ¯
[
1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)ξ¯−k]
. (A.34)
Total economy-wide labour income equals W = ργY . Using Eq. (3.10) and the definition of γ,
we obtain W = (σ− 1)Mπd(ϕd)ζ¯α(χ; η). Hence, the share of wage income accruing to workers,
who are employed in firms with a productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕd, ϕo), can be expressed as
W (ϕ¯)
W
=
1
α(χ; η)
[
1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)ξ¯−k]
. (A.35)
To calculate the Lorenz curve for the distribution of labour income, we must link the income
ratio in Eq. (A.35) to the respective employment ratio. For this purpose, we first note that
total employment in all firms with a productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕd, ϕo) is given by L(ϕ¯) ≡
N
∫ ϕ¯
ϕd
ld(ϕ)dG(ϕ). Substituting ld(ϕ)/ld(ϕd) = (ϕ/ϕd)(1−θ)ξ¯, we can calculate
L(ϕ¯) = Mld(ϕd)
ζ¯
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
[
1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)(1−θ)ξ¯−k]
. (A.36)
In a similar vein, we can show that economy-wide employment of production workers in the
source country equals (1−U)L = Mld(ϕd)β(χ; η)ζ¯/[1+θ(ζ¯−1)]. Hence, the share of production
workers that are employed in firms with a productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕd, ϕo) is given by
λ = β(χ; η)−1[1 − (ϕ¯/ϕd)(1−θ)ξ¯−k]. Combining the latter with Eq. (A.35), we obtain the first
segment of the Lorenz curve for the distribution of labour income
Q1L (λ) =
1− [1− β(χ; η)λ]
k−ξ¯
k−(1−θ)ξ¯
α(χ; η)
, (A.37)
which is relevant if λ ∈ [0, bL), with bL ≡ β(χ; η)−1(1− χ1−(1−θ)ξ¯/k).
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We now follow the same steps as above to calculate the second segment of the Lorenz curve.
We first compute the total domestic wage bill of firms with a productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕo,∞).
This givesW (ϕ¯) ≡W (ϕo)+N ∫ ϕ¯ϕo wo(ϕ)lo(ϕ)dG(ϕ). Accounting for wo(ϕ)lo(ϕ) = η(σ−1)πo(ϕ)
and considering πd(ϕ)/πd(ϕd) = (ϕ/ϕd)ξ¯ from Eq. (3.7) as well as πo(ϕ)/πd(ϕ) = 1 + χξ¯/k,
according to Eqs. (3.6) and (3.17), we can calculate
W (ϕ¯) = W (ϕo) +Mπd(ϕd)ζ¯(σ − 1)η
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)[
χ
k−ξ¯
k −
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)ξ¯−k]
. (A.38)
Dividing Eq. (A.38) by economy-wide labour income W , yields
W (ϕ¯)
W
= 1−
η
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)
α(χ; η)
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)ξ¯−k
. (A.39)
The mass of domestic workers employed by firms with a productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕo,∞)
is given by L(ϕ¯) = L(ϕo) + N
∫ ϕ¯
ϕo l
o(ϕ)dG(ϕ). Accounting for lo(ϕ)/ld(ϕ) = ηκ(σ−1)(1−θ) =
η(1 + χξ¯/k)1−θ and ld(ϕ)/ld(ϕd) = (ϕ/ϕd)(1−θ)ξ¯, we can further write
L(ϕ¯) = L(ϕo) +Mld(ϕd)
ζ¯η
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)1−θ
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
[
χ
k−(1−θ)ξ¯
k −
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)(1−θ)ξ¯−k]
. (A.40)
Dividing L(ϕ¯) by economy-wide employment (1 − U)L, then gives λ = 1 − ηβ(χ; η)−1(1 +
χξ¯/k
)1−θ(
ϕ¯/ϕd
)(1−θ)ξ¯−k
. Solving the latter for ϕ¯/ϕd and substituting the resulting expression
into Eq. (A.39), we obtain the second segment of the Lorenz curve
Q2L(λ) = 1−
η
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)
α(χ; η)
 (1− λ)β(χ; η)
η
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)1−θ

k−ξ¯
k−(1−θ)ξ¯
, (A.41)
which is relevant if ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕo,∞). Together Eqs. (A.37) and (A.41) form the Lorenz curve6
QL(λ) ≡

Q1L(λ) if λ ∈ [0, bL)
Q2L(λ) if λ ∈ [bL, 1]
. (A.42)
6The Lorenz curve in Eq. (A.42) has the usual properties: QL(0) = 0, QL(1) = 1 and Q′L(λ) > 0 ∀ λ ∈ (0, 1).
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The Gini coefficient for the distribution of labour income in Eq. (3.27) can then be computed
according to AL(χ) ≡ 1− 2
∫ 1
0 QL(λ)dλ. Thereby we can note that
∫ bL
0
Q1L(λ)dλ =
1
α(χ; η)
λ+ [1− β(χ; η)λ]
2(k−ξ¯)+θξ¯
k−(1−θ)ξ¯
β(χ; η)
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
2 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)

bL
0
=
bL
α(χ; η)
+
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
2 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
 χ 2(k−ξ¯)+θξ¯k
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)
− 1
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)
 , (A.43)
while
∫ 1
bL
Q2L(λ)dλ =
λ+ η(1 + χξ¯/k)
α(χ; η)
[
β(χ; η)
η(1 + χξ¯/k)1−θ
] k−ξ¯
k−(1−θ)ξ¯ 1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
2 + θ(ζ¯ − 1) (1− λ)
2(k−ξ¯)+θξ¯
k−(1−θ)ξ¯

1
bL
= 1− bL − η
2(1 + χξ¯/k)2−θ
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
2 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)χ
2(k−ξ¯)+θξ¯
k . (A.44)
Substituting Eqs. (A.43) and (A.44) into
AL = 1− 2
∫ bL
0
Q1L(λ)dλ− 2
∫ 1
bL
Q2L(λ)dλ, (A.45)
we obtain
AL = −1 + 2bLα(χ; η)− 1
α(χ; η)
+
2
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
2 + θ(ζ¯ − 1) + 2Z(χ; η), (A.46)
with
Z(χ; η) ≡
η2
(
1 + χξ¯/k
)2−θ
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)
− 1
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)
 1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
2 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)χ
2(k−ξ¯)+θξ¯
k . (A.47)
Using the definition of bL, we can rewrite AL in the following way
AL =
θ(ζ¯ − 1)
2 + θ(ζ¯ − 1) + 2
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
2 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
[1− α(χ; η)β(χ; η)]
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)
+
2
(
1− χ k−(1−θ)ξ¯k
)
[α(χ; η)− 1]
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)
+ 2Z(χ; η). (A.48)
Accounting for Eq. (3.25), we can show that
1− α(χ; η)β(χ; η) = − [α(χ; η)− 1]− [β(χ; η)− 1]− [α(χ; η)− 1] [β(χ; η)− 1]
= − [α(χ; η)− 1]
(
1− χ k−(1−θ)ξ¯k
)
− [β(χ; η)− 1]
(
1− χ k−ξ¯k
)
−
[
η2
(
1 + χξ¯/k
)2−θ − 1]χ 2(k−ξ¯)+θξ¯k . (A.49)
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Substituting Eq. (A.49) into Eq. (A.48), it is straightforward to compute Eq. (3.27).
A.11 Proof of Proposition 3.3.2
From the definitions of α(χ; η), β(χ; η) and inspection of Eq. (3.27), it follows that AL(1) =
AL(0). Furthermore, if χ ∈ (0, 1), the sign of AL(χ)−AL(0) is equivalent to the sign of
δ(χ; η) ≡ 1
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
(
1− χ k−(1−θ)ξ¯k
)[
η
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)
− 1
]
−
(
1− χ k−ξ¯k
)
χ
θξ¯
k
[
η
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)1−θ
− 1
]
. (A.50)
Noting further that
1
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
(
1− χ k−(1−θ)ξ¯k
)
>
(
1− χ k−ξ¯k
)
χ
θξ¯
k (A.51)
holds for any possible χ ∈ (0, 1), it is straightforward to show that δ(χ; η) > 0 must hold if
η(1 + χξ¯/k) ≥ 1, or, equivalently, if χ ≥ [(1− η)/η]k/ξ¯.
But what is the sign of δ(χ; η) if χ < χ¯ ≡ [(1− η)/η]k/ξ¯, where χ¯ < 1 follows from η > 0.5?
To answer this question, we can first note that if χ < χ¯, condition δ(χ; η) >,=, < 0 is equivalent
to condition δ0(χ; η) >,=, < δ1(χ), with
δ0(χ; η) ≡
1− η
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
)1−θ
1− η
(
1 + χ
ξ¯
k
) , δ1(χ) ≡ 1
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
1− χ k−(1−θ)ξ¯k(
1− χ k−ξ¯k
)
χ
θξ¯
k
. (A.52)
It is easily confirmed that δ0(χ; η) increases in χ over the relevant interval, reaching a minimum
function value of δ0(0; η) = 1 at χ = 0. Accordingly, δ0(χ; η) reaches a maximum function value
of ∞ at χ¯. In a similar way, we can show that δ1(χ) is decreasing in χ, reaching a maximum
function value of∞ at χ = 0 and a minimum function value of 1 at χ = 1. Putting together, this
implies that there exists a unique χˆ(η) such that δ0(χ; η) >,=, < δ1(χ) and thus δ(χ; η) >,=, < 0
if χ >,=, < χˆ(η). Finally, accounting for ∂δ0(χ; η)/∂η > 0, it follows that χˆ(η) falls in η and
reaches a minimum value of 0 at η = 1. In this case δ(χ; 0) > 0 holds for any χ ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, χˆ(η) reaches a maximum value of 1 at η = 0, implying that in this case δ(χ; 0) < 0
must hold for any χ ∈ (0, 1). This completes the formal discussion of the properties of AL(χ).
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A.12 Income inequality among employed and unemployed workers
To characterise income inequality among all production workers, we rely on the Lorenz curve
for labour income. Since this Lorenz curve now also captures unemployed individuals, it consists
of three segments. The first segment represents the share of income attributed to those who do
not have a job. Abstracting from unemployment compensation, it is clear that the income share
of this group is zero, and we can thus note that the respective Lorenz curve segment is given by
Q0U (λ) = 0 and relevant for all λ ∈ [0, U).
To calculate the second segment of the Lorenz curve, we follow the steps in Appendix A.10
and combine the labour income share of workers employed in purely domestic firms with a
productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕd, ϕo) – as determined by Eq. (A.35) – with the share of all
production workers who are either unemployed or employed in firms up to productivity ϕ¯:
λ = U +
1− U
β(χ; η)
[
1−
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)(1−θ)ξ¯−k]
. (A.53)
This gives the second segment of the Lorenz curve for the distribution of labour income
Q1U (λ) =
1−
[
1− β(χ; η)λ−U1−U
] k−ξ¯
k−(1−θ)ξ¯
α(χ; η)
, (A.54)
which is relevant for λ ∈ [U, bU ), with bU ≡ U + (1− U)(1− χ1−(1−θ)ξ¯/k)/β(χ; η).
To determine the third segment of the Lorenz curve, we compute the share of total domestic
labour income accruing to workers who are either unemployed or employed in firms with a
productivity level up to ϕ¯ ∈ [ϕo,∞) – as represented by Eq. (A.39) – with the share of production
workers who are either unemployed or employed by these firms:
λ = 1− η
(
1 + χξ¯/k
)1−θ 1− U
β(χ; η)
(
ϕ¯
ϕd
)(1−θ)ξ¯−k
. (A.55)
This allows us to calculate the third segment of the Lorenz curve
Q2U (λ) = 1−
η
(
1 + χξ¯/k
)
α(χ; η)
( 1− λ
1− U
)
β(χ; η)
η
(
1 + χξ¯/k
)1−θ

k−ξ¯
k−(1−θ)ξ¯
, (A.56)
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which is relevant if λ > bU . Putting the three segments together, gives the (extended) Lorenz
curve for labour income distribution
QU (λ) ≡

0 if λ ∈ [0, U)
Q1U (λ) if λ ∈ [U, bU )
Q2L(λ) if λ ∈ [bU , 1]
. (A.57)
The Gini coefficient for the distribution of labour income can then be computed according to
AU (χ) ≡ 1− 2
∫ 1
0 QU (λ)dλ, and is given by the respective expression in Footnote 32.
A.13 Derivation of the Theil index in Eq. (3.30)
Applying the decomposition rule in Eq. (3.29), we can write
T = aSTS + aUTU + aS ln
(
aS
N
N − L
)
+ aU ln
(
aU
N
L
)
, (A.58)
where aS , aU are the income shares of self-employed agents and production workers, respectively,
given by Eq. (3.31). Accounting for Eq. (3.15) and considering σ − 1 = ρ/(1 − ρ), we can
furthermore compute
aS
N
N − L =
ζ¯ργ + 1− ρ
ργ + 1− ρ , aU
N
L
=
ζ¯ργ + 1− ρ
ζ¯(ργ + 1− ρ) . (A.59)
Substitution of Eq. (A.59) into Eq. (A.58) allows us to write
T = aSTS + aLTU + (aS + aU ) ln
(
ζ¯ργ + 1− ρ
ζ¯(ργ + 1− ρ)
)
+ aS ln
(
ζ¯
)
, (A.60)
Finally, noting that aS + aU = 1 and aS/ζ¯ + aU = [ζ¯ργ + 1− ρ]/[ζ¯(ργ + 1− ρ)] hold, according
to Eq. (3.31), we obtain Eq. (3.30).
A.14 The concept of Lorenz dominance
We now consider a second criterion for ranking distributions and look at the criterion of Lorenz
dominance. Thereby, we say that distribution A Lorenz dominates distribution B if the Lorenz
curve of A lies above the Lorenz curve of B for any cumulative share of the population. Since
the Lorenz dominance is equivalent to mean-preserving second-order stochastic dominance, all
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measures of inequality that respect this criterion – such as the Gini coefficient or the Theil index
– rank A as a more equal distribution than B if A Lorenz dominates B.
The Lorenz curve for the income distribution of self-employed agents under autarky is given
by
QaS(µ) = 1− (1− µ)
k−ξ¯
k . (A.61)
Hence, the income distribution of self-employed agents under autarky Lorenz dominates the
respective income distribution under partial offshoring if QS(µ) < QaS(µ) holds for any µ ∈ (0, 1).
We have to check this inequality separately for the three segments of QS(µ). Let us first look
at domain µ ∈ (0, χ/(1 + χ)). In this case, QS(µ) < QaS(µ), is equivalent to D0S(µ, b) ≡
bµ− 1 + (1− µ)b < 0, with b ≡ 1/ζ. Twice differentiating D0S(µ, b) with respect to b gives
∂D0S(µ, b)
∂b
= µ+ ln(1− µ)(1− µ)b, ∂
2D0S(µ, b)
∂b2
= [ln(1− µ)]2 (1− µ)b. (A.62)
with ∂D0S(µ, 0)/∂b = µ + ln(1 − µ) < 0, ∂D0S(µ, 1)/∂b = µ + ln(1 − µ)(1 − µ) > 0, and
∂2D1S(µ, b)/∂b
2 > 0. Accounting for D0S(µ, 0) = D
0
S(µ, 1) = 0, we can therefore conclude that
D0S(µ, b) < 0 and thus QS(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) must hold in the relevant parameter range.
For domain µ ∈ [χ/(1+χ), 1/(1+χ)), it follows from Eqs. (A.17) and (A.61) that QS(µ) <
QaS(µ) is equivalent to D
1
S(µ, b) ≡ (b − 1)χ + [1 − (1 + χ)b−1](1 + χ)(1 − µ)b < 0. Therefore,
∂D1S(µ, b)/∂µ < 0 implies thatD
1
S
(
χ/(1+χ), b
) ≡ Dˆ1S(b) = (b−1)χ+(1+χ)1−b−1 < 0 is sufficient
for Q1S(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) to hold in the relevant parameter domain. Twice differentiating Dˆ
1
S(b) yields
dDˆ1S(b)/db = χ − ln(1 + χ)(1 + χ)1−b, d2Dˆ1S(b)/db = [ln(1 + χ)]2 (1 + χ)1−b. Accounting for
dDˆ1S(0)/db = χ − ln(1 + χ)(1 + χ) < 0, dDˆ1S(1)/db = χ − ln(1 + χ) > 0, and d2Dˆ1S(b)/db2 > 0,
it follows from Dˆ1S(0) = Dˆ
1
S(1) = 0 that Dˆ
1
S(b) < 0 and thus QS(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) must hold for all
µ ∈ [χ/(1 + χ), 1/(1 + χ)).
Finally, we look at domain µ ∈ [1/(1 + χ), 1]. In this case, QS(µ) < QaS(µ) is equivalent to
D2S(µ, b) ≡ −(1+χ)b(1−µ)b+ b(1+χ)(1−µ) < 0, according to Eqs. (A.18) and (A.61). Twice
differentiating D2S(µ, b) with respect to µ gives ∂D
2
S(µ, b)/∂µ = b(1 + χ)
b(1 − µ)b−1[1 − (1 +
χ)1−b(1− µ)1−b], ∂2D2S(µ, b)/∂µ2 = b(1− b)(1 + χ)b(1− µ)b−2 > 0. Accounting for ∂D2S
(
1/(1 +
χ), b
)
/∂µ = b(1 + χ)(χb−1 − 1) > 0, it is thus immediate that D2S(1, b) = 0 is sufficient for
QS(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) to hold in the relevant parameter domain.
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Putting together, we can thus conclude that QS(µ) < QaS(µ) holds for any µ ∈ (0, 1), which
proves that the income distribution of self-employed agents under autarky Lorenz dominates the
respective income distribution in an offshoring equilibrium for arbitrary values of χ ∈ (0, 1).
The Lorenz curve for the distribution of labour income under autarky has two segments and
is given by
QaU (λ) =

0 if λ ∈ [0, Ua)
1−
(
1−λ
1−Ua
) k−ξ¯
k−(1−θ)ξ¯ if λ ∈ [Ua, 1]
, (A.63)
where Ua = θ(ζ¯ − 1)/[1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)], according to Eq. (3.24). The ranking of QaU (λ) and QU (λ)
depends on the unemployment rate of production workers in the offshoring scenario relative to
autarky. Furthermore, as outlined in the main text, the ranking of U >,=, < Ua is equivalent to
the ranking of 1 >,=, < ∆(χ; η) and thus equivalent to the ranking of α(χ; η) >,=, < β(χ; η).
From Appendix A.9 we know that there exists a unique χˆ ∈ (0, 1), such that α(χ; η) >,=, <
β(χ; η) if χ >,=, < χˆ.
Let us first consider χ ≥ χˆ, which corresponds to an offshoring equilibrium with U ≥ Ua.
In this case, we have QaU (λ) = QU (λ) = 0 for all λ ∈ [0, Ua) and QaU (λ) > QU (λ) = 0 for
all λ ∈ [Ua, U). Furthermore, combining Eqs. (A.54) and (A.63), it follows that, for domain
λ ∈ [U, bU ), the ranking of QU (λ) >,=, < QaU (λ) is equivalent to the ranking of
D1U (λˆ) ≡ 1− α(χ; η) + α(χ; η)
(
1− λˆ
)bˆ
∆(χ; η)bˆ −
[
1− β(χ; η)λˆ
]bˆ
>,=, < 0, (A.64)
where bˆ ≡ 1/[1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)] and λˆ ≡ (λ− U)/(1− U). Differentiating D1U (λˆ) gives
dD1U (λˆ)
dλˆ
=
bˆα(χ; η)∆(χ; η)bˆ(
1− λˆ
)1−bˆ
∆(χ; η)1−bˆ( 1− λˆ
1− β(χ; η)λˆ
)1−bˆ
− 1
 . (A.65)
Consider first the case of β(χ; η) ≤ 1. Since χ ≥ χˆ implies β(χ; η) ≤ α(χ; η) and thus ∆(χ; η) ≤
1, it is immediate that β(χ; η) ≤ 1 is sufficient for dD1U (λˆ)/dλˆ < 0. Noting further that λ = U
implies λˆ = 0 and thus D1U (0) = α(χ; η)[∆(χ; η)
bˆ− 1] < 0, we can therefore safely conclude that
QU (λ) < Q
a
U (λ) holds for all λ ∈ [U, bU ) in this case.
But what happens if β (χ; η) > 1? In this case, we cannot rule out that dD1U (λˆ)/dλˆ > 0.
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However, computing the second derivative of D1U (λˆ), we obtain
d2D1U (λˆ)
dλˆ2
=
1− bˆ
1− λˆ

dD1U (λˆ)
dλˆ
− bˆα(χ; η)∆(χ; η)(
1− λˆ
)1−bˆ
(
1− λˆ
1− β(χ; η)λˆ
)1−bˆ
1− β(χ; η)
1− β(χ; η)λˆ
 . (A.66)
From inspection of Eqs. (A.65) and (A.66) we can therefore conclude that dD1U (λˆ)/dλˆ ≥ 0 is
sufficient for d2D1U (λˆ)/dλˆ
2 > 0 if β(χ; η) > 1. To see this, note that β(χ; η)λˆ < β(χ; η)λˆU , with
λˆU ≡ (bU − U)/(1 − λ) must hold on the relevant parameter domain. Substituting for bU , we
obtain β(χ; η)λˆ < 1 − χ1−(1−θ)ξ¯/k < 1. From inspection of Eqs. (A.65) and (A.66) it therefore
follows that if dD1U (λˆ)/dλˆ ≥ 0 holds for some λˆ0 ∈ (0, λˆU ), then dD1U (λˆ)/dλˆ > 0 must hold
for all λˆ ∈ (λˆ0, λˆU ). Furthermore, recollecting from above that D1U (0) < 0, this implies that if
D1U (λˆ) ≥ 0 holds for some λˆ ∈ (0, λˆU ), then D1U (λˆU ) > 0 must hold as well. Accordingly, we can
infer insights on the sign of D1U (λˆ) by evaluating Eq. (A.64) at λˆ = λˆU . This gives
D1U (λˆU ) = α(χ; η)
1−bˆχ1−ξ¯/k
[
η
(
1 + χξ¯/k
)]bˆ (1 + χξ¯/k)−θbˆ −
η
(
1 + χξ¯/k
)
α(χ; η)
1−bˆ
 . (A.67)
Since β(χ; η) > 1 implies α(χ; η) > 1 if χ ≥ χˆ, it is immediate that α(χ; η) < η(1+χξ¯/k), and this
implies D1U (λˆU ) < 0. Putting together, we can therefore safely conclude that QU (λ) < Q
a
U (λ)
holds for all λ ∈ [U, bU ) irrespective of the ranking of β (χ; η) >,=, < 1.
In a final step, we have to look at domain λ ∈ [bU , 1]. According to Eqs. (A.56) and (A.63),
for this parameter domain the ranking of QU (λ) >,=, < QaU (λ) is equivalent to the ranking of
D2U (λˆ) ≡
1− (1 + χξ¯/k)θbˆ
η
(
1 + χξ¯/k
)
α(χ; η)
1−bˆ
(1− λˆ)bˆ∆(χ; η)bˆ >,=, < 0. (A.68)
Notably, the sign of D2U (λˆ) does not depend on the specific level of λˆ, so that sgn[D
2
U (λˆ)] =
sgn[D2U (λˆU )]. However, since D
1
U (λˆU ) = D
2
U (λˆU ) holds by definition, it follows that QU (λ) <
QaU (λ) extends to interval λ ∈ [bU , 1]. Summing up, we can thus conclude that the income
distribution of production workers under autarky Lorenz dominates the income distribution of
production workers in the offshoring equilibrium if the share of offshoring firms is sufficiently
high, i.e. if χ ≥ χˆ.
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Let us now consider χ < χˆ, which implies ∆(χ; η) > 1 and thus U < Ua. In this case, we
have QU (λ) = QaU (λ) = 0 for all λ ∈ [0, U ] and QU (λ) > QaU (λ) = 0 for all λ ∈ (U,Ua). For
domain λ ∈ (U, bU ), the ranking of QU (λ) >,=, < QaU (λ) depends on the sign of D1U (λˆ), where
D1U (0) = α(χ; η)[∆(χ; η)
bˆ− 1] > 0 holds if χ < χˆ. But what can we say about the sign of D1U (λˆ)
if λˆ > U? To answer this question, it is worth looking at Eq. (A.66). From the formal discussion
in Appendix A.9, we know that ∆(χ; η) > 1 requires Ωˆ(η¯) ≡ (η¯ϑ−θ−1)(ϑ−1)θ− η¯+1 > 0, where
ϑ ≡ 1+χξ¯/k and η¯ ≡ ηϑ. In view of Ωˆ′(η¯) = (1−1/ϑ)θ−1 < 0 and Ωˆ(1) = (ϑ−θ−1)(ϑ−1) < 0, we
can conclude that η¯ = η
(
1+χξ¯/k
)
< 1 is necessary for ∆(χ; η) > 1. This implies that β(χ; η) < 1
must hold for all χ < χˆ. Hence, if D1U (λˆ) has an extremum at λˆ ∈ (0, λˆU ), this extremum must
be a maximum. In view of D1U (0) > 0, we can therefore conclude that D
1
U (λˆ) is positive for all
λ ∈ [U, bU ) if D1U (λˆU ) ≥ 0, while D1U (λˆU ) < 0 implies that there exists a unique λ0 ∈ [U, bU )
such that D1U (λˆ) >,=, < 0 if λ0 >,=, < λ. Noting finally that sgn[D
1
U (λˆU )] = sgn[D
2
U (λˆ)]
holds for all λ ∈ [bU , 1) and accounting for limχ→0D2U (λˆU ) = (1 − η1−bˆ)(1 − λˆ)bˆ∆(χ; η)bˆ > 0,
limχ→χˆD
2
U (λˆU ;β) < 0 (see our extensive discussion for domain χ ≥ χˆ), the following conclusion
is immediate: For sufficiently small χ, the distribution of labour income with offshoring Lorenz
dominates the respective distribution without offshoring. For χ smaller than but close to χˆ,
Lorenz curves QaU and QU intersect and it is therefore not possible to rank the distributions
of labour income with and without offshoring according to the criterion of Lorenz dominance.
This completes our discussion on Lorenz curve dominance.
A.15 Economy-wide income distribution if θ > 0
In the subsequent analysis it is useful to introduce the Theil index for the income distribution
within the group of employed production workers, which we denote by TL. Thereby, TL is linked
to TU according to TU = TL − ln(1− U). This allows us to rewrite Eq. (A.58) as follows:
T = aSTS + aUTL + aS ln
(
aS
N
N − L
)
+ aU ln
(
aU
N
L(1− U)
)
, (A.69)
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Following the analysis in the main text step by step and substituting Eq. (3.24) for U , we thus
obtain
T =
1− ρ
ργ + 1− ρTS +
ργ
ργ + 1− ρTL + ln
(
ζ¯ργ + 1− ρ
ζ¯(ργ + 1− ρ)
)
+
1− ρ
ργ + 1− ρ ln ζ¯ −
ργ
ργ + 1− ρ ln
(
∆(χ; η)
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
)
. (A.70)
In autarky, we can explicitly compute the Theil indices for the income distribution of self-
employed agents and production workers, respectively:
T aS =
1
ζ¯ − 1
∫
∞
1
x
−
k
ξ¯
[
ln x− ln ζ¯
]
dx = ζ¯ − 1− ln ζ¯, (A.71)
and
T aL =
1
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
∫
∞
1
y
−
1+θ(ζ¯−1)
θ(ζ¯−1)
{
ln y − ln
[
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
]}
dy
= θ(ζ¯ − 1)− ln
[
1 + θ(ζ¯ − 1)
]
. (A.72)
Substituting for TS , TL and setting χ = 0 then yields
T a = [1− ρ(1− θ)](ζ¯ − 1] + ln
(
1 + ρ(ζ¯ − 1)
ζ¯
)
. (A.73)
While we are not able to rank T and T a for arbitrary levels of χ, we can at least compare Theil
indices for the two limiting cases χ = 0 and χ = 1. Since TL = T aL and TS > T
a
S hold if χ = 1,
we can safely conclude that T − Ta > ∆ˆT (θ; aˆ), with
∆ˆT (θ; aˆ) ≡ ρ(1− ρ)(1− η)
ρη + 1− ρ
aˆ
1− aˆ + ln
(
ρη + (1− ρ)(1− aˆ)
[ρη + 1− ρ] [1− (1− ρ)aˆ]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ˆ1T (aˆ)
+
ρθ
ρη + 1− ρ
[
η ln 2− (1− ρ)(1− η)aˆθ
1− aˆ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ˆ2T (θ;aˆ)
(A.74)
and aˆ ≡ 1− 1/ζ¯. Differentiating ∆1T (aˆ) gives
d∆ˆ1T (aˆ)
daˆ
=
ρ2(1− ρ)(1− η)aˆ [ρη + (1− ρ)(1− aˆ) + η(1− aˆ)]
[ρη + 1− ρ] [ρη + (1− ρ)(1− aˆ)] [1− (1− ρ)aˆ] (1− aˆ)2 > 0. (A.75)
In view of ∆ˆ1T (0) = 0, this implies that ∆ˆ
1
T (aˆ) > 0 holds for all aˆ ∈ (0, 1). While the sign of
∆ˆ2T (θ; aˆ) is not clear in general, it is immediate that ∆ˆT (θ; aˆ) > 0 holds for sufficiently small
levels of θ. This completes our discussion on the Theil index.
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A.16 Source code for the calibration exercises in Section 3.5
The calibration exercise has been executed in Mathematica.7 We offer here the source code
as well as the parameter estimates used in our calibration. At first, we set parameter values:
k = 4.306, σ = 6.698 and θ = 0.102, based on the results in Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier
(2013), and η = 0.75, based on Blinder (2009) and Blinder and Krueger (2013).
k=4.306;1
σ=6.698;2
θ=0.102;3
η=0.75;4
Furthermore, regarding the extent of external increasing returns to scale, we consider the two
polar cases ε = 0 and ε = 1. In addition, we account for ε = 0.56 as reported by Ardelean
(2011).
ε={0,0.56,1}5
As all variables of interest can be expressed in terms of the share of offshoring firms, χ, we define
χ=.;6
χG=1265/8466;7
where χG is the share of offshoring firms in Germany as reported by Moser, Urban, and Weder di
Mauro (2009). We then define ρ, ξ and ζ and check that k > ξ holds.8
ρ=(σ-1)/σ;8
ξ=(σ-1)/(1+θ(σ-1));9
ζ=k/(k-ξ);10
If[k<=ξ, Print[“Error:k<=ξ”]];11
7A self-contained Computable-Data-File (CDF), which can be run on the free to use CDF-player offered by
Wolfram Research, Inc. under http://www.wolfram.com/cdf-player/, can be obtained from the authors upon
request.
8In the source code, we use ξ instead of ξ¯ and ζ instead of ζ¯ to save on notation.
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We also define α(χ; η) and β(χ; η) from Eq. (3.25) as well as γ(χ; η) and ∆(χ, η) as specified in
the main text.
α=1+χ (ˆ(k-ξ)/k)(η(1+χ (ˆξ/k))-1);12
β=1+χ (ˆ(k-(1-θ)ξ)/k)(η(1+χ (ˆξ/k)) (ˆ1-θ)-1);13
γ=(1+η*χ-(1-η)χ (ˆ1-ξ/k))/(1+χ);14
Δ=β/α;15
Now we can turn to aggregate income in the source country relative to autarky, see the proof of
Proposition 3.2.3:
T1=(1+γ(σ-1))(1+ζ(σ-1))/(σ(1+γ*ζ(σ-1)));16
T2=((1+χ)(1+γ*ζ(σ-1))/(1+ζ(σ-1))) (ˆ(σ-1-ε*k)/(k(σ-1)));17
T3=(1+χ) (ˆ1/(σ-1));18
Φ=T1*T2*T3;19
Eq. (3.26) establishes
Λ=((θ(ζ-1)+1-Δ)/(θ(ζ-1)))*((1+ζ(σ-1))γ)/(1+ζ(σ-1)γ);20
where u/ua = Λ and
ua=(θ(ζ-1)/(1+θ(ζ-1))*ζ(σ-1)/(1+ζ(σ-1));21
Finally, inter-group inequality between entrepreneurs and workers as well as intra-group inequal-
ity within both groups, each normalised to one for its respective autarky level, follow from Eqs.
(3.20), (3.21) and (3.27).
ω=1+(1-1/ζ)χ;22
AM=1+χ(2-χ)/(ζ+(ζ-1)χ);23
AL=1+(2(1-χ (ˆ(k-(1-θ)ξ)/k))(α-1)-2(1+θ(ζ-1))(1-χ (ˆ(k-ξ)/k))(β-1))/(α*β*θ(ζ-1));24
We now turn to the determination of the Theil indices. Therefore, we first need to specify the
income share of entrepreneurs, freelance offshoring workers and production workers. This gives
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aM=(1-ρ)/(ζ(ρ*γ+1-ρ))*((ζ+χ(ζ-1))/(1+χ);25
aF=(1-ρ)/(ζ(ρ*γ+1-ρ))*(χ/(1+χ));26
aU=(ρ*γ)/(ρ*γ+1-ρ);27
respectively. Furthermore, we also determine the income share of self-employed agents, as defined
in Eq. (3.31):
aS=(1-ρ)/(ρ*γ+1-ρ);28
Average income of the three subgroups – entrepreneurs, agents in the offshoring service sector,
and production workers – relative to the economy-wide income average is given by
vM=((ζ*ρ*γ+1-ρ)/(ρ*γ+1-ρ))*(1+(1-1/ζ)χ);29
vF=(ζ*ρ*γ+1-ρ)/(ζ*(ρ*γ+1-ρ));30
vU=(ζ*ρ*γ+1-ρ)/(ζ*(ρ*γ+1-ρ));31
while for the self-employed we obtain
vS=(ζ*ρ*γ+1-ρ)/(ρ*γ+1-ρ);32
We now determine the product of income ratios and log income ratios for entrepreneurial income
multiplied by the relative frequency the respective income ratios are realized. For purely domestic
firms, this gives
Alt1=(k*x (ˆξ-k-1)/(ζ+χ(ζ-1)))*Log[(x ξˆ)/(ζ+χ(ζ-1))];33
while for offshoring firms, we obtain
Alt2=((k*((1+χ (ˆξ/k))*x ξˆ-1)x (ˆ-k-1))/(ζ+χ(ζ-1)))*Log[(((1+χ (ˆξ/k))*x ξˆ)34
-1)/(ζ+χ(ζ-1))];35
We can compute similar expressions for production workers and obtain
Alt3=(Δ/(θ(ζ-1)β))y (ˆ((1-θ)*ξ-k)/(θ*ξ))*Log[y*Δ/(1+θ(ζ-1))];36
for workers employed in purely domestic firms and
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Alt4=(Δ/(θ(ζ-1)β))*η*((1+χ (ˆξ/k)) (ˆk/ξ))y (ˆ((1-θ)*ξ-k)/(θ*ξ))*Log[y*Δ/(137
+θ(ζ-1))];38
for workers employed in exporting firms.
In a last step we evaluate the above defined functions at χ = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9
and χ = χG to produce the results in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
Do[z=z0;39
We start with the two Gini coefficients and the measure for inter-group inequality and evaluate
nω=ω/.{χ->z};40
nAM=AM /.{χ->z};41
nAL=AL /.{χ->z};42
We now turn to the Theil index for entrepreneurial income, which in autarky can be computed
according to
Alt00=Alt1/.{χ->0};43
TMa= NIntegrate[Alt00, {x,1,Infinity}];44
The respective Theil index in the case of offshoring can be determined according to
Alt11=Alt1/.{χ->z};45
Alt22=Alt2/.{χ->z};46
TM=NIntegrate[Alt11, {x,1,z (ˆ-1/k)}]+NIntegrate[Alt22, {x,z (ˆ-1/k),Infinity}];47
In a similar vein, we can compute the Theil index for income of employed production workers
under autarky and in the scenario with offshoring. This gives
Alt55=Alt3/.{χ->0};48
TLa=NIntegrate[Alt55, {y,1,Infinity}];49
and
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Alt33=Alt3/.{χ->z};50
Alt44=Alt4/.{χ->z};51
TL=NIntegrate[Alt33, {y,1,z (ˆ-θ*ξ/k)}]+NIntegrate[Alt44,52
{y,z (ˆ-θ*ξ/k)(1+z (ˆξ/k)) θˆ, Infinity}];53
respectively. Thereby, it is notable that in the scenario with offshoring, firms which shift produc-
tion abroad pay a wage premium to their domestic workers, and this wage premium is captured
by an upward shift of the lower bound of the second integral in the equation for TL.
The economy-wide Theil index under autarky is then given by
Ta1=aM*TMa+aU*TLa+aM*Log[vM]+aF*Log[vF]+aU*Log[vU]-aU*Log[Δ/(1+θ(ζ-1)];54
Ta=Ta1/.{χ->0};55
where 1− Ua = ∆a/[1 + θ(ζ − 1)] has been considered, according to (3.24). The economy-wide
Theil index in the scenario with offshoring is given by
T1=aM*TM+aU*TL+aM*Log[vM]+aF*Log[vF]+aU*Log[vU]-aU*Log[Δ/(1+θ(ζ-1)];56
T=T1/.{χ->z};57
To avoid rounding errors, we can manipulate the result in the following way
If[TL<TLa + 0.1 (ˆ10)&&TL>TLa - 0.1 (ˆ10), TL=TLa];58
Finally, we can compute TU , considering the calibrated values of TL. Accounting for
Δa=Δ/.{χ->0};59
Δ1=Δ/.{χ->z};60
we can compute
TUa=TLa-Log[Δa/(1+θ(ζ-1))];61
TU=TL-Log[Δ1/(1+θ(ζ-1))];62
In a similar vein, we can compute TS , relying on the calibrated values of TM :
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TS1=(aM*TM+aM*Log[vM]+aF*Log[vF]-(aM+aF)*Log[vS])/aS;63
TSa=TMa;64
TS=TS1/.{χ->z};65
In a final step, we determine the income and unemployment effects of offshoring by computing
nΦ=Φ/.{χ->z};66
nu=ua*Λ/.{χ->z};67
To complete the calibration exercise, we finally add
Print[“χ=”, z, “ AM= ”, 100 (nAM-1), “ AL= ”, 100 (nAL-1),“ ΔTS=”, 100*(TS -68
TSa)/TSa, “ ΔTU=”, 100*(TU-TUa)/TUa, “ ΔT=”, 100*(T-Ta)/Ta,“ I= ”, 100*(nΦ-1),69
“ u= ”, 100*(nu-ua)];70
,{z0, {0.001, 0.01,0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, N[χG]}}]71
A.17 Proof of Proposition 4.1.1
Note that γ = ΩαSΩ
1−α
N < 1 in Eq. (4.1
′) still endogenously depends on domestic factor prices,
wS and wN , respectively. In order to obtain a testable prediction on how falling offshoring costs,
τS and τN , relate to the individual skill upgrading decision of domestic workers in Eq. (4.1′)
we have to replace wS and wN in ΩS and ΩN . Using the definitions of ΩS = (τSw∗S/wS)
1−θ ≤ 1
and ΩN = (τNw∗N/wN)
1−θ ≤ 1, we replace wS and wN by Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3). Skill upgrading
condition (4.1′) can then be written as
u =
αsα−1 − (1− α) sα[
A (τSw∗S)
α (τNw∗N)
1−αΩαSΩ
1−α
N
](1−θ) − κ,
in which A ≡ 1/[αα (1− α)1−α] > 0 is a positive constant. Unfortunately the above expression
still depends on γ = ΩαSΩ
1−α
N . However, replacing again wS and wN in ΩS and ΩN by Eqs. (4.2)
and (4.3), we find that after K iterations Eq. (4.1′) can be rewritten as a sequence Z (K) with
u ≡ Z (K) = αs
α−1 − (1− α) sα[
A (τSw∗S)
α (τNw∗N)
1−α
]∑K
k=1
(1−θ)k (
ΩαSΩ
1−α
N
)(1−θ)K − κ.
194
Letting K go to infinity we find that sequence Z (K) converges to
lim
K→∞
Z (K) =
αsα−1 − (1− α) sα[
A (τSw∗S)
α (τNw∗N)
1−α
] 1−θ
θ
− κ,
as limK→∞
∑K
k=1 (1− θ)k = (1− θ) /θ. The above equation no longer depends on wS and wN
such that it is easy to infer that ∂s/∂τS < 0 and ∂s/∂τN < 0. Thus, a gradual decline in any
offshoring cost, τS or τN , leads to more individual skill upgrading. Taking additionally into
account that according to Eq. (4.4) the share of tasks performed domestically is proportional to
the respective cost savings factor from offshoring, ΩS ≤ 1 or ΩN ≤ 1, proposition 4.1.1 follows
immediately.
A.18 Proof of Lemma 5.2.1
In order to prove Lemma 5.2.1 it suffices to show that given the production function in Eq. (5.1)
firms optimally decide to match only workers of the same expected skill, such that s¯l = s¯ℓ with
l = 1, 2 and ℓ ∈ {L,H}. The simple proof presented here is taken from Basu (1997). For a more
general proof of positive assortative matching see Becker (1991) or Sattinger (1975).
Consider two different arbitrary average skill levels, s¯L and s¯H , with s¯H > s¯L. A firm facing
the optimisation problem in Eq. (5.2) now has three different possibilities of pairing workers:
π (s¯H , s¯H) = 2As¯
2
H − 2w (s¯H) , (A.76)
π (s¯L, s¯L) = 2As¯
2
L − 2w (s¯L) , (A.77)
π (s¯H , s¯L) = 2As¯H s¯L − w (s¯H)− w (s¯L) . (A.78)
Let us first suppose π (s¯H , s¯L) ≥ π (s¯H , s¯H) which results in the following chain of inequalities
2As¯H s¯L − w (s¯H)− w (s¯L) ≥ 2As¯2H − 2w (s¯H) , (A.79)
2As¯H (s¯H − s¯L) ≤ w (s¯H)− w (s¯L) , (A.80)
2As¯L (s¯H − s¯L) < w (s¯H)− w (s¯L) , (A.81)
2As¯H s¯L − w (s¯H)− w (s¯L) < 2As¯2L − 2w (s¯L) , (A.82)
where s¯H > s¯L has been utilised to derive the inequality in Eq. (A.81) from Eq. (A.80). Note that
the inequality in Eq. (A.82) implies π (s¯L, s¯L) ≥ π (s¯H , s¯L). Now imagine π (s¯L, s¯H) ≥ π (s¯L, s¯L)
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giving rise to
2As¯H s¯L − w (s¯H)− w (s¯L) ≥ 2A (s¯L)2 − 2w (s¯L) , (A.83)
2As¯L (s¯H − s¯L) ≥ w (s¯H)− w (s¯L) , (A.84)
2As¯H (s¯H − s¯L) > w (s¯H)− w (s¯L) , (A.85)
2A (s¯H)
2 − 2w (s¯H) > 2As¯H s¯L − w (s¯H)− w (s¯L) , (A.86)
where again s¯H > s¯L has been utilised to derive the inequality in Eq. (A.85) from Eq. (A.84).
The inequality in Eq. (A.86) implies π (s¯H , s¯H) ≥ π (s¯H , s¯L). Taking stock, profits from positive
assortative matching always surpass profits from cross matching, such that firms always decide
to pair workers of identical skill, i.e. s¯l = s¯ℓ.
A.19 Proof of Proposition 5.2.2
The proof proceeds in two steps. At first we prove the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium
with positive selection into migration, i.e. s˜ ∈ (0, 1) for c ∈ (0, A/2). Then it is shown that the
equilibrium with no migration is unique provided that c ≥ A/2.
For the equilibrium with c ∈ (0, A/2) to exist, it must hold that at least one worker has an
incentive to deviate, when being in an equilibrium without migration, while no worker wants to
deviate, when being in an equilibrium with migration. More formally, focussing on the worker
with the maximum skill, s = 1, it can be shown that w (s¯, 1) = A/2 < w (1, 1)− c = A− c ∀ c ∈
(0, A/2) . Conversely, it follows for all workers, s ∈ [s˜, 1], that w (s¯L, s) ≤ w (s¯H , s) − c ∀ c =
s˜A/2 ∈ (0, A/2). To see this, note that the above inequality simplifies to s˜ ≤ s, once c = s˜A/2
as well as s¯L = s˜/2 and s¯L = (1 + s˜) /2 are replaced. Uniqueness can be proven by considering
a simple counter example which readily extents to more general cases. Imagine two (or more)
cutoffs, 0 < s˜1 < s˜2 < 1, exist. Moreover assume all workers with s ∈ [0, s˜1) ∧ s ∈ [s˜2, 1]
and average skill, s¯1, stay in Home, while all workers with s ∈ [s˜1, s˜2) and average skill, s¯2,
select into migration. For the workers with critical abilities, s˜1 and s˜2, then must hold that
w (s¯1, s˜1) = w (s¯2, s˜1)− c and w (s¯1, s˜2, ) = w (s¯2, s˜2)− c, respectively. Since w (s¯ℓ, s) ∀ ℓ = 1, 2
increases monotonically in s, the above two conditions can only be fulfilled simultaneously, if
s˜1 = s˜2 = s˜, which rules out multiplicity of equilibria.
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The equilibrium without migration is stable for c ≥ A/2, if no individual with skill, s ∈ [0, 1],
has an incentive to deviate, i.e. even if deviation allows to match with the most high-skilled
co-worker with s = 1, the condition, w (s¯, s) ≥ w (1, s)− c, should hold. Replacing c ≥ A/2 this
condition simplifies to 1 ≥ s, which is fulfilled for all s ∈ [0, 1].
A.20 Individual welfare effects and the distribution of skills
Instead of an uniform distribution with support s ∈ [0, 1] we assume an arbitrary distribution
with the same support and cumulative density function F (s). We furthermore assume F (0) = 0
as well as F (1) = 1 and denote the corresponding density function by f(s) = ∂F (s)/∂s. The
average skills within the group of low-skilled natives and high-skilled migrants then can be
expressed as
s¯L =
∫ s˜
0 sf (s) ds
F (s˜)
, and s¯H =
∫ 1
s˜ sf (s) ds
1− F (s˜) , (A.87)
where s˜, as before, denotes the critical worker, separating both groups. The migration indif-
ference condition remains unchanged and is given by As¯Ls˜lf = As¯H s˜lf − c. Focussing on the
expected net wage of the most high-skilled workers with s = 1, we obtain
wH(s˜
lf, 1)− c = A
∫ 1
s˜lf sf (s) ds
1− F (s˜lf) − c, (A.88)
= A
∫ 1
s˜lf sf (s) ds
1− F (s˜lf) (1− s˜
lf) +A
∫ s˜lf
0 sf (s) ds
F (s˜lf)
s˜lf, (A.89)
which is larger than the expected autarky wageA
∫ 1
0 sf (s) ds if and only if [F (s˜
lf)− s˜lf] [s¯H − s¯L] >
0. Since s¯H ≥ s¯L, we have wH(s˜lf, 1) − c < A
∫ 1
0 sf (s) ds if F (s˜
lf) < s˜lf and wH(s˜lf, 1) − c >
A
∫ 1
0 sf (s) ds if F (s˜
lf) > s˜lf.
A.21 Redistribution of the emigration tax revenue
Let the social planner equilibrium be implemented by (symmetric) emigration taxes tsp = A/4.
Governments only care about their nationals and redistribute all tax revenue equally to them
irrespective of their residence. We show that even with redistribution the marginal migrant
s˜sp loses relative to autarky. To see this, note that for the marginal migrant to benefit from
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migration and redistribution
w (1, s˜sp) ≤ wH (s˜sp, s˜sp)− c− tsp + (1− s˜sp) tsp, (A.90)
has to hold, where wH (s˜sp, s˜sp)−c− tsp is the marginal migrant’s net wage after having paid cost
c and tax tsp, while w (1, s˜sp) is the autarky wage paid to an individual with comparable skill s˜sp.
As population size is normalized to unity, total tax revenue (1− s˜sp) tsp equals the amount of
redistribution each individual receives. Using wℓ(s¯ℓ, s) = As¯ℓs ∀ ℓ = L,H in combination with
s¯L = s˜
sp/2, s¯H = (1+ s˜sp)/2 as well as s˜sp = 2 (c+ tsp) /A and tsp = A/4 allows us to rewrite Eq.
(A.90) as:
c
4
≤ c
2
A
. (A.91)
Eq. (A.91) holds with equality for c = 0, and collapses otherwise to c > A/4, which contradicts
s˜sp = 12 +
2c
A < 1.
Let us now extend this result to individuals in the neighbourhood of s˜sp. We focus on workers 0 ≤
ssp1 ≤ s˜sp ≤ s˜sp2 ≤ 1 who are indifferent between the outcomes in the social planner equilibrium
with redistribution and autarky, such that:
w (1, ssp1 ) = wL (s˜
sp, ssp1 ) + t
sp (1− s˜sp) (A.92)
w (1, ssp2 ) = wH (s˜
sp, ssp2 )− c− tsp + tsp (1− s˜sp) (A.93)
Again using wℓ(s¯ℓ, s) = As¯ℓs ∀ ℓ = L,H in combination with s¯L = s˜sp/2, s¯H = (1 + s˜sp)/2 as
well as s˜sp = 2 (c+ tsp) /A and tsp = A/4 allows us to solve Eqs. (A.92) and (A.93) for:
ssp1 =
1
2
and ssp2 =
1
2 +
6c
A
1 + 4cA
∈ [1/2, 1] ∀ c ∈ [0, A/4] . (A.94)
Note that ssp1 < s˜
sp < ssp2 , if c ∈ (0, A/4). Thus, after redistribution the most able non-migrants
as well as the least skilled migrants are worse off than under autarky.
A.22 Proof of Proposition 5.4.4
Without loss of generality let us focus on ce > cm, the opposite case, cm > ce, then follows by
symmetry. Equilibrium may feature up to three groups of workers: migrants, educated workers,
and those who do not signal at all. The corresponding subindices are ℓˆ ∈ {m, e, n}. As in the
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baseline model the wage rate of a worker with skill sℓˆ is given by Eq. (5.3), i.e. w
(
s¯ℓˆ, sℓˆ
)
= As¯ℓˆsℓˆ
with s¯ℓˆ being the average skill in group ℓˆ ∈ {m, e, n}. At prohibitive cost, cm ≥ A/2 and /or
ce ≥ A/2, no worker with s ∈ [0, 1] has an incentive to deviate from an equilibrium without
migration. To see this, note that w (s¯, s) ≥ w (s, s) − cm, in which s¯ = 1/2, can be rewritten
as 1 ≥ s ∀ s ∈ [0, 1], once we take into account that cm ≥ A/2. An analogous logic applies to
education, if ce ≥ A/2.
For scenario (i) to arise the sorting 0 ≤ s˜m < s˜e ≤ 1 has to apply. Note that all workers
with s ∈ [0, s˜m) choose not to signal, all workers with s ∈ [s˜m, s˜e) select into migration and all
workers with s ∈ [s˜e, 1] select into education. The resulting average skills in the three groups
are then given by s¯n = s˜m/2, s¯m = (s˜m + s˜e) /2 and s¯e = (s˜e + 1) /2. Intuitively, s¯e > s¯m > s¯n.
For the marginal workers, s˜m and s˜e the following two arbitrage conditions apply
w (s¯n, s˜m) = w (s¯m, s˜m)− cm, (A.95)
w (s¯m, s˜e)− cm = w (s¯e, s˜e)− ce. (A.96)
Solving both equations yields s˜e = 2ce/A and s˜m = cm/ce for all cm < 2c2e/A < A/2. Note that
the first inequality sign in this condition follows from s˜m < s˜e, while the second inequality sign
follows from s˜e < 1.
Scenario (ii) is derived in a stepwise fashion by eliminating all possible equilibrium sortings,
except for 0 ≤ s˜e ≤ s˜m = 1. Intuitively, 0 ≤ s˜m < s˜e ≤ 1 cannot be an equilibrium, since
for 2c2e/A < cm < ce < A/2, this sorting is incompatible with the incentive constraints in
Eqs. (A.95) and (A.96). Assuming 0 ≤ s˜e < s˜m ≤ 1 would imply that s¯m > s¯e. Recalling that
ce > cm, this cannot be a stable outcome, as workers with s ∈ [s˜e, s˜m), who select into education,
bear larger cost, ce ≥ cm, and have smaller gains, w (s, s¯m) > w (s, s¯e), than those who select
into migration. Clearly, for any worker with s ∈ [s˜e, s˜m) using migration instead of education as
a signalling device would be optimal. Since we already have shown that the equilibrium without
migration does not exist for cm < ce < A/2, the only remaining equilibrium constellations are
0 ≤ s˜m ≤ s˜e = 1 and 0 ≤ s˜e ≤ s˜m = 1. Intuitively, individual incentives are such that each
worker who is inclined to signal, prefers to be in the same group as the workers with the maximum
skill, s = 1. On the contrary, the workers with s = 1 are indifferent between both signals, since in
both equilibria welfare equals w (s¯m, 1)− cm = w (s¯e, 1)− ce = A/2. Extending this comparison
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to all workers with s ∈ [s˜e, 1], it can be easily shown that w (s¯m, s)− cm ≤ w (s¯e, s)− ce. Thus,
all workers with s ∈ [s˜e, 1] weakly prefer 0 ≤ s˜e ≤ s˜m = 1 over 0 ≤ s˜m ≤ s˜e = 1, such that
0 ≤ s˜e ≤ s˜m = 1 is the only equilibrium for 2c2e/A < cm < ce < A/2.
A.23 Derivation of Eqs. (5.11) and (5.12)
Facing the production function from Eq. (5.10), and knowing only the average skill within the
two groups, L and H, firms optimally match together only workers from the same subgroup, L
or H. We can therefore separately write down the reduced form profit maximization problem
for the resulting two types of firms:
max
kℓ
πℓ (kℓ) = 2As¯
2
ℓk
α
ℓ − 2w (s¯ℓ)− rkℓ ∀ ℓ ∈ {L,H} . (A.97)
The profit maximising level of capital depends on whether the firm employs individuals from
group H or L. It follows from
∂πℓ (kℓ)
∂kℓ
= 2Aαs¯2ℓk
α−1
ℓ − r
!
= 0 ∀ ℓ ∈ {L,H} , (A.98)
and we get the standard result that the rate of return to capital, r, equals its value marginal
product. Using the above equation in combination with the full employment condition:
k¯ = s˜kL + (1− s˜) kH , (A.99)
as well as s¯L = s˜/2 and s¯H = (1+ s˜)/2 allows us to solve for the amount of capital used by firms
solely employing natives or migrants, respectively:
kL =
[
s˜+ (1− s˜)
(
1 + s˜
s˜
) 2
1−α
]−1
k¯, (A.100)
kH =
[
(1− s˜) + s˜
(
s˜
1 + s˜
) 2
1−α
]−1
k¯, (A.101)
with kH ≥ k¯ ≥ kL.
A.24 The social planner solution in a model with capital
We show that s˜sp ≥ s˜lf for all α ∈ [0, 1). Note that s˜lf is implicitly determined by w (s¯H , s˜lf) −
w (s¯L, s˜
lf) = c = A (1− α) s˜lf (s¯HkαH − s¯LkαL). Substituting s¯L = s˜lf/2 and s¯H = (1 + s˜lf)/2, and
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replacing kL and kH by Eqs. (5.11) and (5.12) this indifference condition may be expressed as
Ω(s˜lf;α) = c/Ak¯α where
Ω(s˜lf;α) ≡ (1− α)
(1− s˜lf) + s˜lf ( s˜lf
1 + s˜lf
) 2
1−α
−α s˜lf (1 + s˜lf)
2
− (1− α)
s˜lf + (1− s˜lf)(1 + s˜lf
s˜lf
) 2
1−α
−α (s˜lf)2
2
.
(A.102)
In order to obtain an implicit definition of s˜sp we start out from aggregate welfare which is
Figure A.1: Migration in the laissez faire and the social planner equilibrium
s˜lf
0
s˜sp
1
1
α = 0 α = 14 α =
1
2 α =
3
4
1
2
1
2
b b b b
45◦
s˜lf < s˜sp
given by W (s˜) =
∫ s˜
0 As¯Lk
α
Lds +
∫ 1
s˜ As¯Hk
α
Hds −
∫ 1
s˜ c ds. Again, substituting s¯L = s˜
lf/2 and
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s¯H = (1 + s˜
lf)/2, and replacing kL and kH by Eqs. (5.11) and (5.12) we obtain
W (s˜) =
A
4
k¯α
s˜3
[
s˜+ (1− s˜)
(
1 + s˜
s˜
) 2
1−α
]−α
+(1− s˜) (1 + s˜)2
[
(1− s˜) + s˜
(
s˜
1 + s˜
) 2
1−α
]−α− (1− s˜) c.
(A.103)
In a next step we compute dW (s˜sp) /ds˜sp
!
= 0 and solve for Λ(s˜sp;α) = c/Ak¯α where
Λ(s˜sp;α) ≡ −
[
dW (s˜sp)
ds˜sp
− c
]
1
Ak¯α
. (A.104)
Setting Ω(s˜lf;α) = Λ(s˜sp;α) we finally obtain a link between s˜lf and s˜sp for the same economic
fundamentals A, k¯, and c. Plotting this link for varying levels of α ∈ [0, 1) in Figure A.1 reveals
that s˜sp ≥ s˜lf for all α ∈ [0, 1). In particular we show that for α = 0 we get the familiar result
s˜sp = s˜lf + 12 .
A.25 Proof of Proposition 5.4.6
We start by proving that Wi (s˜lfi ) ≤ Wi (1) = Ai/4 ∀ Ai ≥ Aj . Note that for s˜lfi = 1 we obtain
Wi (1) = Ai/4 from Eq. (5.16). Using this together with Wi (s˜lfi ) from Eq. (5.16) we obtain
Wi (s˜
lf
i )−Wi (1) = (Aj −Ai)
[
1 + (s˜lfi )
3
]
−Ai (1 + s˜lfi ) s˜lfi +Ai2 (s˜lfi )2
≤ (Aj −Ai)
[
1 + (s˜lfi )
3 − 2 (s˜lfi )2
]
,
(A.105)
where the last line is non-positive whenever 1 + (s˜lfi )
3 − 2 (s˜lfi )2 ≥ 0 and Ai ≥ Aj . Since
1 + (s˜lfi )
3 − 2(s˜lfi )2 has a local maximum at s˜lfi = 0 and intersects the abscissa at s˜lfi = 1
and s˜lfi = 1/2 ±
√
5/4, we have 1 + (s˜lfi )
3 − 2(s˜lfi )2 ≥ 0 ∀ s˜lfi ∈ [0, 1] and, hence, Wi (s˜lfi ) ≤
Wi (1) ∀ Ai ≥ Aj . In order to complete the proof of Proposition 5.4.6 it remains to show that
for Aj > Ai we have W lfi (c) ≥ Ai/4 ∀ 0 ≤ c ≤ 14
(
2Aj − 3Ai +
√
4A2j − 8AiAj + 5A2i
)
, while
W lfi (c) < Ai/4 ∀ 14
(
2Aj − 3Ai +
√
4A2j − 8AiAj + 5A2i
)
< c < 12 (2Aj −Ai). Using Eq. (5.15)
to substitute for s˜lfi in Eq. (5.16), it can be shown that W
lf
i (c)− Ai/4 = 0 has three solutions,
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which are
c1 =
1
2
(2Aj −Ai) , (A.106)
c2 =
1
4
(
2Aj − 3Ai +
√
4A2j − 8AiAj + 5A2i
)
, (A.107)
c3 =
1
4
(
2Aj − 3Ai −
√
4A2j − 8AiAj + 5A2i
)
. (A.108)
Note that since 2/3 < AD/AF < 3/2, solution (A.108) is negative and therefore economically
irrelevant. Solution (A.106) equals the prohibitive migration cost at which s˜lfi = 1. Finally,
it is easily checked that 0 < 14
(
2Aj − 3Ai +
√
4A2j − 8AiAj + 5A2i
)
< 12 (2Aj −Ai). Since Eq.
(5.16) implies W lfi (0) = Aj/4 > Ai/4 we can immediately infer that for low migration cost,
i.e. 0 ≤ c ≤ 14
(
2Aj − 3Ai +
√
4A2j − 8AiAj + 5A2i
)
aggregate welfare gains exist, while for high
migration cost, 14
(
2Aj − 3Ai +
√
4A2j − 8AiAj + 5A2i
)
< c < 12 (2Aj −Ai), aggregate losses
result.
A.26 The social planner solution in a model with asymmetric countries
In order to show that s˜spi > s˜
lf
i ∀ i, j ∈ {D,F} with i 6= j we have to consider two scenarios in
which either Ai > Aj or Ai < Aj . We start with Ai < Aj and rewrite s˜
sp
i > s˜
lf
i as
− 4c (Aj − c) (Aj −Ai) < AiA2j . (A.109)
Note that Eq. (A.109) holds true for the economically relevant parameter space 0 ≤ c ≤
1
2 (2Aj −Ai), which completes the first part of the proof. Now suppose Ai > Aj , such that
s˜spi > s˜
lf
i can be expressed as
− 4c (Aj − c) (Aj −Ai)−AiA2j < −
4
3
c (Aj − c)−A2j <
4
3
c2 −A2j < 0, (A.110)
where we have made use of the fact that 23Ai < Aj < Ai. The last inequality in (A.110) holds
true, since the economically relevant parameter space 0 ≤ c ≤ 12 (2Aj −Ai) translates into
0 ≤ c ≤ 12Aj for 23Ai < Aj < Ai, such that we can be sure that for 0 ≤ c ≤ 12 (2Aj −Ai) we
have s˜spi > s˜
lf
i .
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A.27 Proof of Lemma 5.6.1
In order to prove Lemma 5.6.1 it suffices to show that given our production function in Eq. (5.18)
firms optimally decide to match only workers of the same expected skill, such that s¯l = s¯ℓt with
l = 1, 2; ℓ ∈ {N,M,R} and t = 1, 2. The simple proof presented here is based on Basu (1997)
and extends our proof from Appendix A.18 to a scenario with arabitrary many subgroups (ℓ×t).
For a more general proof of positive assortative matching see Becker (1991) or Sattinger (1975).
Consider two arbitrary chosen average skill levels s¯ℓt 6= s¯ℓ′t′ with ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ {N,M,R} and
t, t′ = 1, 2 as well as ℓ 6= ℓ′ and t 6= t′. Now let us – without loss of generality – assume that
s¯ℓt > s¯ℓ′t′ . A firm with two vacancies has three different possibilities of pairing the workers from
the subgroups ℓ× t and ℓ′ × t′ in order to maximise Eq. (5.19):
π (s¯ℓt, s¯ℓt) = 2As¯
2
ℓt − 2w (s¯ℓt) , (A.111)
π (s¯ℓ′t′ , s¯ℓ′t′) = 2As¯
2
ℓ′t′ − 2w (s¯ℓ′t′) , (A.112)
π (s¯ℓt, s¯ℓ′t′) = 2As¯ℓts¯ℓ′t′ − w (s¯ℓt)− w (s¯ℓ′t′) . (A.113)
Let us first suppose π (s¯ℓt, s¯ℓ′t′) ≥ π (s¯ℓt, s¯ℓt), which results in the following chain of inequalities:
2As¯ℓts¯ℓ′t′ − w (s¯ℓt)− w (s¯ℓ′t′) ≥ 2As¯2ℓt − 2w (s¯ℓt) , (A.114)
2As¯ℓt (s¯ℓt − s¯ℓ′t′) ≤ w (s¯ℓt)− w (s¯ℓ′t′) , (A.115)
2As¯ℓ′t′ (s¯ℓt − s¯ℓ′t′) < w (s¯ℓt)− w (s¯ℓ′t′) , (A.116)
2As¯ℓts¯ℓ′t′ − w (s¯ℓt)− w (s¯ℓ′t′) < 2As¯2ℓ′t′ − 2w (s¯ℓ′t′) , (A.117)
where s¯ℓt > s¯ℓ′t′ has been utilised to derive inequality (A.116) from (A.115). Note that inequality
(A.117) then implies π (s¯ℓ′t′ , s¯ℓ′t′) ≥ π (s¯ℓt, s¯ℓ′t′). Now imagine π (s¯ℓ′t′ , s¯ℓt) ≥ π (s¯ℓ′t′ , s¯ℓ′t′), giving
rise to:
2As¯ℓts¯ℓ′t′ − w (s¯ℓt)− w (s¯ℓ′t′) ≥ 2As¯2ℓ′t′ − 2w (s¯ℓ′t′) , (A.118)
2As¯ℓ′t′ (s¯ℓt − s¯ℓ′t′) ≥ w (s¯ℓt)− w (s¯ℓ′t′) , (A.119)
2As¯ℓt (s¯ℓt − s¯ℓ′t′) > w (s¯ℓt)− w (s¯ℓ′t′) , (A.120)
2A (s¯ℓt)
2 − 2w (s¯ℓt) > 2As¯ℓts¯ℓ′t′ − w (s¯ℓt)− w (s¯ℓ′t′) , (A.121)
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where again s¯ℓt > s¯ℓ′t′ has been utilised to derive inequality (A.120) from (A.119). Inequality
(A.121) now implies π (s¯ℓt, s¯ℓt) ≥ π (s¯ℓt, s¯ℓ′t′). Taking stock, profits from positive assortative
matching always surpass profits from cross matching, such that firms always decide to pair
workers of identical skill, i.e. s¯l = s¯ℓt.
A.28 Proof of Proposition 5.7.1
We show that in a migration equilibrium the lifetime income of all workers, i.e. wages w(s¯ℓt, s)
∀ ℓ ∈ {N,M,R} at age t = 1, 2 less the migration cost c, if applicable, is not higher than
the comparable lifetime income
∑2
t=1w(s¯t, s) = 2w(s¯, s) in a non-migration equilibrium, with
s¯t = s¯ = 1/2 being the time-constant average skill of the overall population.
Beginning with the high cost cˆ ∈ [cˆlfb , cˆlfc ) case (c) we demonstrate that
2w (s¯, s) ≥

w (s¯N1, s) + w (s¯N2, s) if s < s˜lfm,
w (s¯M1, s)− c+ w (s¯R2, s) if s ≥ s˜lfm.
(A.122)
Using the definition of w (s¯ℓt, s) in Eq. (5.20) in combination with s¯ = 1/2 ≥ s¯Nt = s˜lfm/2 ∀ t =
1, 2 and s˜lfm = cˆ from Eq. (5.26), we reduce the first inequality in Eq. (A.122) to cˆ ≤ 1, which
in case (c) with cˆ < cˆlfc = 1 always is fulfilled. Substituting s¯M1 = s¯R2 = (s˜
lf
m + 1)/2 ≥ s¯ = 1/2
and s˜lfm = cˆ from Eq. (5.26) into the second inequality in Eq. (A.122) we can solve for s ≤ 1,
which generally holds true, since s ∈ [0, 1].
Turning to the low cost cˆ ∈ [cˆlfa , bˆlfb ) case (b) we show that
2w (s¯, s) ≥

w (s¯N1, s) + w (s¯N2, s) if s < s˜lfm,
w (s¯M1, s)− c+ w (s¯R2, s) if s ∈ [s˜lfm, s˜lfr),
w (s¯M1, s)− c+ w (s¯M2, s)− c if s ≥ s˜lfr .
(A.123)
Using s¯ = 1/2 ≥ s¯Nt = s˜lfm/2 ∀ t = 1, 2 in combination with s˜lfm = (1 + 4cˆ−
√
1 + 16cˆ2)/2 from
Eq. (5.26), we transform the first inequality in Eq. (A.123) into cˆ ≥ 0, which in case (b) with
cˆ ≥ cˆlfa = 0 always is fulfilled. Note that the second inequality in Eq. (A.123) can be rewritten
as
λ (s) ≡ 1− s˜lfm −
1 + s˜lfr
2
+
cˆ
s
≥ 0, (A.124)
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where s¯ = 1/2 ≤ s¯M1 = (s˜lfm + 1)/2 and s¯R2 = (s˜lfm + s˜lfr)/2 have been used to replace s¯, s¯M1,
and s¯R2. Since λ′(s) < 0, we have λ (s) ≥ λ (1) and λ(1) ≥ 0 is sufficient for λ(s) ≥ 0. Using
s˜lfm = (1 + 4cˆ −
√
1 + 16cˆ2)/2 from Eq. (5.26) and s˜lfr = 4cˆ/(1 − 4cˆ +
√
1 + 16cˆ2) from Eq.
(5.27) we find that λ(1) ≥ 0 may equivalently be expressed as cˆ ≤ 1/3, which in case (b) with
cˆ < cˆlfb = 1/3 always is fulfilled. Replacing s¯, s¯M1, and s¯M2 in the third inequality of Eq. (A.123)
by s¯ = 1/2 ≤ s¯M1 = (s˜lfm + 1)/2 < s¯M2 = (s˜lfr + 1)/2 yields
µ (s) ≡ 4cˆ
s
− s˜lfm − s˜lfr ≥ 0. (A.125)
Since µ′(s) < 0, it is sufficient to have µ(1) ≥ 0 for µ(s) ≥ 0. Using s˜lfm = (1+4cˆ−
√
1 + 16cˆ2)/2
from Eq. (5.26) and s˜lfr = 4cˆ/(1− 4cˆ+
√
1 + 16cˆ2)/2 from Eq. (5.27) we find that µ (1) = 0 and,
hence, µ(s) ≥ 0.
A.29 Proof of Proposition 5.7.2
Using the definition of s¯ℓt in Eq. (5.23) and substituting Y from Eq. (5.28) in Eq. (5.30) we
can rewrite the social planner’s objective function as:
W (s˜m, s˜r) =

A [1 + s˜m (1− s˜m)] /2− 2 (1− s˜m) c for (a),
As˜ms˜r (s˜r − s˜m) /4 +
∑
k A [1 + s˜k (1− s˜k)] /4− (1− s˜k) c for (b),
A [1 + s˜m (1− s˜m)] /2− (1− s˜m) c for (c),
(A.126)
with k = m, r. The corresponding first order conditions then follow as
∂W (s˜m, s˜r)
∂s˜m
=
A (1− 2s˜m)
2
+ 2c
!
= 0 for (a), (A.127)
∂W (s˜m, s˜r)
∂s˜m
=
A
(
1− 2s˜m + s˜2r − 2s˜ms˜r
)
4
+ c
!
= 0 for (b), (A.128)
∂W (s˜m, s˜r)
∂s˜r
=
A
(
1− 2s˜r − s˜2m + 2s˜ms˜r
)
4
+ c
!
= 0 for (b), (A.129)
∂W (s˜m, s˜r)
∂s˜m
=
A (1− 2s˜m)
2
+ c
!
= 0 for (c). (A.130)
Since in the cases (a) and (c) the return margin is fixed to s˜r = s˜m and s˜r = 1, respectively, the
social planner only has to choose the optimal emigration cutoff s˜m, and it follows immediately
that in both cases we have s˜spm(cˆ) =
1
2 + s˜
lf
m(cˆ), where s˜
lf
m(cˆ) is defined as in Eq. (5.26). In
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the intermediate case (b) the emigration cutoff s˜spm(cˆ) and the return cutoff s˜
sp
r (cˆ) follow as the
joint solution to Eqs. (A.128) and (A.129). An explicit analytical solution to Eqs. (A.128) and
(A.129) exists. However, since the resulting expressions for s˜spm(cˆ) and s˜
sp
r (cˆ) are lengthy and
tedious to derive, we do not report them here. We rather plot them directly as a function of
the only exogenous variable cˆ in Figure 5.13. Of course we thereby have to distinguish between
the cases (a), (b), and (c), which as in the laissez-faire equilibrium are separated by the cost
thresholds cˆspa ≤ cˆspb ≤ cˆspc . Again the critical cost level cˆspc separates the high cost case (c)
from an equilibrium without migration. Using s˜spm(cˆ
sp
c ) =
1
2 + s˜
lf
m(cˆ
sp
c )
!
= 1 in combination with
s˜lfm(cˆ) = cˆ from Eq. (5.26) for case (c) we find cˆ
sp
c = 1/2. Similarly, when focusing on case (b)
we find that s˜spr (cˆ
sp
b )
!
= 1 implies cˆspb ≈ 1/20. Consistently, we find that W spb (cˆspb ) = W spc (cˆspb ),
while W spb (cˆ) > W
sp
c (cˆ) for cˆ < cˆ
sp
b , where W
sp
b (cˆ) and W
sp
c (cˆ) are the aggregate welfare levels
resulting from the substitution of s˜spm(cˆ) and s˜
sp
r (cˆ) for the cases (b) and (c) into W (s˜m, s˜r) from
Eq. (A.126). Finally, note that scenario (a) in principle is defined over cˆ < 1/4, which follows
from s˜spm(cˆ) =
1
2 + s˜
lf
m(cˆ) < 1 in combination with s˜
lf
m(cˆ) = 2cˆ from Eq. (5.26) for case (a).
However, since W spc (cˆ) > W
sp
a (cˆ) for all cˆ < 1/4 we have cˆ
sp
a = 0. Taking stock, the aggregate
welfare level in the social-planner equilibrium as depicted in Figure 5.13 then is defined as the
envelope function W sp(cˆ) = max{W spa (cˆ),W spb (cˆ),W spc (cˆ)}.
A.30 Proof of Proposition 5.8.1
Suppose individuals now live for t = 1, 2, 3 periods. We focus on skilled migration and follow the
baseline model in ruling out late emigration at age t = 3. Individual education and migration
decisions can then be summarised in Figure A.2. The four possible individual outcomes in Figure
A.2 imply an overall number of seven potential selection patterns for educated emigrants, which
we denote by:
(d) 0 < s˜e < s˜m < s˜r < 1 ⇒ imperfect selection into temporary (permanent) migration,
(e) 0 < s˜e < s˜m < s˜r = 1 ⇒ imperfect selection into temporary migration only,
(f ) 0 < s˜e < s˜m = s˜r = 1 ⇒ no selection into migration,
(g) 0 < s˜e = s˜m = s˜r < 1 ⇒ perfect selection into permanent migration only,
(h) 0 < s˜e = s˜m < s˜r = 1 ⇒ perfect selection into temporary migration only,
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Figure A.2: Education, migration and return decisions
education (E × 1)
migrate (M × 2)
education and
temporary migrationreturn (R× 3)
education and
permanent migration
stay (M × 3)
stay (N × t)
education but no
migration
no education (U × t)
neither education nor
migration
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
(i) 0 < s˜e = s˜m < s˜r < 1 ⇒ (im)perfect selection into temporary (permanent) migration,
(j) 0 < s˜e < s˜m = s˜r < 1 ⇒ (im)perfect selection into permanent migration only.
From Section 5.6 we know that for constant and equal signalling cost ce = cm = c > 0 the
signalling patterns (g) to (j) cannot exist. The only relevant scenarios are thus the cases (d),
(e), and (f ), which we discuss separately in the following. In scenario (f ) only education is used
as a signal, implying 0 < s˜e < s˜m = s˜r = 1. The critical student at age t = 1 hence has the
choice between a career as an uneducated worker (U × t) or an educated (E × 1), who stays at
home (N × t) at age t = 2, 3. The corresponding indifference condition for the marginal student
s˜e thus reads:
∆e (s˜e) ≡ w (s¯E1, s˜e) + w (s¯N2, s˜e) + w (s¯N3, s˜e)− c−
3∑
t=1
w (s¯Ut, s˜e)
!
= 0. (A.131)
Using w(s¯ℓt, s) from Eq. (5.20) and replacing s¯Ut = s˜e/2 < s¯E1 = s¯N2 = s¯N3 = (s˜e + 1)/2 we
find:
s˜lfe (cˆ) = 2cˆ/3 < s˜
lf
m (cˆ) = s˜
lf
r (cˆ) = 1 for cˆ ∈ [cˆlfe , cˆlff ). (A.132)
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In scenario (e) the most high-skilled workers with s ≥ s˜m combine education with subsequent
(temporary) migration in order to obtain a more effective signalling device. We solve the re-
sulting two-stage game by backward induction, beginning with the emigration decision at age
t = 2. For the marginal emigrant s˜m at age t = 2 indifference condition:
∆m (s˜m) ≡ w (s¯M2, s˜m) + w (s¯R3, s˜m)− c− w (s¯N2, s˜m)− w (s¯N3, s˜m) != 0 (A.133)
has to hold. Using the definition of w(s¯ℓt, s) in Eq. (5.20) and replacing s¯Nt = (s˜e + s˜m)/2 <
s¯M2 = s¯R3 = (s˜m + 1)/2 we can solve for the emigration cutoff s˜m(s˜e) as a function of the
education cutoff s˜e
s˜m (s˜e) =
cˆ
1− s˜e . (A.134)
The indifference condition for the marginal student at age t = 3 can be summarised as:
∆e (s˜e) ≡ w (s¯E1, s˜e) + w (s¯N2, s˜e) + w (s¯N3, s˜e)− c−
3∑
t=1
w (s¯Ut, s˜e)
!
= 0. (A.135)
Using the definition of w(s¯ℓt, s) in Eq. (5.20) and replacing s¯Ut = s˜e/2 < s¯Nt = (s˜e + s˜m)/2 <
s¯E1 = (s˜e+1)/2 we can rewrite this indifference condition as ∆e (s˜e) ≡ A(1+ 2s˜m)s˜e/2− c != 0,
which solves for the education cutoff:
s˜lfe (cˆ) =
(
1 + 4cˆ−
√
1 + 16cˆ2
)
/2 for cˆ ∈ [cˆlfd , cˆlfe ), (A.136)
once s˜m is replaced by s˜m(s˜e) = cˆ/(1 − s˜e) from Eq. (A.134). Substituting s˜lfe (cˆ) from Eq.
(A.136) back into s˜m(s˜e) = cˆ/(1− s˜e) from Eq. (A.134) then yields the corresponding migration
cutoff:
s˜lfm (cˆ) = 2cˆ/
(
1 + 4cˆ−
√
1 + 16cˆ2
)
for cˆ ∈ [cˆlfd , cˆlfe ). (A.137)
Finally, in case (d) with 0 < s˜e < s˜m < s˜r < 1 all workers with skills s ≥ s˜e get educated before
the most high skilled among them with s ≥ s˜m (s ≥ s˜r) emigrate temporary (permanently)
abroad. We begin with the return decision of initial emigrants at age t = 3 and solve by
backward induction. At age t = 3 worker s˜r is indifferent between returning home (R × 3) and
staying abroad (M × 3) if
∆r (s˜r) ≡ w (s¯M3, s˜r)− c− w (s¯R3, s˜r) != 0, (A.138)
209
whereas s¯R3 = (s˜m+ s˜r)/2 < s¯M3 = (s˜r +1)/2. Using the definition of w(s¯ℓt, s) in Eq. (5.20) we
can solve for
s˜r (s˜m) =
2cˆ
1− s˜m . (A.139)
At age t = 2 worker s˜m is indifferent between going abroad (M×2) and staying at home (N×2)
if
∆m (s˜m) ≡ w (s¯M2, s˜m) + w (s¯R3, s˜m)− c− w (s¯N2, s˜m)− w (s¯N3, s˜m) != 0, (A.140)
whereas s¯Nt = (s˜e + s˜m)/2 < s¯R3 = (s˜m + s˜r)/2 < s¯M2 = (s˜m + 1)/2. Using the definition of
w(s¯ℓt, s) in Eq. (5.20) and replacing s˜r by s˜r(s˜m) from Eq. (A.139) we can solve for
s˜m =
1− 2s˜e + 4cˆ−
√
1 + 16cˆ2 − 4s˜e (1− s˜e)
2 (1− 2s˜e) . (A.141)
Finally, at age t = 1 worker s˜e is indifferent between getting educated (E × 1) and staying
uneducated (U × 1) if
∆e (s˜e) ≡ w (s¯E1, s˜e) + w (s¯N2, s˜e) + w (s¯N3, s˜e)− c−
3∑
t=1
w (s¯Ut, s˜e)
!
= 0, (A.142)
whereas s¯Ut = s˜e/2 < s¯Nt = (s˜e + s˜m)/2 < s¯E1 = (s˜e + 1)/2. Using the definition of w(s¯ℓt, s) in
Eq. (5.20) and replacing s˜m by s˜m(s˜e) Eq. (A.141) we can solve for s˜lfe (cˆ). Substituting s˜
lf
e (cˆ)
back into the Eq. (A.141) then delivers s˜lfm (cˆ). Once obtained, s˜
lf
m (cˆ) from Eq. (A.141) can
then be used to replace s˜m in s˜r(s˜m) from Eq. (A.139), which finally results in s˜lfr (cˆ). Analytical
solutions for s˜lfe (cˆ), s˜
lf
m (cˆ), and s˜
lf
r (cˆ) exist, but are lengthy and tedious to derive. We, thus,
instead of reporting the cutoffs s˜lfe (cˆ), s˜
lf
m (cˆ), and s˜
lf
r (cˆ) here directly, plot them as functions of the
only exogenous variable cˆ > 0 in Figure 5.15. The cost thresholds 0 < cˆlfd < cˆ
lf
e < cˆ
lf
f , separating
the scenarios (d), (e), and (f ), thereby follow directly from the definition of the respective cases.
Using s˜lfe(cˆ) from Eq. (A.132) we find that s˜
lf
e(cˆ
lf
f ) = 2cˆ
lf
f /3
!
= 1 implies cˆlff = 3/2. Similarly,
s˜lfm(cˆ
lf
e )
!
= 1 with s˜lfm(cˆ) from Eq. (A.137) yields cˆ
lf
e = 3/5. Finally, s˜
lf
r(cˆ
lf
d )
!
= 1 with s˜lfr(cˆ) for
scenario (d) solves for cˆlfd ≈ 3/10.
A.31 Derivation of Eqs. (5.26′′) and (5.27′′)
Note that discounting has no effect on individuals’ return decision at age t = 2. Hence, as in the
baseline model, the return cutoff s˜r(s˜m) is linked to the emigration cutoff s˜r through Eq. (5.22).
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The emigration decision at age t = 1, on the contrary, crucially depends on how individuals
value future costs and benefits. Modifying the indifference condition in Eq. (5.24) accordingly
we find that the net gain from emigration can be written as:
∆m (s˜m) =

w (s¯M1, s˜m) + δw (s¯M2, s˜m)− (1 + δ)c− w (s¯N1, s˜m)− δw (s¯N2, s˜m) (a),
w (s¯M1, s˜m) + δw (s¯R2, s˜m)− c− w (s¯N1, s˜m)− δw (s¯N2, s˜m) (b),
w (s¯M1, s˜m) + δw (s¯R2, s˜m)− c− w (s¯N1, s˜m)− δw (s¯N2, s˜m) (c),
(A.143)
whereas ∆m (s˜m)
!
= 0 has to hold for the critical emigrant s˜m. Using the definition of w(s¯ℓt, s)
in Eq. (5.20) in combination with s¯ℓt ∀ ℓ ∈ {N,M,R} and t = 1, 2 from Eq. (5.23) then allows
us to recover s˜lfm (cˆ, δ) in Eq. (5.26
′′) separately for the cases (a), (b), and (c). Replacing s˜m in
s˜r(s˜m) = 2cˆ/(1− s˜m) from Eq. (5.22) by s˜lfm (cˆ, δ) from Eq. (5.26′′) then finally yields s˜lfm (cˆ, δ)
as given in Eq. (5.27′′).
A.32 Proof of Proposition 6.4.1
The indirect utility of Home’s median voter V (p, s˜, s˘∗) is given by
V (p, s˜, s˘∗) =
1
P (p, 1)
− p
P (p, 1)
A
[ ∫ 1
s˜ f (s) dsL∫ 1
s˜ f (s) dsL+
∫ 1
s˘∗ f (s
∗) ds∗L∗
β
∫ 1
s˜
(s− s˜) f (s) ds
]
− p
P (p, 1)
A
[ ∫ 1
s˘∗ f (s
∗) ds∗L∗∫ 1
s˜ f (s) dsL+
∫ 1
s˘∗ f (s
∗) ds∗L∗
β
∫ 1
s˘∗
(s∗ − s˜) f (s∗) ds∗
]
,
(A.144)
in which P (p, 1) denotes the aggregate price index, which is increasing in p. The first term at the
right hand side of (A.144) reflects real income, the second term is disutility from comparing to
other natives,
∫ 1
s˜ f (s) dsL, while the last term measures disutility from comparing to migrants,∫ 1
s˘∗ f (s
∗) ds∗L∗. The median voter supports migration if V (pm, s˜m, s˘∗) > V (pa, s˜a, 1). Assuming
f(s) = f(s∗)1 this inequality can be expressed as:
1
P (pa, 1)
− p
a
P (pa, 1)
β
∫ 1
s˜a
(s− s˜a) f (s) ds < 1
P (pm, 1)
− p
m
P (pm, 1)
β (A.145)[
(1− s˜m)L
(1− s˜m)L+ (1− s˘m)L∗
∫ 1
s˜m
s− s˜mds+ (1− s˘
m)L∗
(1− s˜m)L+ (1− s˘m)L∗
∫ 1
s˘m
s− s˜mds
]
, (A.146)
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which simplifies to 12 (1− s˜a)2 > 12 [1− (s˘∗)2]− (1− s˘∗) s˜m. Defining the right hand side of this
inequality as ξ (s˘∗) ≡ 12 [1 − (s˘∗)2] − (1− s˘∗) s˜m and noting that ξ′ (s˘∗) = s˜m − s˘∗ < 0 we get
1
2 (1− s˜a)2 > 12 (1− s˜m)2 > 12 [1− (s˘∗)]− (1− s˘∗) s˜m which holds for all s˜m < s˘∗ as s˜a < s˜m.
B Empirical appendix
B.1 Data description and summary statistics
We source our data from the following providers: The data on (nominal) output at the in-
dustry level stem from the OECD’s STAN database. Deflation of output for the calcula-
tion of the real growth rate control is done with industry specific producer price indices ob-
tained from the German Statistical Office. Industry competition for 2005 is taken from the
Monopoly Commission’s annual report to the Federal German government and can be accessed
at http://www.monopolkommission.de/haupt.html. The input output tables used in the cal-
culation of the offshoring indices are part of the national accounts provided by the German Sta-
tistical Office at https://www.destatis.de/EN/Homepage.html. Data on industry level trade
and output are taken from the OECD STAN data base, as are the export shares in production.
Table 8.1 summarizes all variables in our final sample of 3,917 individuals which are full-
time employed in manufacturing. More than half (59%) of the respondents participated in
on-the-job training. Of those who participated, 42% did so by own initiative. We can group
individuals into five age groups, with the average worker being of age 42 having 14 years of tenure.
Unsurprisingly, the majority of workers (76%) in manufacturing are male. We classify workers
according to their education as high-skilled (university degree), medium-skilled (degree from a
technical school, e.g. the German “Meister”) and low-skilled (all residual workers). The majority
of workers (68%) are classified as low-skilled, less are high- (21%) or medium-skilled (11%). Of
the respondents 17% stated that having a career is important for them. Only a small fraction of
all workers held a fixed term contract (6%) or were just temporarily employed (1%). Among all
workers 10 % answered that they face the fear of job loss. We classify employers according to the
number of employees and distinguish between five groups: firms with 1 - 9, 10 - 49, 50 - 249, 250
- 499 and more than 500 employees. The majority of firms (90%) introduced new technologies
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Table 8.1: Summary statistics: estimation sample
Variables share mean st. dev.
Individual characteristics
On-the-job training 0.586 - -
Thereof by own initiative 0.421 - -
Age - 42.06 10.06
16 - 29 0.117 - -
30 - 39 0.297 - -
40 - 49 0.345 - -
50 - 64 0.231 - -
≥ 65 0.010 - -
Education
Low 0.677 - -
Medium 0.109 - -
High 0.214 - -
Further individual characteristics
Important to have a career 0.173 - -
Fixed term contract 0.055 - -
Temporary work 0.011 - -
Job loss fear 0.103 - -
Female 0.241 - -
Tenure 13.66 9.621
Employer size (# of employees)
1 - 9 0.109 - -
10 - 49 0.183 - -
50 - 249 0.246 - -
250 - 499 0.132 - -
≥ 500 0.332 - -
Further employer characteristics
New technology introduced 0.896 - -
Current firm success (very) good 0.805 - -
Industry characteristics
Offshoring growth 2004 - 2006 - .325 0.393
Output growth 2004 - 2006 - 0.079 0.114
Herfindahl index (x 1,000) 2005 - 60.363 83.684
Number of observations 3,917
during the sample period. Overall the employing firm’s success was largely seen as good or very
good; 81% of the respondents answered in this way. Industry output growth is the growth of
real output, calculated as log-difference. The Herfindahl index of industry concentration is the
sum of the squared market shares of all market participants in the respective 2-digit NACE 1.1
industry.
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Table 8.2: Summary statistics: offshoring
j Industry classification Oj Ôj j Industry classification Oj Ôj
35 Other transport equip. 0.82 152.65 22 Publishing, printing 0.047 26.68
34 Motor vehicles 0.37 95.47 30 Office, computing mach. 8.17 23.76
27 Basic metals 2.15 86.07 15 Food, beverages 0.54 22.88
33 Medical, optical, precision instr. 0.61 52.01 29 Machinery, equipment 1.71 20.63
28 Fabricated metal prod. 0.30 39.38 20 Wood, cork prod. 1.02 19.23
25 Rubber, plastic 0.16 34.81 26 Non-metallic mineral prod. 0.31 13.31
24 Chemicals 0.83 34.32 36 Furniture 3.20 10.49
16 Tobacco 0.11 31.67 17 Textiles 4.63 8.03
18 Wearing apparel 5.60 30.45 32 Radio, television, comm. 9.83 5.36
19 Leather, luggage 7.70 29.27 31 Electrical machinery 1.52 4.19
21 Paper 0.49 27.79 23 Coke, refined petroleum 0.456 -52.44
Notes: The offshoring intensity Oj (in percent) is calculated for 2004. Offshoring growth Ôj (in percent) is
calculated over the time span from 2004 to 2006. Industries are ranked in decreasing order according to the
magnitude of sectoral offshoring growth.
Industry level offshoring is calculated as described in Eq. (4.7). For the industries 15-16,
17-19, and 21-22 the OECD STAN bilateral trade data base only holds information on combined
non-OECD trade flows. We hence use the same share of non-OECD imports in total imports
for the individual industries within each of the three aggregates and multiply them with total
STAN imports, for which we have industry specific data in all cases. Checking the robustness of
this approach, we dropped the respective sectors and still found our results presented in section
4.2.3 to be similarly sized and statistically significant. Table 8.2 gives an overview of offshoring
intensities across industries, both in levels and growth rates.
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Table 8.3: Offshoring and on-the-job training: robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
import pen. with exports weighted no small ind. no 35 and 32 no 24 no 17 own initiative
Average marginal effect of:
Offshoring growth 0.2423*** 0.0815*** 0.0626*** 0.0748*** 0.0850*** 0.0827*** 0.0763***
(0.0664) (0.0214) (0.0192) (0.0245) (0.0229) (0.0191) (0.0203)
Age 30 - 39 -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0306 -0.0016 -0.0033 0.0058 0.0171
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0235) (0.0203) (0.0205) (0.0196) (0.0287)
Age 40 - 49 -0.0505** -0.0501** -0.0599** -0.0462* -0.0475** -0.0420* -0.0091
(0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0296) (0.0241) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.0308)
Age 50 - 64 -0.1406*** -0.1380*** -0.1602*** -0.1376*** -0.1318*** -0.1346*** -0.0875**
(0.0278) (0.0282) (0.0327) (0.0288) (0.0289) (0.0296) (0.0362)
Age 65+ -0.3362*** -0.3338*** -0.3759*** -0.3343*** -0.3394*** -0.3256*** -0.1713***
(0.0573) (0.0568) (0.0618) (0.0577) (0.0620) (0.0616) (0.0558)
Female -0.0678*** -0.0678*** -0.1032*** -0.0645*** -0.0687*** -0.0655*** -0.0468**
(0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0198) (0.0187) (0.0205) (0.0222) (0.0194)
Married -0.0103 -0.0104 -0.0068 -0.0129 -0.0114 -0.0012 -0.0092
(0.0215) (0.0214) (0.0243) (0.0214) (0.0226) (0.0242) (0.0227)
Tenure 0.0028 0.0028 0.0040 0.0027 0.0029 0.0008 -0.0015
(0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0032) (0.0051)
Tenure squared -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Medium-skill 0.0363 0.0346 0.0246 0.0343 0.0308 0.0221 0.1134***
(0.0353) (0.0344) (0.0336) (0.0351) (0.0359) (0.0353) (0.0411)
High-skill -0.0002 0.0026 -0.0295 -0.0026 0.0006 0.0178 0.0253
(0.0213) (0.0216) (0.0249) (0.0218) (0.0234) (0.0213) (0.0242)
Importance to have a career 0.0655*** 0.0633*** 0.0632*** 0.0613*** 0.0601*** 0.0568*** 0.0808***
(0.0208) (0.0204) (0.0235) (0.0207) (0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0203)
Firm size 10 - 49 -0.0167 -0.0181 -0.0029 -0.0239 -0.0148 -0.0192 -0.1247***
(0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0245) (0.0218) (0.0212) (0.0219) (0.0360)
Firm size 50 - 249 0.0533*** 0.0505*** 0.0690*** 0.0488*** 0.0546*** 0.0401*** -0.0561***
(0.0168) (0.0162) (0.0259) (0.0162) (0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0217)
Firm size 250 - 499 0.1021*** 0.0977*** 0.0874** 0.0914*** 0.1014*** 0.1007*** -0.0260
(0.0290) (0.0277) (0.0387) (0.0289) (0.0288) (0.0304) (0.0243)
Firm size 500+ 0.1290*** 0.1203*** 0.1041** 0.1152*** 0.1115*** 0.1119*** 0.0309
(0.0234) (0.0241) (0.0464) (0.0239) (0.0233) (0.0272) (0.0351)
Fixed term contract -0.0790** -0.0794** -0.0637 -0.0801** -0.0788** -0.0993*** -0.0985***
(0.0342) (0.0330) (0.0456) (0.0331) (0.0343) (0.0334) (0.0331)
Temporary work 0.0392 0.0418 0.0506 0.0156 0.0680 0.0445 0.0375
(0.0522) (0.0527) (0.0932) (0.0574) (0.0534) (0.0545) (0.0957)
Job loss fear -0.0517** -0.0511** -0.0616** -0.0525** -0.0562*** -0.0481** -0.0426
(0.0215) (0.0209) (0.0299) (0.0212) (0.0208) (0.0210) (0.0327)
New technology introduced 0.1637*** 0.1646*** 0.1488*** 0.1633*** 0.1687*** 0.1676*** 0.1293***
(0.0220) (0.0215) (0.0269) (0.0218) (0.0224) (0.0221) (0.0285)
Current firm success (very) good 0.0341* 0.0393** 0.0401 0.0396** 0.0446** 0.0405* 0.0471**
(0.0203) (0.0198) (0.0246) (0.0193) (0.0204) (0.0210) (0.0188)
Herfindahl index 0.0010*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0004**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Growth in export share of prod. 0.1904
(0.1495)
KldB88 (2-digit) occupation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.1397 0.1395 0.1383 0.1393 0.1393 0.1279 0.2207
Observations 3888 3888 3888 3,845 3,685 3,421 2,623
Notes: The table shows average marginal effects from estimating variants of the Probit model specified in section
4.2.1. The reference category for firm size is 1 - 9 employees. The industry output growth is compute for 2004 to
2006. The Herfindahl index, which is published bi-annually by the German Monopoly Commission refers to 2005.
Individual controls are the same as in column (6) of Table 4.1. Industry level controls are as in Table 4.2. Export
share in production is taken from the OECD STAN data base. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level
and shown in parentheses below the coefficients. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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